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SUMMARY 
This is an ethnographic study of police patrol work. Its 
central concern is to explore how patrol work is socially 
constructed by the organisational actors performing this task - 
the uniformed police constables. 
The thesis is divided into three main sections: Part One, 
as a whole, provides a critical exposition of the relevant 
literature. Chapter One examines the emergence of a sociology 
of the police. Chapter Two advances a "realist" conception of 
police work through an examination of previous literature, 
leading to a critical discussion of the various definitions of 
policing in Chapter Three. Chapter Four argues that the patrol 
officer's work world is best understood by examining the 
interrelation of three primary themes: the occupational culture 
of the lower ranks, the organisational milieu in which the 
constable works, and the specific environment in which policing 
takes place. 
Part Two argues that the primary concern of patrol officers 
is the avoidance of trouble, both fron the public they police 
and from the organisation in which they work. This theme is 
taken up in Chapter Six which seeks to explore the tensions that 
arise from this central concern with trouble and how it results 
in the peculiar configuration of working rules and practices. 
In Part Three, attention is focused on how patrol work is 
performed on the street. The first chapter starts with an 
examination of the communications system and how it affects 
patrol work. In Chapter Eight we empirically examine the 
resources which patrol officers utilise to achieve control of 
incidents. The final chapter explores how officers resolve the 
incidents with which they are called to deal. 
A methodological appendix is attached which details how the 
study was carried out and the ethical implications arising from 
such a study. 
This thesis is dedicated to all my teachers 
especially Frederick John Norris (1926-1986). 
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PREFACE 
My entry into the backstage world of policing has been 
marked by events which, although outside of my control, have 
had a significant impact on both this study of police work and 
police work itself. The day that I started fieldwork in Surrey, 
the PSI report on policing in the Metropolis was published. 
That evening, the banner headline in the London Evening Standard 
read: "Racist, Sexist, Drunken says their own report" - not an 
auspicious beginning for a researcher who, from that day, was 
living in a police section house and trying his best to 
neutralise the negative and, to some, threatening, image of 
being a student of sociology! 
Same six months later, I started work at another fieldwork 
site, this time in the Met. On my second day, another Standard 
headline brought news of a more tragic policing event: "Wounded 
Policewoman Dies in Hospital", read the headline; below, the 
text read, "WPC Yvonne Fletcher from C division was killed while 
on duty at a demonstration outside the Libyan Embassy. Two 
bullets hit her in the stomach ..... The shots came from inside 
the Embassy. " (17 April 1984). For the next few weeks, the 
station was run by a skeleton staff as so many officers were 
taken to provide cover at the Embassy. 
Both these events accompanied and gave impetus to major 
changes in the administration of the Metropolitan Police. In 
the Autumn of 1985, the management structure was significantly 
decentralised with the creation of eight districts covering the 
whole of the Metropolitan area. Each district was given 
substantially increased autonomy from central control. In 1986, 
after a major review of the Force's capacity to handle large 
scale incidents and serious public order disturbances, it was 
decided to disband the Special Patrol Group which had always 
been centrally controlled and, also, the locally based Instant 
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Response Units. In their place, each new district was to have a 
Territorial Support Group which would combine the functions of 
the disbanded units. 
On January lst, 1984, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
was passed through Parliament. The provisions of this Act 
significantly altered the powers and procedures used in every 
day police work. 
What effect these changes will have on patrol work is yet 
to be seen. Although, not wishing to dismiss their 
significance, particularly the decentralisation of managerial 
responsibility, the evidence fran this study suggests that, in 
the short term, the effect of these changes will be minimal. 
1984 saw other events which had a more day to day effect on 
the nature of policing during my fieldwork. The anti-nuclear 
missile protests at the American airbase at Greenham Common and, 
more importantly, the coal dispute, both resulted in a massive 
and prolonged drain of 'manpower' fran the stations in which I 
was working. 
Fuelled by these factors, the political debate surrounding 
police accountability to Local Authorities was also becoming 
increasingly heated and vociferous. 
Such was the turbulent nature of the political and policing 
environment during the period of my fieldwork. However, these 
factors provide the backcloth rather than the foreground of this 
study. While history was playing out its course, patrol work 
continued unabated and this is a study of that work. Emergency 
calls were still answered, officers still stopped those they 
regarded as suspicious, continued to issue traffic citations and 
helped find lost children. 
Accordingly, the focus of this study is on the routine 
aspects of day to day patrol work. It seeks to elucidate 
the manner in which such work is structured, understood and 
achieved by uniformed police constables. It attempts to see 
the environment which is policed and the organisation in which 
policing is carried out through the eyes of the patrol officer. 
A necessary component of this task, was to suspend my 
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judgement about what I saw and heard, particularly when I found 
it personally distasteful. I, therefore, did not seek to 
criticise what I witnessed, either at the time or in this 
report. Some may condemn my approach as blinkered, one-sided 
and offering legitimacy to beliefs and practices which they, 
themselves, condemn. My reply is that such an approach would 
have prevented me from the task of trying to unravel how 
policing is actually achieved. I believe, and others are at 
liberty to disagree, that, if any significant changes are to 
come about in the practice of policing, they will have to 
appreciate and take into account how that work is performed and 
the values and beliefs of those who carry it out. For, 
otherwise, a lack of understanding will lead to inappropriate 
and ineffectual reforms which will have more effect on the 
rhetoric of policing than on the reality itself. If this sounds 
like an apology from someone who has been hoodwinked or "gone 
native", then what follows serves as my denial. 
A note to the reader. 
For reasons of anonymity, the areas in which I worked have 
been given pseudonyms. Kimberley refers to the two 
Metropolitian research sites and Fakeston to the one in Surrey. 
As this is not a comparative study when I have talked about 
force organisation I am refering to the Metropolitian Police 
unless otherwise stated. Where data is not specifically 
attributed to a particular research site, it may have emanated 
from either. Of course, the names of all persons and places 
have been changed. 
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PART I 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF POLICE VJRK: THE LITERATURE 
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Chapter 1 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE POLICE: TOWARDS A 
SOCIOLOGY OF POLICING 
Any commentator on the police is i iediately faced with a 
minefield of political, epistemological and theoretical disputes. 
This is hardly surprising. The history of sociology itself is 
rent with disagreements about the nature of power, authority and 
social control (Lukes, 1978). The police institution, central to 
the control apparatus of modern industrial societies, cannot be 
insulated from such debates. Indeed, the debates frame the very 
issues that are raised, the questions that are asked and answers 
that are posited. Within criminology, it is possible to discern 
four major positions fran which the police institution has been 
approached: Traditional, Interactionist, Radical and Realist. To 
a degree, they each represent an historical development from one 
phase to another. However, breaks are never clean cut, strands 
survive, positions merge and diverge. 
Traditional Criminology 
Traditional criminology largely ignored the police, 
accepting their role as self evident and non problematic. 
Mannheim's major text book on criminology, published in 1965, has 
no discussion on the police institution and, as late as 1970, 
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Hood and Sparks' 'Key Issues in Criminology' manages but nine 
pages on the law enforcement process. (Mannheim, 1965; Hood and 
Sparks, 1970). This absence of attention on the police in echoed 
Britain the American experience of the nineteen forties and 
fifties. Essentially, criminological theory was concerned with 
why men broke the law. Neither law, nor enforcement seemed 
relevant to this discussion: Merton's Anomie Theory (1938); 
Sutherland's Differential Association (1956); Cohen's (1955) and 
Cloward and Ohlin's Strain Theory (1961), all share the same 
problematic (Box, 1981). Humans were regarded by nature as 
conforming creatures, so that some special event had to intervene 
to lure the naturally obedient into ccmnitting criminal acts; 
whether it be associating with the wrong types, or failure to 
achieve at school, the commitment to conventional values was 
presumed to have lessened. 
It was assumed that the relationship between the police and 
the law was symmetrical. Criminology paid little attention as to 
how and why criminal sanctions came to be invoked by the police 
against certain kinds of behaviour and not others. Nor did it 
ask whether sanctions were applied equally to individuals engaged 
in similar infractions. In fact, even where this problem was 
raised by Merton (1938) or Terrance Morris (1957), they asserted 
that police records did, in fact, adequately represent the 
distribution of criminally sanctionable behaviour, specifically 
that of the lower classes. Attention was not, therefore, focused 
upon organisational policy or the practice of enforcement. 
In Britain, the treatment of the police was informed by an 
implicitly consensual or social pathological perspective on those 
whom they policed (Cf: Reith, 1938; Hart, 1955; Critchley, 1978). 
As Brogden (1981) points out, these provide a 'history from 
above' and as such miss out the conflictual role surrounding the 
development of the Police, since they are unable to theorise 
class based conflict (Brogden, 1981: 208). It was not necessary 
for these cannentators to theorise the role of the police beyond 
that of a civilising institution, as the relationship between the 
police and the state was seen in terms of a naive pluralist 
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model: the police merely functioning as the impartial agents of 
the state, neutrally implementing the law. 
The police institution was either iqnored or seen as 
non-problematic in Traditional criminology. The decisive break 
was heralded by the publication in 1963 of Howard Becker's 
"Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance". Although the 
ideas were not new, Lenert (1951)had been saying much the same a 
decade earlier, the result was a radical re-orientation of the 
criminological agenda, both in scope and in method. 
Interactionist Sociology 
The schism which Becker Is work precipitated did not occur in 
a vacuum. American sociology itself was undergoing a major 
re-orientation. The natural science model of American 
positivism, committed to a more or less deterministic causal 
account of social life through quantitative research techniques, 
was increasingly under attack. The movement is probably best 
summed up by the title of Homans' paper "Bringing Men Back In" 
(1964) , although the groundwork for the attack was laid in Dennis 
Wrong's article "The Oversocialised Conception of Man" (1961). 
In Kuhnian terms, a paradigm shift was occurring; although not 
one that would ever be ccoplete, since the nature of the problem 
ultimately rests on two competing sociological traditions, one of 
system and the other of action (Dave, 1970). Becker's simple and 
even trite assertion that "Deviant behaviour is that which is so 
labelled" signalled a radical recasting of the criminological 
agenda. What had previously been taken for granted was now up in 
the air for debate and examination. A torrent of questions 
emerged. By focusing on deviancy, the remit of the studies was 
widened to include rule and norm infraction, and not just 
infractions of the criminal law. This inevitably raised 
questions as to why and how some deviant acts were seen as 
criminal while others were not, and implicitly raised the 
possibility of analysing why some social groups were able to 
assert their power in order to criminalise others. 
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Due to methodological and theoretical preferences, the main 
focus of attention became the process of definition that 
individual actors brought to bear in particular situations. The 
rates of deviant behaviour were seen to be produced by the 
actions of persons within the social system who define, classify 
and record behaviours as deviant. These actions themselves were 
seen as worthy of study and therefore attention was directed to 
the role of the agencies and agents of the social control system. 
From this perspective, deviant behaviour is that which is 
organisationally defined and processed as abnormal by particular 
actors in the social system who have the power so to define 
(Kituse and Cicourel, 1963). 
The police were identified as the most powerful group of 
definers and thus their role in the process of creating and 
sustaining deviant definitions through the application of 
negative sanctions became highly pertinent. Further, the police 
are the 'agency' through which the most consequential of deviant 
labels are applied, criminal sanctions. As the word 'agency' 
suggests, they are active in producing these definitions and, as 
such, they are produced through the interaction with those who 
can be potentially labelled. From the Interactionist point of 
view, it is, however, not the quality of the act that is 
important to understanding deviancy, but the label that is 
applied to the act and, therefore, police definitional practices 
must become open to scrutiny. 
If such practices were to be opened up it also required a 
methodology to suit. The tools of positivistic quantitative 
sociological research were fashioned to provide answers to 
questions steaming from macro-sociological issues. What Becker, 
Hughes and Wrong, among others, were asserting was that such 
concepts were misconceived in sociology and criminology alike. 
The project of bringing 'meaning' back in brought with it a 
distrust of treating society as a reified object. Social life is 
constituted in the flux and flow of everyday life. It is 
emergent, and its outcome cannot be determined without detailed 
observation. Douglas speaks for the tradition as a whole when he 
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maintains: 
Life is too immensely complex, too uncertain, too 
conflictual and too changing for any set of abstract and 
predefined rules to specify activity that will have 
results seen as adequate to the individual actors 
(Douglas, 1970: 20). 
Instead, they were methodologically committed to reproducing 
scenes fron social life as experienced by their participants. 
The task was therefore limited and yet broad in scope. Limited 
because it demanded detailed, or, to use Geertz's phrase, "Thick 
Description" (1973)of particular social phenomena. The aim was 
modest, not on a plane with high sociology to produce grand 
theory, but to produce partial accounts. They were necessarily 
partial because the sociologist could not claim any privileged 
access to knowledge, and also because the riches and diversity of 
the social world demanded respecting the integrity of the 
differing meaning systems found within it (Rock, 1979). 
If such a task was limited in its aim, preferring middle 
range concepts such as 'career', it was broad in the range of 
phenomena it could study. The social world of the jazz musician 
(Becker, 1963); that of the poolplayer (Polsky, 1967); of casual 
homosexual encounters, (Humphreys, 1975); and of the subterranean 
world of the receiver of stolen goods (Klockars, 1974) all became 
the subject of intensive situated study. So too did the police. 
At first, situational studies emerged of police / public 
encounters, informed directly by the central concern of 
labelling. This, mainly American research, focused on such 
aspects as the police and juveniles, (Piliavin and Briar, 1964; 
Werthman and Piliavin, 1967) or on the relations of the police 
with the under-classes, (Bitther, 1967; Chapman, 1970) aal, 
although such studies continued, they gave way to more detailed 
organisational studies. Skolnick's "Justice Without Trial", 
(1975) Rubinstein's "City Police" (1973), and van Maanen's work 
on police socialisation, for instance, (1973,1978a) 
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substantially uncovered the police organisational and 
occupational cultures. 
As Sherman notes (1980), the result of opening up the police 
to sociological gaze was indeed a substantial increase in the 
knowledge available about policing. The sociological abstracts 
list 75 articles published between 1959-68, and between 1969 and 
1978 the volume increased fourfold to 323. However, once 
Pandora's box was opened, the central concerns of deviancy 
theory, although still influential, gave way to new issues. The 
police became interesting in their own right and studies emerged 
on both sides of the Atlantic. 
The Rise of the New Criminology 
In Britain, at least, the sociology of the police almost 
failed to emerge. In fact, in twenty years, there have only been 
six major first-hand studies of actual police practice: Banton 
(1964); Cain (1973); Manning (1977); Chatterton (1975); Holdaway 
(1983) ;P. S. I. (1983). Of these Cain and Banton' fieldwork was 
carried out in the early nineteen-sixties. Manning's work is 
based on limited observation, but grounded in his vast American 
experience. Although Chatterton's Ph. D has not been published, 
there are a number of insightful papers available by him, albeit 
spanning observation work of more than fifteen years. 
Holdaway suggests the reason for this hesistant emergence 
is fourfold. First, unlike in the U. S. A., there was no major 
institutional research inititiative fran the Home Office or the 
criminological institutes. Second, there was a reluctance among 
British sociologists to spend lengthy periods involved in 
fieldwork. Third, the police themselves were not particularly 
amenable to being researched. Finally, the "New Criminology" 
altered the criminological agenda making such studies seem 
marginal (Holdaway, 1979: 1-13). 
It seems to me that it is this last point which is most 
pertinent. The issues originally raised by Becker, - in lay 
Page 7 
terms, who makes the rules, who breaks the rules and who enforces 
the rules - were recast and the emphasis shifted fron enactment 
to inception. As a result, a new set of problems emerged and a 
new methodology and epistemology were called into play, demanding 
such macro-sociological concepts as class, state and society. 
For the interactionist, such concepts were viewed as illegitimate 
since they were static, independent variables. The 
Interactionists' conception of social structure was dynamic and 
inter-subjectively constituted. In this they follow Shu/tz and 
Weber in emphasising that the reification of everyday concepts 
like state and society, individual and class must be avoided. 
Social abstracts must be reduced to their concrete social core, 
as Weber states: 
...... in sociology concepts like "state", "co-operative", 
"feudalism" and similiar ones, in general designate 
categories of specific kinds of human interaction; this 
is its task to reduce then to 'understandable actions' 
and this means without exception, the actions of specific 
individuals. (Weber, cited in Wagner; 1973). 
The important point here is that 
'society' again as an abstraction 
(Marx, 1973: 137) as this rcerely 
"Ss must avoid 
vis a vis the 
reifies human 
postulating 
individual" 
actions into 
monolithic structures. 
For Taylor, Walton and Young this position leads to a 
"bracketing away" of the "social totality" which produces 
deviancy (1973: 208). They therefore turned their attention, and 
that of British Criminology as a whole, towards constructing a 
Marxian theory of deviancy. Similarly, Cain (1979) has argued 
that a political sociology of the police failed to emerge due to 
the myopic vision of those theorists who concerned themselves 
with the police. Because they grounded their explanations in the 
organisation and generated low level propositions about the 
nature and variety of police institutions, they were unable to 
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Trove beyond the organisation as a unit of analysis. For Cain, 
interactionist studies, including her own, were blinkered. They 
were merely the icing on the cake and failed to examine what the 
police role was. Although Cain is right in suggesting that a 
fully political sociology of the police did not emerge, she is 
surely wrong in laying the blame at the feet of a handful of 
organisational theorists, particularly in Britain. Radical 
criminology itself precluded the answer, along with practically 
every other question that might be interesting to ask about the 
police in their role as police. 
In the early work of the New Criminology (Taylor, Walton & 
Young, 1973/1975) the emphasis of their critique of existing 
criminology was that it had failed to ask or to answer the 
question of who rules and why? This gave greater emphasis to 
Becker's original question and located the answer in political 
economy (Taylor, Walton & Young, 1973: 270). It was assumed 
that there was an identity between the economic base and the 
various state agencies. This is an instrumentalist version of 
the state, with the police, the education system, and so on, seen 
as nothing more than the tools of the dominant class. As Jock 
Young makes clear in his latter day self-critique: "The 
institutional structure is seen to be a seamless web of 
institutions which are unambiguously supportive of capitalism. " 
(Young, 1979: 14). There is, then, an isomorphic relationship 
between the dominant class, the state and its institutions. 
This being the case, there is no need to actually examine the 
process which generates crime control. 
This position is exemplified in Young's work on drug takers 
and the police in the Notting Hill Gate area of London (Young, 
1971). Using a model of deviancy amplification adapted from 
Wilkins (1971), Young argues that social control by the police 
served to amplify and increase drug use. In Young's account, 
however, the police as actors are absent. They are straw men 
pushed and pulled by forces outside of their own control. In the 
absence of any concrete actors, agency seems to rest with the 
unspecified effect of the media, with the drug takers responding 
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to an abstract and undefined social reaction. 
The mission of the New Criminology was taken up by the 
Centre for Contempory Cultural Studies, then under the 
directorship of Stuart Hall. As Downes & Rock (1982) point out, 
"Policing the Crisis" (Hall, 1978) is the nearest to the fully 
social theory that Taylor, Walton & Young demanded in their New 
Criminology. Hall et al develop a more sophisticated version of 
the relationship between the state, its functionaries, and the 
dominant made of production. In fact, its authors criticise the 
earlier radical criminology for having "..... no theory of the 
state... (and that)-state power through the operation of law is 
acknowledged only formally, and its mode of operation is treated 
as unproblematic. " (Hall, 1978: 194). 
The problem of isomorphism is confronted by recourse to 
Gramsci, and the structualist Marxism of Althusser and 
Poulantzas. The state is conceived, not as the direct expression 
of the dominant class interest, but as the site of the struggle 
between the classes. It is "relatively autononous" from the 
dominant class, continually in flux and only determined in the 
last instance. When the relationship changes between the 
classes, so will the constellation of forces represented in the 
state. At present, the key shift has been f ram the dominance of 
private capital to that of monopoly capital, with the state, 
therefore, having to play an increasingly interventionist role. 
Thus differing economic stages give rise to a varied reaction on 
the part of state agencies. However, such intervention cannot be 
conceived as occurring because of a correspondence between the 
mode of production, the form of state and the character of law; 
because of the "uneven character between the differing levels of 
state and social formation" (Hall, 1978: 197). 
When interventions do occur, it is either through the 
ideological state apparatus (e. g., the educational, religious, 
welfare and media bodies) or through the repressive state 
apparatus (e. g., the police and the army). It is, of course, 
more convenient if the reproduction of labour, and the production 
of consent can be achieved at the ideological level, as Hall et 
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al express it: 
The capitalist state functions best when it operates 
normally through leadership and consent for then the 
state was free to undertake its more educative and 
ethical role, drawing the whole edifice of social life 
progressively into conformity with the productive sphere 
(Hall, 1978: 207). 
The mechanism for this is hegemony, the power of a dominant 
class to project its own peculiar way of seeing the world so that 
this is accepted as part of the natural order of things by those 
who are in effect subordinated to it. It is on this level that 
"Policing the Crisis" operates, and, as such, it is not actually 
about policing, but the manufacturing of a false consensus 
through the ideological state apparatus. Mugging becomes the 
vehicle through which the state seeks to promote unity and 
justify the interventionism required by nonopoly capital. 
There are numerous problems associated with such a position; 
not least that there can be no empirical disconfirmation of the 
thesis. If the police adopt an increasing militaristic role or 
if over night they all became 'community bobbies', the result 
would be the sane, merely the most convenient way of achieving 
hegemony. The result is that police work is hidden from view, 
and known without looking. This is no accident, because crime 
and its control are seen as epiphenomena which reside in the 
world of appearances, whereas the real explanation for crima must 
be found in the world of essences. The phenomenal world gives 
way to the noumenal (Rock, 1979). The ultimate result of such a 
position is that: 
There is no 'Marxist theory of deviancy' either in 
existence, or which can be developed within orthodox 
Marxism. Crime and deviancy vanish into the general 
theoretical concerns of Marxism (Hirst, 1975: 204). 
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Young, in partial rejection of his early position, has 
termed the dominant trend as "Left Idealism". The central tenet 
is that social control is maintained by a series of "coercive 
institutions structured together in a functional fashion" (Young, 
1979: 13). As we have seen with the Gramscian theory of the 
state, coercion can be manifest or latent, and the distinction is 
irrelevant because the potential is always available. Coercion 
is equally present in the manufacture and maintenence of false 
consensus, whether by the school, the welfare agencies or the 
police. Behind the velvet glove, lies the iron fist: if the 
former is unsuccessful, the latter can always be used. As Young 
states in relation to the New Criminolgy, its stress is on: 
... the illusionary nature of appearances: that concensus 
masks coercion: that crime statistics are a sheer fiction 
hiding the criminality of the rich: treatment is a cloak 
for punishment: the universality of law is a rhetoric 
which hides particularism (Young, 1979: 16). 
The result is that attention on the police has not been 
fostered. It is not necessary to try and map out what police 
work is actually about or how it is achieved since the result is 
the same. If a patrol officer uses various non-coercive 
resources to achieve a task, say to diffuse a potentially violent 
disagreement by using tact, diplomacy and humour, (Fielding, 1984) 
this is of little interest. That somebody may have attained a 
criminal record, and perhaps lost a potential job because of the 
failure of an officer to successfully negotiate a non-coercive 
resolution to the conflict, is likewise deemed as irrelevant. 
The New Criminology has not, however, had an altogether 
negative impact on the sociology of the police. It has focused 
attention on the relationship between the police and the state, 
forcing a rethink about police neutrality in relation to law and 
crime control. It has also raised issues about the ideological 
nature of present police practices in criminalising the poor 
(Box, 1983: 13). With this preamble in mind, it is now necessary 
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to turn away from history and to examine the synthesis and 
integration which has occurred to make possible what I have 
termed a realist position on the police. 
.... And The Fall 
The unwieldy and heady structures of radical criminology, 
despite its initial promise of providing an account of deviancy 
which incorporated it into the social totality, has gradually 
given way to less ambitious projects. Iapetus has came from both 
interactionist (Rock, 1979), and less stringent structuralist 
critiques (Brogden, 1982). The result has been a 
re-interpretation of the theory of the state, an end to 
epistemological imperialism, and the possibility of 
methodological pluralism. E. P. Thompson captures the shift in 
emphasis when he writes: 
If all law and all police are utterly abhorrent then it 
cannot matter what kind of law or what place the police 
are held within, and yet the most immediate and 
consequent struggles to maintain liberty are exactly 
about kinds and places, cases and precedents and the 
bringing of power to particular account (Thompscn, 1978: 
xi). 
Brogden, following Thompson's injunction, provides the most 
sophisticated attempt to locate the police in relation to the 
state. In a careful historical study he empirically demonstrates 
that the Chief Constable, and thus the police as a whole, is 
largely autonomous from the Home Office, parliament, the legal 
system and the local state. He therefore introduces the concept 
of the urban manager, drawn from the work of Pahl (1975). 
However, unlike Pahl in his earlier work, he insists that the 
role must not be conceived of as an independent variable, thus 
giving rise to complete autonomy, but as a constrained role. It 
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is constrained by the complexity of the peculiar conjunction of 
historical, economic and ideological forces at any given tirre, 
thus giving rise to relative autonomy. 
The Police Chief as urban manager is seen as having to 
arbitrate between the competing demands of various groups in 
formulating policy (Brogden, 1982: 30). Of course, not all 
arguments are given equal weight, and the job of the Police Chief 
is to filter the 'legitimate' fron the 'illegitimate' demands. 
As Brogden notes: 
His legal status as a constable under common law grants 
him unique discretionary powers. When canbined with his 
legal knowledge necessary to his managerial function he 
has considerably more independence as a resource provider 
in the local area than any other urban manager (Brogden, 
1982: 95) 
While radical criminology moved from instrumental to 
structuralist accounts of the state, the realist approach has 
shifted from structuralist to a sophisticated pluralist model, 
while still retaining some of the features of structuralism. 
Crucially the concept of relative autonomy has been retained, 
although stripped of its predictive status; it has come to be 
used more as a descriptive label. As Saunders suggests in a 
different context (Saunders, 1981: 278), the concept of relative 
autonomy, although removing the problem of isomorphism, replaces 
it with the "to opposing principles which cannot be supported by 
counter-factuals " (Saunders, 1981: ibid). This is to argue that 
the state supports the long term interests of monopoly capital 
while at the sane time responding to pressure from the 
subordinate classes. However, unless it can be specified in 
advance when the contradictory pressures on the state will be 
resolved, there is no possibility of disconfirming the 
thesis (Saunders, ibid). 
The importance of this critique is that the state, and its 
agents, have becorre structurally differentiated at the 
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theoretical level and there is no longer a "presuired homogeneity 
of influence-by a homogeneous ruling class (Cain, 1979: 157). 
Such a position, therefore, implicitly raises questions about the 
level of structural co-respondence - between the police, the 
state, and the dominant economic class - which can no longer be 
taken for granted. Isomorphism has been rejected because it is 
possible to utilise an alternative position, "which recognises a 
diversity within the state", (Cain, ibid) and thus allows for a 
political intervention which, "appropriately organises pressure 
upon it in the interests of greater democracy" (Cain, 1979: 
151). 
Caning from different, if not hostile traditions, Young 
fron structural Marxism (Taylor, Walton & Young, 1973), and Cain, 
from the interactionist school (1973), have both arrived at 
roughly the same position (Cain, 1979; Lea & Young, 1984). They 
are both of the firm belief that incursions can be made into the 
state and its apparatus to bring them under democratic control. 
Underlying their position is a vision of the state as an arena to 
be captured by particular groups or classes, to be held and 
cajoled into dispensing favours to sectional interests. For both 
of them the group that must do this is the working class. The 
importance here is that they see these gains as real; not just 
the icing on the cake, but substantive (Lea and Young, 1984: 
260-261). 
Inevitably, the academic concerns of developing a political 
sociology of the police has led to a fusion of interest between 
those wishing to interpret the police institution and those with 
a desire to change it. The gauntlet thrown down by Cain to 
extend and develop the emerging political sociology of the police 
(i. e. Bunyan, 1977; Hall, 1978; Reiner, 1978) has been net with a 
flurry of studies on: the technology of policing and surveillance 
(Manwaring White, 1983; BSSRS, 1985); the policing of public order 
(Bowden, 1978; Cowell, Jones & Young, 1982; Fine & Millar, 1985); 
the police and the state (Brogden, 1982); the politics of policing 
(Baldwin and Kinsey, 1982; Reiner, 1985) and accountability and 
the police (Hain, 1979,1980; Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984). 
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In many respects this has been a major advance, as the 
uncritical assumptions of the traditional criminolgy have been 
thoroughly routed, the limited concerns of the interactionists 
have been broadened, and the theoretical impasse of the New 
Criminology has been superceded by a return to the phenomenal 
world. The central concern with all these studies has been with 
the process of democratising the police through the vehicle of 
police accountability. The debates surrounding the 
accountability arguments are in themselves complex; however, 
there are four major positions from which accountability has been 
broached: 
a) Existing law should be used to force Chief Constables to 
act in particular ways. 
b) Existing police authorities should use their residual 
powers. 
c) There should be changes in law to make police authorities 
responsible for determining general police policy. 
d) That local cainunities should be given control of 
policing (adapted from Jefferson & Grimshaw, 1982: ch5). 
All of these proposals fail to provide an adequate model of how 
the police could be brought to account, primarily because they 
fail to understand the distinction between being accountable to 
law and being accountable to an electorate. In recognition of 
this, Jefferson & Grimshaw propose that the solution is to 
provide an elected body with judicial standing whose purpose 
would be to provide,, "policy instructions to officers in respect 
of a general duty to uphold the law" (1982: 175). 
Jefferson & Grimshaw's arguments withstanding, there are 
limits as to how far accountability arguments can be taken. In 
all the positions including their own, there is an assumption of 
symmetry between official organisational policy and the 
implementation of that policy. There has been no attempt to take 
on board the implications of the various studies of the police 
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organisation. As Fielding argues (Fielding, 1981), while senior 
officers may embrace the demand for some form of accountability, 
guarding against its more zealous proponents with a rhetoric of 
professionalism, the perennial problem for the police 
organisation is still how to achieve control of the lower ranks 
in implementing organisational goals. Thus, if a Chief Officer 
and his management team accepted the position of those to whom 
they were made accountable, implementation at street level ývuld 
still be problematic. Jefferson denies the reality of this 
problem, preferring to see organisational rule breaking as in the 
interests of senior officers. This flies in the face of a 
growing body of evidence fran observational studies of the 
ingrained conflict between managerial and street level cultures 
(Holdaway, 1983; Ianni, 1983). Further, as Kelling has stressed, 
even internally generated change has a tendency to revert to 
'business as usual' in a short time, (Kelling, 1983). 
To provide answers to such problems it is necessary to 
bridge the gap between macro and micro-sociology which has dogged 
criminology for much of its history. As McBarnet argues, it is 
really a false dichotomy: "For a full explanation of how law is 
enforced then, substantive law, legal structure and the state 
must be added to moods and bureaucracies and face to face 
interaction". However, she adds, "... structural analysis is the 
corollary to and the context for, not a replacement of, 
interactional analysis. " 
(McBarnet, 1977: 31-32). 
If the accountabilty arguments are to have any clout they 
must be able to illustrate how their proposals will affect the 
day to day practices of policing. However, as Fielding notes, 
"in the long run it may well be easier to reprogram the 
technology than the manpower " (Fielding, 1981: 93). In itself 
this may be viewed as desirable, restricting the police use of 
motorised patrol, cutting dawn the emphasis on public order 
training, and resisting police demands for more expensive and 
sophisticated technology. However, arguments about 
accountability go further, for they suggest that there will 
be a 
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qualitative change in the relationship between the police and the 
policed in a locale. If this is the case, it is necessary to 
examine what the police do, and how they achieve it. 
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Chapter 2 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE POLICE: 
TOWARDS A REALIST VIEW OF POLICING 
There are two related and fallacious assumptions common 
to the law and order and civil liberties lobbies. Both 
emphasise law enforcement as the central police function, 
and adopt a rational deterrence model of classical 
criminology, albeit at different stages of the argument 
(Reiner, 1985: 171). 
The central position that has not been addressed is what are 
the police for, and it is to this question that I now wish to 
turn. In 1964, the Royal Commission, for the first time since 
the inception of the New Police, reviewed the original police 
mandate, and although they extended it, they hardly changed the 
basis of the original formulation. The police have a duty to: 
maintain law and order and to protect persons and property; to 
prevent crime; they are responsible for the detection of 
criminals and for the interrogation of suspected persons; they 
have a duty to control road traffic and to befriend anyone in 
need (Abridged from Critchley, 1978: 309-310). What this does 
not include is any clue as to how such goals should be achieved, 
which are, in themselves, second order questions to which the 
police organisation jealously guards the right to formulate the 
solutions (Critchley, 1978: 228; Brogden, 1982). 
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The Police Mandate: Rhetoric 
The police mandate is imbued with tensions because its 
primary function, as presented by the organisation itself and the 
media - the control of crime - is impossible to achieve. The 
forces which generate crime and deviancy are materially and 
ideologically outside of its control. The result has been the 
increasingly sophisticated use of presentational strategies to 
secure support for the organisation which, in its own terms, was 
seen to be failing (Reiner, 1985: ch 5). During the 1960's and 
1970's the problem of police ineffectiveness to limit the growing 
crime rate was presented as one of manpower shortages (Mark, 
1978: 137). As establishments carte up to strength in the 1980's, 
with rising unemployment and a 40% pay rise, the crime figures 
still continued to rise. The organisational rhetoric was quick 
to shift gear, with the police admitting that they could not 
control crime. As Canmissioner Newman expressed in 1983, "Crime 
statistics are just as much a reflection of the performance of 
other social agencies as they are of police performance. " (Cmnd: 
8928; 10). 
The result of such contradictions, then, is the development 
of presentational strategies (Manning, 1977: ch 5), amplified by 
the media (Chibnall, 1977), aimed at smoothing over the gaps 
between rhetoric and reality. If tensions exist at the level of 
primary goals, then, they are replicated and transformed within 
the organisation with the development of second order goals. 
These result from accommodations reached within the organisation 
about how to achieve their specified objectives enshrined in the 
police mandate. Given that the primary objectives are hard, if 
not impossible, to achieve, there is an increased pressure for 
second order goals to displace higher ones. 
For instance, as Jones illustrates, although the police 
organisation espouses the principles of preventative patrolling, 
either on foot or by car, as being the backbone of the police 
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service, in reality the function is starved of manpower, 
organisational commitment and status (Jones, 1980). Even so, the 
organisation must, and does, develop strategies for the 
accomplishment of particular goals. However, these are 
selectively filtered and transformed into those which can be most 
easily measured and thus provide the organisation and the police 
manager with a handle with which to monitor organisational 
activity. Preventative strategies receive little priority; 
instead, arrests, process, recorded stops and tickets issued, 
tend to become the primary, individual, departmental and 
organisational indicators of success. (PSI, 1983: Vol iv). 
The development of second order goals, such as the setting up 
of divisional information units, dedicated ownunications 
functions, targetting and surveillance squads, etc., tend to be 
related back to first order goals through the mechanism of 
figures, either in terms of the crime rate or crude indicators 
such as police activity (PSI, 1983; Vol iv: 307). Organisational 
choices have to be made about the distribution of manpower and 
resource allocation between specialist units. Inevitably such 
choices are political. However, organisationally, they are 
presented as neutrally responding to (reified) crime figures. It 
is known that differential enforcement strategies have an unequal 
bearing upon particular groups and classes, (Cf, Stevens & 
Willis, 1979). Carr-Hill & Stern's (1979) sophisticated analysis 
of official crime statistics, where they relate to a number of 
demographic variables, illustrates that, "At the level of police 
practice there is some discrimination which either protects or 
shields particular social groups or takes them as prime targets ." 
(Carr-Hill & Stern, 1979; 258). Further, one of the tust 
important variables is the size of the police force in relation 
to the size of population, and this plays an important part in 
the determination of the offence rate and clear up rate (ibid; 
256). In other words, the more police there are, the more 
recorded crime there will be. This would make little difference 
if the impact of policing was distributed evenly across different 
social classes. It is not. Policing is concentrated in poor 
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inner-city areas, such as Toxteth, Lambeth and Hammersmith, with 
their attendant transient populations, composed mainly of a 
fragmented working class and ethnic minorities (see, Policing 
London, 1982: no 2,6). 
Policing is focused on particular types of crime, and 
therefore, on particular classes and areas (Cf, Box, 1981). 
Although such choices are presented as one dimensional, 
determined by the crime rate, they have the effect of increasing 
the criminalisation of particular sub-sections of the population. 
This leads to the police engaging in a form of circular argument. 
Manpower is decided by reference to crime figures, (Cf Bunyard, 
1978: 107, for the formula) ; therefore, more police will mean 
more crime, and this in turn will mean more police (Ditton, 
1979). This is an important point to bear in mind because, 
depending on one's level of analysis, different answers emerge to 
the problem of discrimination. In Donald Black's study of 
police/citizen encounters which takes the primary unit of 
analysis as the individual encounter, he could find "... no 
evidence that the police discriminate on the basis of race " 
(Black, 1980: 105). In Great Britain the PSI report made the 
same point with regard to the Metropolitian Police (PSI, 
1983: vol; iv, 125-128). To view discrimination merely as an 
individual psychological state is to oversimplfy the issue, for 
it is Embodied in the differential levels of manpower and 
resources allotted to particular places and functions. Police 
officers may or may not enforce the law neutrally, but the police 
organisation certainly does not. 
The reality of organisational practice gives rise to unequal 
policing, resulting in the criminalisation of particular 
sub-groups. As Box (1983) notes, it is hard not to see 
definitions of serious crime as ideological constructs, since 
they are not related to the most serious offences. In terms of 
harm, injury, suffering and economic loss, price fixing, the non 
implementation of safety at work legislation and fraud have far 
greater consequences. In effect they relate to a "subsection 
which is more likely to be committed by young, poorly educated 
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males who are often unemployed, live in a orking class 
impoverished neighbourhood and frequently belong to ethnic 
minorities " (Box, 1983: 13). 
The police, along with conservative British and American 
criminologists, maintain, without due regard to the contrary 
evidence (Cf, Box, 1983), that lower class crime is by far the 
most destructive of social life. Thus, Wilson argues: "Predatory 
street crime does not merely victimise individuals, it impedes 
and, in extreme cases, even prevents the formation and 
maintenance of the community " (Wilson, 1975: 21). Or, as Morgan 
states: "Delinquency has now ceased to be merely a symbol of 
urban breakdown (if it ever was) ... and has become a major 
contributor to it " (Morgan, 1978: 21). 
The representation of the police as neutrally responding to 
crime is tenuous. The selective use and disclosure of 
information through the media results in particular events being 
filtered out and others highlighted. Thus a framework is 
generated which allows otherwise unrelated and unconnected 
incidents to be welded together into a crime wave. Crime waves 
are always about street crime and can be seen as one of the 
mechanisms by which legitimacy for unequal enforcement is 
manufactured (Fishman, 1979; Hall, 1978; Cohen, 1972; 
Brogden, 1982). Criminal justice, therefore, becomes elevated 
into a 'community service', and "... it is presented as being 
above politics and dispensing justice for all, irrespective of 
class, race, sex or religion - this further legitimises the state 
and those whose interests it unwittingly or otherwise furthers" 
(Box, 1983: 14). 
Political tensions are resolved at the level of ideology. 
However, other tensions result fron the interpretation of the 
received mandate which casts the police as primarily concerned 
with law enforcement, the prevention of crime and its discovery. 
As Manning argues, the mandate is received by a very traditional 
managerial and organisational structure, and seen as an 
essentially technical problem. The police 
do not concern 
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themselves with a theory of crime causation, but believe that 
increases in manpower, information flow, and response time will 
lead to decreases in crime and increases in arrest (Manning, 
1979b: 706). 
The Police Mandate: Reality 
It is now necesary to examine the data for the claim that 
the mandate is impossible. Although the information relating to 
Great Britain is not voluminous, it is sufficient and consistent 
enough to draw some general conclusions about the nature of 
police patrol work, specifically in relation to the image of the 
police as law enforcers, and preventors and detectors of crime. 
Ironically, the majority of police work is not related to 
law enforcement. Punch's study of calls for police assistance in 
three East Anglian towns revealed that between half and three 
quarters of all requests for assistance were for service rather 
than law enforcement functions (Punch & Naylor, 1973). Eckblau 
& Heal's study of incoming calls to a subdivisional control room 
confirmed Punch's earlier findings. Only 18% of calls required 
the preparation of a fresh crime report and calls relating to 
"plight" made up by far the greatest proportion of demand 
(Eckblom & Heal, 1982). In Punch's terms, the police represent a 
"secret social service". It is secret because the outcome of the 
majority of the incidents rarely enter into the official records 
of the police organisation; in essence, since they do not 
generate crime reports they are lost from view (McCabe & 
Sutcliffe, 1978). These findings are consistent with numerous 
American studies which'also illustrate that the majority of calls 
for police assistance are not crime related (Cunning & Edel, 1965; 
Bercal, 1971; Webster, 1973). 
If a different measurement device is used, that of task 
analysis of how patrol officers spend their time, then even 
smaller proportions of police activity are shown to be directly 
related to law enforcement. A study by Cowrie & Kings (1974) 
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of the police services research unit, shows that, in both rural 
and urban settings, only about 6% of a patrol officer's tine is 
spent on incidents that are finally defined as criminal. The 
accumulated evidence fron various ethnographic studies confirms, 
and gives colour to, the broad range of non crime related 
activities that the police are called to deal with (Banton, 1964; 
Cain, 1973; Holdaway, 1983; PSI, 1983: Vol iv). 
If police work is not directly related to law enforcement 
and crime control, it is often argued that the presence of 
patrols on the street has a deterrent and preventative function. 
Clearly the police service supports this view as some 40% of 
patrol officers' time is spent on random and uncommitted patrol 
(Carrie & Kings, 1974). Studies of both car and foot patrols 
tend to disconfirm the deterrent effect of patrolling. Both 
British and American data confirms that, although some patrol 
presence is necessary to deter potential offenders, the precise 
number of foot or car patrols makes very little difference; it is 
only when patrols are removed completely that reported crime 
increases (Bright, 1969; Kelling, 1974). 
This is hardly surprising since foot patrol officers are 
only as effective as far as their eyes can see and ears can hear r 
and, for that matter, so are car patrol officers . As Clarke and 
Hough point out in their review on the literature on police 
effectiveness. 
Given present burglary rate and an evenly distributed 
patrol coverage, a patrolling policeman in London could 
expect to pass within a 100 yards of a burglary 
in 
progress once every eight years and even then not realise 
that the crime was taking place (Clarke & Hough, 1984: 
7). 
To become a real deterrent the level of patrolling mould 
have 
to be increased to a point where the chance of detection was 
a high probability, which is not an economically 
feasible 
proposition. Further, burglars are well aware 
that the 
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likelihood of being caught is low; therefore, any realistic 
increase in the level of foot patrol would be liable to have 
little effect, (ibid). 
It was for these reasons that the government Working Party 
on Manpower, Equipment and Efficiency (Home Office, 1967) 
recommended the introduction of unit beat policing with the 
primary aim of a swifter response to calls for assistance and 
complaints. Unfortunately, the theory behind rapid response 
generally failed to take into account the length of time that 
callers take to contact the police after they have discovered an 
offence. Eckblau & Heal's (1982) study illustrated that over 
sixty percent of callers had delayed at least five minutes before 
calling the police and Beick & Kessler's study in the USA (1977) 
illustrated that over fifty percent of people took between twenty 
and forty minutes before calling the police, victims often 
discussing with relatives and friends what action they should 
take before calling. Quite clearly, rapid response is severely 
limited in its effectiveness by the delay between incident and 
reporting. 
Contrary to the popular mythology surrounding police 
investigations which portrays them as involving painstaking 
detective work; piecing together disparate clues to put a name to 
an unsolved crime, the police are highly dependent on victims and 
witnesses for the identification of offenders. Burrows and 
Tarling's (1982) study of records drawn from three metropolitan 
police forces illustrates that the police are responsible for 
discovering either directly or indirectly about fifteen percent 
of crime. There now seems to be a general consensus of research 
findings that the public is responsible for solving between 
eighty-three and eighty-five percent of cleared up offences, 
(Steer, 1980; Mawby, 1979; Bottomley & Coleman, 1981). 
Generally, if the offender is apprehended it is either 
because they are caught red handed or because a victim or witness 
can narrte the person who committed the offence. When the police 
do not have such information, the possibility of detecting 
offenders is very low. Perhaps this is best illustrated by the 
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case of the Yorkshire Ripper manhunt which, by July 1979 rronths 
before he was caught, had involved 500 police officers, 250,000 
officer hours and had cost over three mi l lon pounds. (Nicholson, 
1979). 
In sunmary, then, we can say that the police have little 
effect on the prevention of crime, spend little of their time 
dealing with it and do little to discover it. Having examined 
what the police do not do it is necessary to turn our attention 
to what it is that they actually do. 
Page 27 
Chapter 3 
TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF THE POLICE 
THE SEARCH FOR THEMATIC UNITY 
As I have noted earlier, any discussion of policing is faced 
with problems of definition, partly as a result of 
epistemological disputes, but also arising from the confusions 
and contradictions apparent in the received police mandate; 
glossed over by the police reliance on presentational strategies. 
However, there are also more tangible reasons for the confusion 
which is borne out of a recognition that the reality of police 
work does not fall neatly under any conceptual umbrella. The 
literature on patrol work is replete with dichotomies which try 
and capture the range of tasks and styles that can be used to 
characterise police work: social service versus crime work, 
(Punch & Naylor, 1973); "shit work" versus "real work", (PSI, 
1983: Vol iv); "peace officer" versus "enforcement officer", 
(Banton, 1964); "proactive" versus "reactive", (Reiss, 1971); 
"conmunity" versus "fire-brigade" policing, (Alderscn, 1984). 
By relying on dichotomies to describe the police function, 
discontinuity at the phenomenal level is reproduced at the 
conceptual, and thus theoretical unity which might merge the 
disparate activities under a single banner is lost. Rock (1973) 
cogently argues in his chapter on the enforcement of laws, that 
there is indeed a functional unity to all the various police 
activities which are teleologically related to the primary goal: 
"... of being responsible for the boundary patrolling tasks of a 
system of social control. They control those deviancies which 
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are proscribed both by external law-giving institutions and by 
their own law-interpreting behaviour " (Rods, 1973: 174). 
Legitimacy 
To perform this primary task, there are subsidiary functions 
which facilitate the implementation of first order goals, and 
these are what Rock terms, "... the incidental and unintended 
consequences of police work " (Rock, 1973: 184). Thus, the range 
of non-crime-related tasks that the police find themselves 
involved in, for instance acting as marriage guidance councillors 
in domestic disputes, are a necessary price for the police, "to 
continue to function as effective agents of control " (ibid). 
The involvement in these subsidiary tasks is a mechanism which 
enables the police to perform their primary control function 
without undue recourse to coercive measures, by cloaking the 
office in a shroud of legitimacy. Further, such interventions 
enable informal contacts with the conmunity, resulting in an 
increased information flow about other, more serious infractions. 
Thus, the "coercive role style is tempered with a benign 
complexion" (ibid); therefore, coercive power is transposed into 
legitimate authority by the diversity of tasks that the police 
are prepared to engage in. 
While Rock is right in stressing the legitimation function 
of diversity, there are less certain grounds for his assertion 
that it is the quest for legitimacy which unifies the social 
service functions with that of law enforcement. The 
distinction 
between the two types is far less sharply drawn than many 
conientators would have us believe. The practice of policing 
evolves as the structure or each particular 
interaction unfolds; 
it is not predetermined fron without, but structured 
from within 
(Van Maanen, 1978b: 224). Thus Chatterton describes how 
essentially similar infractions result 
in differing outcomes 
depending on the style of the officer and the demeanour of the 
subjects, with arrest being the result of an officer 
failing to 
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negotiate a social service definition on a particular incident 
rather than anything i ntrinsic to the incident itself 
(Chatterton, 1983). Also, in reactive policing, officers have 
little power to determine what they are called to deal with; the 
structure of patrol relying heavily on the public's definition of 
normative order in weighing up whether to call in the police. 
Force 
The police are called into a variety of situations which may 
or may not be viewed as part of their primary function, but it 
can only be decided during or after the event, not before it. 
The process by which criminal sanction is invoked, whether 
formally or informally, will be dependent on how the officer 
reads the situation and what resources are used to provide a 
solution. This may or may not involve the use of coercion but 
the crucial point is that the distinction between incidents 
necessitating the use of coercive force and those that do not is 
false. It is in recognition of this that Bittrer proposed an 
alternative definition of policing which aimed at unifying police 
practice at the level of coercion. 
For Bitther: 
... the role of the police 
is best understood as a 
mechanism for the distribution of non-negotiable coercive 
force, employed in accordance with the dictates of an 
intuitive grasp of situational exigencies" (Bittner, 1978: 
33). 
While Bittner notes that the police rarely use force in 
encounters with the public, he maintains that this does not 
undermine the fact that it is a resource that can be used if 
police procedure is opposed. The justification for the use of 
force, as he rightly points out, cannot be derived from any 
external prescription but fron particular readings of particular 
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situations. Thematic unity is provided by the fact that the 
solutions to the problems that the police deal with potentially 
or actually require the use of force. As Bittner notes: 
... this lends homogeneity to such diverse procedures as 
catching a criminal, driving the mayor to the airport, 
evicting a drunken person fron a bar, directing traffic, 
crowd control, taking care of lost children, 
administering first aid and separating fighting 
relatives (Bittner, 1978: 38). 
Bittner's definition has been highly influential in providing a 
basis for analysing patrol work. However, by equating the police 
role with the use of force, it has led many commentators to 
underplay the use of other resources at the police officer's 
disposal for achieving particular ends. Essentially, this again 
raises issues about the nature of power. In Bittner's 
formulation all power is exercised on the basis of the coercive 
potential of the applicant. However, this clouds over the 
distinction between legitimately perceived authority and 
coercion. People comply with a host of social rules not because 
there is a threat that coercion will be used against then if they 
transgress, but because to a greater or lesser degree, thay 
accept the legitimacy of the rules. As Box argues, the suprising 
aspect of deviancy is not how much but how little there is, and 
this is a reflection on the efficacy of social control, 
excercised through socialisation, in binding people to the 
conventional moral order (Box, 1981: ch 4). Police officers' 
mandate to act authoritively in situations is often implicitly 
and explicitly accepted as legitimised by the public (Cf: Wiley & 
Hudik, 1974), even by those on whom negative sanctions are 
applied (Matza, 1969). 
Power has two sides, and in this sense its exercise can be 
seen as a form of interaction (Simnel, 1964; Arendt, 1970), in 
which there is reciprocity between the super-and sub-ordinate. 
While the actual use of coercion represents the loss of 
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reciprocity, its threatened use does not; it is merely that the 
subject is not prepared to undertake the sacrifices which result 
from its use. The other side of the successful mobilisation of 
power is compliance which can be categorised under three 
dimensions (Etzioni, 1961), alienative, utilitarian and 
normative. Each derives its power fran a different source: 
alienative from coercion; utilitarian from the transfer of 
socially scarce resources; normative fron the acceptance of the 
authority of the super-ordinate as legitimate. 
By making power and force equivalents,. Bitther has made the 
other resources at a police officer's disposal subsidiary. As 
the PSI report notes ( 1983: Vol iv) "... the great majority of 
police officers habitually try and avoid using more force than is 
necessary. " (opcit, 173). Even in arrest situations the police 
rarely resort to coercion to secure compliance. Nor is this only 
true of British policing, in Reiss' study over 90% of arrests 
were managed without recourse to gross force; i. e., physical 
coercion, threat or handcuffs (Reiss, 1968). 
Order 
Like all definitions, Bittner's can be justified neither 
theoretically nor empirically but only by recourse to its 
heuristic value, and, in failing to differentiate between the 
different sources of power, the definition obscures the diversity 
of strategies used to achieve compliance, (Muir, 1977; Bitther & 
Bayley, 1983; Fielding, 1984). The question still remains, to 
what degree can we find conceptual unity? As we have seen, most 
incidents that the police involve themselves in do not end up 
with a crime report being filed, nor do the police have much 
effect on either the prevention or detection of crime. In the 
light of this, Ericson proposes that: 
The mandate of police patrol officers is to employ a 
system of rules and authoritative colds to transpose 
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troublesome, fragile situations back into a normal or 
efficient state, whereby the ranks of society are 
preserved.... (and) .... Therefore the patrol police are 
essentially a vehicle in the reproduction of order 
(Ericson, 1982: 7). 
The importance of this is that it allows thematic unity, as does 
Bittner's definition, but without prejudging the resources that 
are used to reconstitute order. It locates the police firmly as 
the guardians of the status quo. However, by focusing on 
reproduction, the question of order is made problematic; it is 
not merely transmitted but, "... continually worked at through the 
process of conflict, negotiation and subjection. " (Ericson, 1982: 
7). 
Unity is derived at the level of function rather than of 
technique. The police are seen as restitutive in the variety of 
situations that they encounter, but the definition is not 
imperialistic in specifying 'whose' order. As Sykes & Brent 
note, the police are often called into situations not as 
'enforcers' of a public legal conception of order, but as 
'reinforcers' of localised private normative conceptions of 
order. This results because people confuse their "private 
informal order with the formal legal order" (Sykes & Brent, 1983: 
28). In this situation legal sanction is often inappropriate. 
Donald Black, in his chapter on dispute settlement, (Black, 1980: 
ch 5) illustrates that people call the police because the 
resources they possess for the resolution of conflict are 
insufficient. In the majority of these incidents, police 
officers are called to act as conciliators to try and reconcile 
conflicting parties. Chatterton's work (1978 & 1983)has shown 
that, where a private normative order has been exceeded, not a 
legal one, officers have a variety of resources at their 
disposal. Particularly, they can use their considerable 
discretion to engineer a situation where a more substantial 
infraction can be invoked, and thus provide the opportunity for 
legal resources to be brought to bear. 
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In proactive encounters, as well as reactive ones, the 
officer utilises normative standards applied to temporal, spatial 
and informal social orders (Sacks,, 1978). Thus, in dealing with 
a situation, an officer decides what, if anything, is out of 
order, and uses the various resources at his or her disposal to 
reconstruct it. Since there are a multitude of informal orders, 
officers have considerable latitude in determining whether an 
intervention is justified and what such interventions should 
consist of. While an event may threaten their own value systems, 
it may not be legally proscribed and, while it may be legally 
proscribed, it may not challenge the normative system of the 
local moral order. Police officers may turn a blind eye to 
drunken driving which is legally proscribed, but may apply the 
law strictly in relation to the possession of small amounts of 
marijuana. Discretion is a central part of a police officer's 
mandate. This allows for selectivity in both what to involve 
oneself in and what resources to utilise when seeking compliance. 
As Ericson notes, these cover a wide range, including: 
... the authority of his off 
ice, his procedural legal 
power to detain, search and the use of physical force, 
his substantive legal powers to charge and various 
manipulative strategies that form part of the recipe 
knowledge of his craft. In short he 'negotiates order' 
variously employing the strategies of coercion, 
manipulation and negotiation (Ericson, 1982: 9). 
Police work, then, is not primarily concerned with criminal 
law enforcement but the more vague and less concrete problem 
of the reproduction of order. Following Manning, (1977,1979a), 
Ericson maintains that: 
... the work 
is always carried out with respect to rules, 
including legal rules, administrative rules and the 
recipe rules of the occupational culture of line 
officers. In other words it is the work of producing and 
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controlling deviance, of using social rules in the 
construction of the social order. (Ericson, 1982: 9). 
The patrol officer is an active user and interpreter of rules. 
These rules, however, are not transposed from the ideal to the 
actual, nor is it the case that legal rules take precedence over 
administrative or occupational. Rules have to be situationally 
applied. For the patrol officer, whose work is often only 
tangentially related to criminal law enforcement, organisational 
and occupational constraints are as important in guiding action. 
Even where the invocation of legal rules is necessary to reach a 
desired outcome, they are still applied by organisational and 
occupational factors. Accordingly the next chapter will examine 
how these rules provide both a constraint and a resource for 
achieving the ends of routine patrol work. 
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Chapter 4 
POLICE WORK: ORGANISATION, 
OCCUPATION AND ENVIRONMENT 
Organisational Analysis and the Occupational Culture 
As with all organisations, the factor which separates the 
neophyte from the old-timer is the ability to articulate actions 
in the light of a situationally relevant reading of 
organisational rules and procedures. Organisational rules are 
not merely transposed from theory to practice, they are mediated 
at various levels which transform their meaning and import. 
While the formal organisation gives rise to a set of rules, for 
both practice and justification, the appropriate invocation of 
rules requires a second order system. As Strauss et al. have 
demonstrated, there must be rules for using the rules (Strauss et 
al., 1963). This second order rule system derives from the 
organisational culture and is transmitted through a period of 
occupational socialisation which neophytes must undergo to gain 
the social knowledge and skills necessary to assurre an 
organisational role (van Maanen & Schien, 1979: 211). 
Such a position requires a particular reading of 
organisational life because, implicitly, it places the concept of 
culture as the central feature of organisational analysis (Astley 
& Van de Ven, 1983). Historically this has cone about through a 
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re-emergence of the "action frame of reference", favoured by 
Weberian sociology and more recently re-introduced into British 
sociology by Goldthorpe's 'Affluent Worker' studies (Goldthorpe 
et al, 1968). Pitting themselves against the technological 
determinacy of the previous generation of writers (Blauner, 1964; 
Woodward, 1958), they introduced the notion of "orientation to 
s'ork". It was argued that the subjective features of the work 
situation had been treated as overdetermining. Instead, worker 
behaviour and the understanding that they brought to their work 
were acknowledged to be a result of the complex interaction 
between work structure and worker biography. 
Unlike the human relations school (Mayo, 1949) which tried 
to locate subjective meaning in terms of individual psychological 
need, the action approach saw it as socially generated. Attention 
moved away from structural determinism and psychological 
reductionism and turned towards examining the social processes 
generated in the work situation itself. Drawing on the 
phenomenological perspective (Schultz, 1972; Berger & Luckmann, 
1966), the problem of organisational sociology became, "the 
manner in which the everyday world is socially constructed yet 
perceived as real and routine " (Silverman, 1970). 
A problem emerges fron the rejection of structural 
determinism and psychological reductionism. If organisational 
behaviour is not to be explained in terms of external and 
constraining forces, or by reference to universal human needs, 
what is it then that gives rise to the consistent patterning of 
human behaviour? The answer may be arrived at through a 
synthesis of phenomenology and post-Wittgensteinian philosophy 
(Winch, 1958; Giddens, 1976), which treats social life as 
rule-governed rather than law-governed, where such rules can be 
conceived of as arising from the fabric of inter-subjective 
meanings or, in other words, fran culture. 
As Berger & Luckmann note, for meaning to become 
inter-subjective, reciprocity and exchange have to be 
established; this is achieved through the process of 
externalisation, objectification and internalisation (Berger & 
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Luckmann, 1966: 78). The movement between these three processes 
results in the objectified world being "... reabsorbed into 
consciousness and that the structuration of this world comes to 
determine the subjective structures of consciousness itself" 
(Berger, 1967: 15). There is therefore a dialectical interplay 
whereby action determines consciousness and consciousness 
determines action. 
Culture is a universal human phenomenon. However, its 
particular configuration results from the peculiar problems that 
differing social groups face. As Ford (1942) suggests, "culture 
is a traditional way of solving problems" or a "learned solution 
to problems", but there is no central or agreed definition of 
culture. Kroeber and Kluckholm (1952) found some one hundred and 
sixty definitions in the literature, and by way of synthesis 
conclude: 
Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit of 
symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of 
human groups, including their embodiment in artifacts; 
the essential core of culture consisting of traditional 
(ie historically derived and selected) ideas and 
especially their attached values; culture systems may on 
the one hand be considered products of action, and on the 
other as conditioning elements for further action 
(Kroeber & Kluckholm, 1952: 2). 
A major application of this perspective has been recent 
organisational studies. Smircich illustrates, (1983a) that 
organisational analysis has been influenced by five major 
perspectives of culture. Following Goodenough's cognitive view 
(1971), and Geertz's symbolic conception (1973), she proposes the 
following definition of organisational cultures: 
The emergence of social organisations depends on the 
emergence of shared interpretive schemas, expressed in 
language and other symbolic constructions that develop 
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through social interaction. Such schemas provide the 
basis for shared systems of meaning that allow day to day 
activities to become routinized or taken for granted 
(Smircich, 1983b: 160). 
Organisational reality is, then, constructed individually 
and through social interaction, and members actively participate 
in the creation and re-creation of meaning. In the light of 
this, Smircich reminds us that, "... human actors do not know or 
perceive the world, but know and perceive their %urld through the 
medium of culturally specific frames of reference" (Smircich, 
1983b: 161). It cannot be assumed that the organisation has 
homogeneous meaning structures which inform and guide action. 
Organisational managers, for instance, do not have a monopoly cn 
the development of meaning, although they often act as if they 
do. Others in the organisation are also active in producing and 
shaping organisational reality through the meanings and 
interpretations that they bring to their work world. Indeed, in 
hierarchical organisations there is a greater likelihood of a 
disjunction between the two: 
Thus the organisational strategy favoured by a dominant 
coalition may be countered by rival frames of reference 
and poorly implemented by accident or design. (ibid) 
This is highly pertinent to police organisations, and it is 
therefore necessary to examine the way in which the peculiar 
problems faced by the lower ranks gives rise to a patterned and 
culturally held solution which informs the everyday practice of 
policing. 
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The Occupational and the Organisational 
Milieu of Policing 
The patrol task is structured and ordered through the 
interaction between the organisation, occupation and environment 
in which it is located. It gives rise to the peculiar 
structuration of working rules that are contained in the 
occupational culture. The ascendency of the occupational culture 
over other forms of structuration arises from the paradox that, 
in police work, discretion tends to increase towards the bottom 
of the hierarchy. Indeed, the perennial problem for the police 
manager is how to control the lower ranks. Even under the 'fixed 
point' system discussed by Chatterton (1979), there were 
considerable opportunities for easing behaviour which, as he 
illustrated, were tolerated as long as they were covered by a 
'good story' if something should go wrong and they should be 
called to account. James' study (1979), illustrated how senior 
managers responded to rising levels of street crime by setting up 
a specialist squad to operate in accordance with the professional 
ethos of senior management. Within a matter of months, however, 
the squad had managed to subvert the organisational goal of 
professional policing and replace it with practical policing. 
This autonomy is compounded by three factors outlined in the 
PSI Report. First, frontline supervisors do not see it as their 
job to interfere on the level of the street activities of their 
officers. Second, senior managers, i. e. inspectors and above, 
rarely stay at a station for more than two years so that there is 
little time to build up a team, comprehensive objectives, and 
personnel management. Third, P. C. 's are therefore taught by 
other P. C. 's and informal work practices are passed on through 
the peer group rather than the organisation (PSI, 1983: Vol iv, 
274ff). 
The problem of supervision is not just a technical matter, 
but relates to the legal position of the constable. Summing up 
in the case between Fisher and Oldham corporation in 1930, the 
judge stated: 
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Now the powers of a constable, qua police officer, 
whether conferred by common law or statute law are 
exercised by him by virtue of his off ice and cannot be 
exercised on the responsibility of any person but 
himself..... A constable, therefore when acting as a peace 
officer is not exercising a delegated authority but an 
original authority (in Critchley, 1978: 271). 
The police constable is legally autonomous and therefore his or 
her immediate superiors cannot instruct him or her as to what to 
do in a given situation, since discretion is an integral part of 
the office. Supervisors can and do reconmend, suggest, threaten, 
and cajole their officers with informal and formal organisational 
sanction, that they should deal with a situation in a particular 
way. But, as Chatterton has shown: "A P. C. could legitimately 
respond - 'sorry Sergeant. That may be your way of dealing with 
such an incident but the way I did it was just as good 
(Chatterton, 1981: 26). 
Finally, the ascendency of the occupational culture is given 
further weight by the nature of the work that they deal with. 
Most situations are not one dimensional but often ambiguous and 
confusing, open to various interpretations. Police work is 
always situationally contingent. This is reflected in the 
organisational mandate. There are rules about dress, courtesy, 
conduct etc. but these do not dictate how officers should or 
should not act in a given situation. Police work continually 
involves discretion (Lambert, 1970) and the practice of policing 
evolves as the structure of each particular interaction unfolds. 
(van Maanen, 1978b: 224ff). 
The patrol officer's descision to act in particular 
circumstances is therefore dictated by a situationally informed, 
culturally defined reading of organisationally and legally 
proscribed rules. The principal concern of the officer is the 
avoidance of negative sanctions from either the organisation; in 
the form of disciplinary proceedings or the loss of perks, or 
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from the public; in terms of challenges to authority which entail 
physical or psychological harm. Skolnick brilliantly integrated 
police culture with the level of psychological rrotivation in the 
"Working personality of the police officer" (Skolnick, 1975). He 
relates this to two principal variables: "danger and authority 
which should be interpreted in the light of a constant pressure 
to appear efficient " (cpcit, 44). 
Following Skolnick, Chatterton argues that the two primary 
concerns of officers when dealing with a specific incident are 
the avoidence of "within-the-job" trouble and "on-the-job" 
trouble (Chatterton, 1978,1981). Within-the-job trouble, 
".... is bound up with the relationship between the patrol officer 
and their supervisors in the organisation" (Chatterton, 1978: 
49), such that the lower ranks are: 
... concerned that any information about then received by 
higher level officers projected a favourable impression 
and at least did not damage their reputations. 
(Chatterton, 1983: 201). 
On-the-job trouble, on the other hand, arises from the 
environment that the patrol officer polices and the relationship 
between themselves and the various publics on a division that 
they encounter. As Chatterton notes: 
The decisions and actions taken at incidents ref lect the 
concern to control relationships between themselves and 
the various publics on a division, to maintain their 
capacity to intervene authoritatively in any incident and 
to preserve their own and others beliefs that they were 
'on top of the area' (Chatterton, 1981: 208). 
The avoidance of "trouble", from whichever source, either 
"within the job" or "an the job" stems from the primary 
occupational concerns of patrol officers in limiting the type and 
range of negative sanctions. 
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Organisation and Environment: 
Information and Uncertainty 
The concern with trouble is given added salience by the 
manner in which the environment is transformed by organisational 
mediations. The external environment is not a thing in itself 
which can be discussed in terms of a simple causal relationship 
between organisation and environment. As Weick argues: 
Instead of discussing the 'external environment' we will 
discuss the 'enacted environment'. The phrase the 
enacted environment preserves the crucial distinction 
that we wish to make, the most important being that the 
human creates the environment to which the system then 
adapts. The human does not react to any environment, he 
enacts to it. It is this enacted environment, and 
nothing else, that is worked upon by the process of 
organising. (Weick, 1969: 63f) 
For Manning, following Weick, the police organisation can be seen 
essentially as an information processing system, whereby 
messages, (signals) are converted into signs. However, there is 
a problematic relationship between signs, the signifier and the 
signified contained within then. Manning sees the way in which 
the police receive, encode and act upon information received from 
the environment, (i. e. a citizens call) as exceedingly ccrnplex, 
(Manning: 1983). By the time a call reaches a patrol officer it 
has undergone three levels of encoding and decoding (Manning, 
1983: 197). The result of this semiotic process is that the 
uncertainty, which necessarily accompanies policing, is 
replicated and amplified within the communications system 
because: 
Same calls cannot be understood due to the lack of facts, 
some cannot be understood because the relevant 
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information is prohibited from the air, and some cannot 
be understood because they are either previously 
understood by arrangement or because the understandings 
lying behind them operate to convey a quite different 
meaning (Manning, 1977: 303). 
The dispatched patrol officer is aware that the message 
being responded to has a low dependability as a basis for action. 
A 'fight' may be youthful pranks, a 'domestic' usually involves 
only tongues, but sometimes knives. On arrival at the incident, 
a message has to be situationally re-interpreted with reference 
to location, the actors involved and other available sense data. 
One of the consequences of such informational uncertainty is 
the perceptual heightening of the threat of danger and violence 
related to on-the job trouble. It gives rise to what Manning 
(1977), has termed the 'threat-danger-hero' notion of police 
work, and the development of a set of %orking rules which 
classify various groups and classes as more dangerous than 
others. In Skolnick's terms, police officers develop a short 
hand classification of people who represent "Symbolic 
Assailants". Thus he writes : 
The policeman, because his work requires him to be 
occupied continually with potential violence develops a 
perceptual shorthand to identify certain types of people 
as symbolic assailants, that is persons who use gesture, 
language and attire that the policeman has come to 
recognise as a prelude to violence (Skolnick, 1975). 
As Holdaway has shown, (Holdaway, 1983: Ch6) in Britain the 
category of "Symbolic Assailant" is extended to include not 
just 
those who threaten the police with potential violence, but also 
those who, because of their authority or status, can challenge or 
disarm police authority. Lawyers, doctors and social workers 
fall into the category of "challengers", while women and children 
are "disarmers". 
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The uncertainty surrounding police work is not only 
reflected in the occupational culture, it is transformed by it. 
Action and excitement, comparatively rare events in police work, 
are moulded into stories which punctuate the long tea breaks 
taken during the quiet periods. Long past incidents relating to 
glamorous and heroic deeds are recalled. Quite trivial incidents 
are transformed, through skilfull recounting, into dramatic and 
exciting events, where danger was met with skill and measured 
judgement resulting in a satisfactory outcome (Holdaway, 1983: 
Ch10). Such transformations are not just related to the telling 
of stories but have consequences in action, as the technology of 
unit beat policing is manipulated to produce the excitement that 
is often lacking. Thus, the communications system and motorised 
patrol are used to create excitement through co-ordinated chases, 
if not of perceived offenders,, then of each other (ibid). 
The consequences and correlates of uncertainty, above all, 
relate to the problem of on-the-job trouble that the patrol 
officer faces. It is arguable,, however, that the most important 
aspect of uncertainty facing the patrol officer stems from the 
internal organisation of policing rather than the external 
environment. Within-the-job trouble primarily results from the 
fact that the police officer "can never be absolutely certain 
that the action taken in a particular situation will later prove 
to be the most effective way of handling the situation" 
(Chatterton, 1978: 49). As the PSI Report makes plain, within the 
organisation rules operate in an almost entirely negative 
fashion; they are inhibitory rules. However, due to the nature 
of supervision, the enforcement of such rules is almost entirely 
retrospective. It is related to paper irk, or the account of 
action, rather than the action itself. Inhibitory rules are not, 
"... internalised but are taken into account when deciding how to 
act in case they should be caught and the rule invoked against 
them" (PSI, 1983: Vol iv, 171). 
As various organisational studies have shown, police 
deviancy is both engendered and condoned by the police 
organisation itself. The requirement for the patrol officer to 
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be highly productive while, at the sane time, keeping within 
legal and organisational constraints is contradictory. The 
tension can be summed up as falling between a 'due process' model 
of law enforcement and a 'crime control' model. On the one hand, 
through various presentational strategies, the police 
organisation presents itself as being constrained by 'due 
process' while at the same time, fighting a losing battle against 
crime and, therefore requiring tougher laws to fight the war. 
Because present laws are inadequate, it is argued, the patrol 
officer is often forced to bend the rules. The Chief Constable 
of Essex, Bob Bunyard explained in relation to hooliganism; "too 
often officers dealing with such incidents have to pretend that 
they have powers which they do not have". (The Guardian, 20/6/85: 
1), explicitly making the fact that the police often have to 
exceed their legal public powers in the interest of crime 
control. 
Proverbially, the lower rank's assertion that one cannot 
police by the book results in the fact that, 'you're always in 
the shit'. While the organisation is prepared to condone rule 
breaking as long as everything goes smoothly, if a complaint is 
received or something should go wrong then a multitude of 
inhibitory rules can be used to bring someone to account. In the 
minds of the lower ranks this is to ritualistically offer a 
sacrificial lamb to the gods. 
This uncertainty is increased rather than decreased by the 
contradiction between the rhetoric and the reality of 
law and 
police operational guidelines laid down in the Judge's Rules. 
In 
practice, the law often favours crime control rather 
than due 
process (McBarnet, 1978 & 1981). Thus, while many police 
researchers have described the rule breaking and 
illegality of 
the rank and file practices, McBarnet carefully 
illustrates how 
such practices are enshrined in ad hoc case 
law (McBarnet, 1981: 
Ch 3). The consequence is that: 
Front men like the police become the ' fall guys ' of the 
criminal justice system taking the 
blare for any 
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injustices in the operation of law, both in theory 
and....... indeed in law. The law holds individual 
policemen personally responsible for the contravention of 
legality that are successfully sued, while at the same 
time refusing to make clear until after the event exactly 
what the police are supposed to do (McBarnet, 1981: 
156). 
The uncertainty faced by the lower ranks results in the need 
to control as much information as possible. Their autonomy from 
direct supervision creates the climate where information 
management is made possible. Organisational sanction results 
primarily from indirect information, in the form of paperwork, 
gossip, or a public complaint. By selectively filtering and 
laundering information the patrol officer is able to lessen the 
risk of in-the-job trouble. 
The control of information has various ramifications. If 
the police organisation both condemns and condones primary 
deviations, the result is to engender secondary deviations in the 
form of peer group solidarity which makes secrecy and the control 
of information possible. Thus, the solidarity which results from 
the external aspects of 'the job, (Cf Westley, 1970: Ch3) e. g., 
the threat of physical harm, is strengthened by internal 
contradictions. Peer group solidarity is directed as much 
against the organisation as the environment. In Westley's, 
admittedly small, sample of officers seventy-three percent would 
not "shop" another officer for stealing and would perjure 
themselves to protect the offender. 
To Westley, secrecy is one of the most important aspects of 
the occupational culture represented by the rule of silence. 
Alderson (1984) has illustrated how this rule of silence made the 
effectiveness of Operation Countryman, the corruption case in the 
Metropolitan Police, impossible. The team of detectives brought 
in to investigate from the provinces was met by a wall of 
silence. Involving over one hundred officers, and costing 
several millions of pounds, the operation resulted in the 
Page 47 
prosecution of only two detectives for accepting bribes. This 
was in spite of the Chief Constable in charge of the 
investigation being convinced that, of the eighty or so prime 
suspects, at least twenty five would be charged. 
Manning suggests that lying in police organisations takes 
several different forms, (Manning, 1977: 185-188): lying to 
protect one's colleagues, lying to protect an informant, lying to 
evade internal discipline and lying to procure a charge. 
Information is therefore manipulated either by omission, thus 
remaining silent, or by commission, and being liable to perjury. 
If in-the-job trouble results from the need to control 
information by officers as a result of perceived threats to their 
autonomy from the organisation, then on-the-job trouble results 
from threats to their autonomy on the streets. 
The Environment: Policing People 
On-the-job trouble arises from the patrol officer's mandate 
to act authoritatively in a given situation. Thus, as Fielding 
notes, one of the key accomplishments of a successful 
intervention is the "ability to convey the potential power of the 
office while containing its actual deployment to a minimum" 
(Fielding, 1984: 14). There are two elements in considering 
on-the-job trouble. The first is, what strategies can be used to 
prevent trouble arising, and the second is, if trouble 
does 
arise, what strategies can be applied to minimise 
it? In spite 
of the fact that most police interventions go unchallenged, 
the 
majority of studies of policing have focused on the second of 
these two issues (Reiss, 1968; Skolnick, 1975; Bittner, 1967; 
Westley, 1970; van Mannen, 1974 & 1978b; Holdaway, 
1983; PSI, 
1983: Vol iv). 
Collectively, these studies have documented how the law-in- 
books, which gives rise to the legal right to use 
"as much force 
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as necessary" to secure the arrest or detention of a suspect, is 
translated by the occupational culture into law-in-action. In 
Westley's sample of officers, sixty-six percent gave their 
primary rationalisation for the use of force an illegal basis, 
i. e. disrespect for the police or for obtaining information. 
Only eight percent gave a legal basis, i. e. to make an arrest 
(Westley, 1970: 122). Thus Westley concludes that, "group 
engendered values are relatively more important to the men than 
their legal function. " (ibid) 
Reiss' observational data confirms this picture. Of the 
thirty-seven incidents where unnecessary force was used: 
Almost one half of the cases involved the open defiance 
of police authority (39%), or resisting arrest (9%). 
Open defiance of police authority, however, is what the 
policeman defines as his authority, not necessarily 
official authority. Indeed in 40% of the cases that 
policemen considered open defiance the policeman never 
made an arrest (Reiss, 1968, reprinted in Landmann 1980: 
292). 
Holdaway's study of the British police also illustrates that 
the rules governing the use of force are occupational rather than 
legal. Force is used to regain control and authority, to gain 
confession, and for retribution (Holdaway, 1983: Ch 9). However, 
as Black's study illustrated, the use of unnecessary force may be 
limited, with other resources being brought to bear. Thus, 
disrespect for the police results in the chance of being arrested 
increasing by between twenty to thirty percent. (Black: 1980; 97). 
The use of force is, however, incremental rather than clear cut. 
An officer may choose to ignore a disrespectful slight to his or 
her authority, he or she may choose to manipulate the grounds for 
arrest, or choose to physically coerce the offender, either for 
the purposes of an arrest, or as an educative measure which has 
no legal consequences. 
The use of force and arrest for dealing with such incidents 
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is not without its problems, and for these reasons officers ray 
be circumspect about resorting to its use too often. First, 
there is always the possibility that its use may be unsuccessful: 
the officer may sustain injury, the offender may escape, etc. 
Second, while it nay be inn-ediately successful, the suspect may 
sustain injuries which require treatment, resulting in the 
possibility of an internal investigation and/or the suspect may 
make a formal complaint of wrongful arrest which will inevitably 
result in some form of internal disciplinary enquiry. Third, the 
over reliance on the use of force and arrest may be regarded by 
colleagues and superiors alike as a failure to negotiate a 
non-coercive or legitimate non-legal solution, thus raising 
issues about the officer's competence. 
The exercise of authority is always problematic for the 
police and, in part, this stems from the peculiar nature of their 
working environment. Briefly, police/public encounters may be 
characterised as being anonymous: they usually have no previous 
knowledge of each other; coercive: generally the public are 
unwilling actors in the police drama; stressful: the encounters 
are often charged with emotion; brief : the encounters only last a 
few minutes; and, finally, spontaneous: the parties have little 
or no knowledge of what to expect from each other (Sykes & 
Clarke, 1975: 477-488). 
For the patrol officer, the problem of supervision of this 
"volatile working group" (Sykes & Brent, 1983: Ch3), is related 
to the essential task of gaining information to ascertain whether 
or not an arrestable offence has occurred; the restitution and 
maintenance of order within the situation; gaining the right to 
act authoritatively and determining the resolution of the 
situation. (Sykes & Brent, 1983: 68; Sykes & Clarke, 1975: 
476-485; Manning, 1982). 
There are various mechanisms for minimising the chance of 
challenges to the officer's right to intervene authoritatively, 
and thus limit the possibility of on-the-job trouble and the loss 
of control. For instance, standing away and slightly behind the 
drivers-side door when carrying out a car stop so that the door 
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cannot be used as a capon against one (Rubinstein: 1973; Ch7). 
Such physical strategies, however, range from the instrumental to 
the symbolic. For instance, standing very close to a suspect so 
as to be in a position to thwart their attempts to escape or by 
using gesture to convey information by one's relaxed gait, etc. 
(ibid). 
In conjunction with the use of the body, the most important 
aspect of a police officer's armoury is the ability to use talk 
as a strategy to gain compliance. Empirically, it is not the 
case that when an officer's authority is challenged the result is 
the use of force, rather it is the use of talk. As Sykes & Brent 
show, "... in over 90% of cases of disobedience to an order that 
occurred in these encounters, repetition in a civil manner v%as 
sufficient to achieve compliance" (Sykes & Brent, 1983: 63). It 
would appear from this that officers routinely accept challenges 
to their authority without recourse to force, partially, perhaps, 
because they realise that citizens have to switch to a different 
"cognitive domain" before they comply with a request, and 
initially all that is necessary is to try again. If the strategy 
is still unsuccessful then the result is to enter into what Muir 
terms, 'an extortionate transaction of threat and counterthreat' 
(Muir, 1977: 38). Thus, Sykes & Brent illustrate that the 
sequence of such extortionate transactions tends to suggest: 
That as the number or length of the disturbances 
increases, the officer gradually escalates the 
forcefulness of his regulatory responses to a point where 
the civilian gives in. (Sykes & Brent, 1983: 22). 
Further, as Fielding illustates, talk based strategies utilise 
generally available repertoires to achieve particular ends. 
Thus, humour and civility, deceit and a sense of timing all 
become resources by which control can be maintained. It 
is not 
so much that an officer's work is about ordering and commanding 
citizens, but setting up the conditions under which such 
imperatives are viewed as either legitimate or at least tacitly 
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accepted (Fielding, 1984). For successful and, therefore, 
canpetent practice officers have to display competency in three 
domains, effective, cognitive and tactical (Manning, 1979a). 
However, such competency is not merely related to the situational 
exigencies of the moment. As we have already seen, the patrol 
officer is emeshed is a complex web of relationships which derive 
from legal, occupational, organisational and environmental arena. 
From this perspective, police work cannot be understood merely 
from an examination of what happens on the street. For instance, 
an arrest for drunk and disorderly may be legally correct but the 
station sergeant may view it as inappropriate. Conversely, it 
may be occupationally and organisationally acceptable to arrest 
for 'assualt on police' but later judged illegal by the courts. 
Caught between the competing and sometimes contradictory 
pressures which stem from organisational, environmental and legal 
uncertainty the patrol officer's position is tenuous. 
Although patrol officers have to reach an individual 
accommodation to the precarious position that they find 
themselves in, they are not completely isolated since the same 
situation is also faced by their colleages. Their carrion 
problems allow shared solutions. These solutions have both a 
cognitive and practical domain. In cognitive terms they allow 
officers to draw on a second order system of rules which orders 
and makes sense of the competing and contradictory 
demands. 
Practically, the extent to which an officer draws upon the second 
order rule system of the occupational culture will, to a greater 
or lesser degree, determine the contours of what police work 
is 
and how it can be achieved. 
To understand and explain police behaviour it 
is therefore 
necessary to examine how the police task 
is constructed by the 
organisational actors. This approach 
implies a partial rejection 
of much, particularly American, sociology of police work. 
Like 
Sociology in general, a significant part of police sociology 
has 
taken as its raison d'etre the discovery of 
law like 
generalisations which could be used to explain 
the effects of 
individual police officers' decisions (Sherman 1980). 
However, 
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such analyses do little to advance our understanding of how the 
police patrol task is achieved by knowledgeable and self 
reflecting actors. The saliences of patrol officers are not 
given by a neutral reading of the classic sociological variables 
of age, sex and class, or indeed by the more relevant variables 
such as suspects' demeanour or legal seriousness. Instead, they 
are filtered through an occupational lens which refocuses their 
perspectives. 
Much of the sociology of the police has ignored this crucial 
point and the result has been the failure to account for patrol 
officer behaviour. For instance, Friedrich's sophisticated 
analysis - based on the extensive Black Reiss data - could only 
account for 25% of the variance using the twelve best variables 
at the situational level of analysis (Friedrich: 1977). 
. 
It is the purpose of Part II to indicate how the patrol task 
is constructed through the mediation of the occupational culture. 
It will be argued that the most important factor in shaping a 
patrol officer's work is the avoidance of trouble, frcm both the 
public that he or she polices and the organisation for which he 
or she works. 
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PART II 
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE POLICE PATROL TASK 
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Chapter 5 
THE TERMS OF TROUBLE: VOCABULARY AND GRAMMAR 
Language and Culture 
As we have seen, the occupational relevancies of the patrol 
officer cannot be derived fron the organisational rhetoric of 
crime fighting which has limited applicability to the reality of 
routine patrol. Nor can they be derived from a reading of the 
formal organisational rules. These are more a reflection of the 
institutionalised attempts of management to control their 
subordinates rather than the reality of actual practice. 
Instead, it is necessary to examine the manner is which the 
patrol officer makes sense of the world and contructs the 
practice of policing and document, "the variety of practices and 
mundane considerations involved in the determination of 
operational meaning and situational relevance of policies and 
procedure for ongoing organisational activities" (Zimmerman, 
1970: 222). 
By treating the organisational arena as a dynamic forum in 
which meaning is created and recreated by reflexive and 
knowledgeable actors the analyst is faced with two problems. 
First, how does he or she gain access to such meanings? Second 
by what criteria can he or she claim that they are shared? This 
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is particularly a problem as such knowledge is not readily 
accessible. It rests on tacit understandings, unspoken 
assumptions, and taken for granted commonsense agreements between 
organisational actors. They are not manifest but operatively 
latent. It is in an attempt to solve these two problems that an 
analysis of occupational language provides a crucial key. 
The relationship between language and culture has long been 
of interest to anthropologists who have seen the function of 
communication for both individuals and groups as directly related 
to participants' purposes and needs (Hymes, 1961). Language 
provides a means by which different speech communities categorise 
and differentiate the social world which enables them to contrast 
activities in terms of their different purposes, roles and 
focuses. (Frake, 1969). 
Traditionally, such an approach has been limited to speech 
communities who inhabit a "physically bounded unit of space and 
have a full range of role opportunities" (Saville-Troike, 1982: 
p19) such as a tribe or a nation state. More recently, the 
concept of speech community has been used to include "any group 
within society which has anything significant in common". It is 
in this second sense that that subcultural and organisational 
theorists have used the concept. The development of specialist 
languages has been documented in the construction industry 
(Reimer: 1979), among heroin users (Agar: 1973), and within the 
medical profession (Becker et al: 1961) to single out but a few. 
The importance of these vocabularies, Manning argues, is that 
they contain: 
... the 
information necessary for dealing with the 
problems of the organisation. As these are faced, role 
terms, role imputations and typifications arise and have 
with than sets of acceptable referents". (Manning, 1970: 
225). 
The ability of any member of a group to utilise its language 
correctly can be seen as a mark of social competence. 
This 
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applies as much to understanding the vocabulary and grammar as in 
knowing what to say to wham and how appropriately to say it in a 
situtation (Hymes, 1966). Within an organisational setting the 
discovery of a distinct occupational argot provides a mechanism 
for determining the manner in which its users categorise the 
world and which aspects of it are of particular importance. 
In the police organisation, like any other, the vocabulary 
provides the distinct and discrete elements which locate people 
and activities that are occupationally and organ isationally 
relevant. In Mills' sense, this is a vocabulary of motives, 
since correct usage in accounting for actions provides others 
with the motive for that action. For example, when a police 
officer says, "I stopped a couple of niggers in the High 
Street. ", the word "niggers" provides enough organisational 
justification for the stop. As Mills reminds us, a sociological 
account of motives does not, "require either an explanation or 
reason for the action but, rather, some description of the 
socially organised conditions which produce the practical and 
ordinary use of motive in the mundane affairs of societal 
members. " (Mills, 197 : 103). The grammar provides the "deep 
structure" which allows for "ordinary members' competent and 
sensible employ (ment) of a motive as a device. " By uncovering the 
grammar which links the vocabulary in such a way as to make it 
organisationally relevant, we are able to discover the key 
saliences of the organisational actors. 
The Terms of Trouble 
Within the police culture there is a highly developed 
occupational argot, part of which is reproduced below. It 
is 
apparent from an examination of the terms, that their referents 
are the practical day-to-day concerns of officers rather than 
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strictly legal or organisational concerns. 
At first sight, the terms appear to be little more than a 
colourful, yet rather vague and arbitrary slang: 
"bottle" "pear-shaped" "headcase" "nigger" "threw a 
lAubblie" "umbrellas" "trendy lefty" "out of order" "coon" 
"tart" "comeback at you" "banana-shaped" "spade" "nutter" 
"toe-rag" "Tan" "over the top" "paki" "bent" "snt 
apeshit" "coloured gentlemen" "sootie" "bollocking" "yob" 
"commie" "black" "taking the micky" "stuck on" "Anti" 
"lost his bottle" "Storytime" "Coloured" "trot" "slag" 
"Greenham Oman" "suimiary justice" "street justice" 
"loonies" "our coloured bretheren" "jackanory" "Jungle 
Bunny" "spook" "wog" "pro" "griefy" 
Most of the terms are not unique to the police, they are 
borrowed from the wider culture. However, their meaning and 
import is subtly reworked and transformed to provide a wide and 
rich vocabulary. While each term is interesting in its in 
right, taken as a whole, correct use in the organisational 
setting is reliant on an underlying grammar which structures and 
orders the use of the vocabulary. For instance, what do "over 
the top" "story-time" and "bent" have in conirtion? Or, for that 
matter, "spades" "trendy lefties" and "toe-rags"? 
If one takes seriously Chatterton's claim that the primary 
concern of patrol officers when dealing with an incident is the 
avoidance of "within-the-job" and "on-the-job" trouble, then it 
becomes readily apparent as to what the terms are referring. 
They are all actions on the part of the police or the public that 
are related to the problem of trouble. Furthermore, the terms 
can be broken down into four distinct categories: those that 
refer to people who are considered troublesome; behaviour that is 
indicative of trouble; the strategies that officers use to avoid 
"cYl" and "in-the-job" trouble; and the organisational 
consequences of not avoiding trouble. 
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Figure 1. 
The Terms of Trouble 
PEOPLE 
Race : C1ass, Sex & Others: Politics : 
Coons : Yobs Antis 
Spooks : Toe-rags Commies . 
Slags : Tan Lefties . 
Sootier : Pro Greenham women 
: Coloured Bretheren : Tart Trots . 
Coloured Gentlemen : Nutters : " 
Blacks : Headcases 
Coloureds : Loonies : 
" Wogs 
Jungle Bunny :: . 
Nigger 
. Spades : 
Pakis 
Behaviour Strategies Consequences 
Went Apeshit Umbrellas Pear shaped . 
Threw a Wobblie Jackanory Banana shaped 
Taking the Micky Storytime Bent . 
Over the top Bottle Griefy 
Lost his bottle : Street Justice : Bollocking 
Out of order Summary Justice: Come back at you . 
Stuck on 
It is now necessary to examine each of the terms separately, 
to unpack their meaning and show how they frame officers' 
perceptions of the people and incidents with which they deal. 
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People: Racial Categories 
In Kimberley, there are more words in the police argot to 
describe someone of West Indian origin than there are for any 
other category of person: "slag", "nigger", "coon", "spook", 
"spade", "jungle bunny", "wog", "coloured gentlemen", "our 
coloured bretheren", "black", "coloured". Such terms are not a 
police invention, they are borrowed from the wider society and 
transformed by the police culture to fulfil a particular role in 
the construction of the officer's everyday work world. Apart 
from "black" and "coloured", all the labels convey more than a 
simple denotative label referring to ethnic origin. Embedded 
within than is the history of colonialism, domination, oppression 
and racism, writ small. Even the terms "coloured gentlemen" and 
"our coloured bretheren", as used in Kimberley, convey ironic 
intent, for blacks are viewed as neither "gentlemen" nor as 
"bretheren". Such labels are used as presentational strategies. 
For instance: 
Towards the end of the briefing, after a discussion on 
deployment, one of the younger P. C. 's interrupted: "What 
are ue going to do about the spades in the square? " The 
inspector, quickly glancing at me, interceded, "Coloured 
gentlemen please A.... " There was a giggle from the rest 
of the relief. 
The term "black", used positively and self assertively by the 
West Indian community itself, is notable by its absence and, 
although occasionally used, more often by senior officers than 
their juniors, its usage is the exception rather than the rule. 
Racist talk extends from the use of pejorative labels to wider 
attitudes as the following brief extracts fron my field notes 
illustrate: 
While patrolling, a young P. C. pointed out some of the 
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new building work going on. "I think it's some new 
housing, they look nice, but soon they'll (blacks) move 
in and turn them into slums. " 
The reality of poverty in the decaying inner city is also 
questioned. As an inspector put it: 
Some of the squalor that people live in round here is bad 
because of bad education, lack of understanding, but 
there are only a few real poor. 
Or as a P. C. put it more succinctly: 
You know this is the poorest borough in London but look, 
there are more BMWs here than in the City, and where do 
they get the money from? 
Even where the day to day evidence contradicts beliefs, 
stereotypes prevail: 
Black unemployed youth take it out on society by robbing 
mainly white women. 
Not all officers express such strong beliefs, although many do. 
However, racist talk is part of the everyday work world of police 
officers. It is accepted and tolerated, even by supervisory 
staff and, therefore, tacitly encouraged. The culture of the 
relief is at home with the language of racism: 
It is customary to head back to the station at midnight 
for a cup of tea. Five or six of the relief (all male) 
were lounging around in the canteen waiting for the 
kettle to boil. A was engaging everyone in a fast banter 
of insult exchanges. Somehow the conversation got 
steered towards B's sister. As B put it: "She's going to 
marry a fucking spade. " There was sane discussion as to 
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who he was, and A said that he knew the man. "He's a 
fucking mountain, can't half lift some, bet he's got a 
big dick. " "I'm speechless", said B. "I mean, what do I 
do with their kids -- probably grow up to be Rastas. " He 
then started to immitate his prospective nieces and 
newphews talking in a broad West Indian accent. "It's 
not that I don't like him", he went on "but he is a 
spade. " 
Another P. C. joined in: "It's not right though, is it? 
Horses don't go with cows. " All seven or eight of those 
present were quite at home with this banter, with the 
exception of D who, although generally quiet, kept 
completely out of the conversation and every now and then 
would look at me uncomfortably and raise his eye brows. 
Police Racism: A Discussion 
The police culture is at ease with the language of racism. 
There is, however, no necessary fit between attitudes and 
behaviour, and establishing such a link is a tenuous business. 
As can be seen from the preceding section, the verbalised 
hostility to West Indians is widespread. It ranges fron the use 
of pejoritative labels, which are demonstrably false, to wider 
attitudes. As Taylor reminds us, "verbalisms are real because 
they are socially efficacious, they are not therefore less real 
because they happen to be untrue" (Taylor, 1979: 148). It is, 
therefore, to miss the point to see such verbalisations as a 
manifestation of false consciousness or mistaken beliefs: the 
purposes that they serve in a particular setting are independent 
of their truth value. 
It is important to keep analytically separate the different 
forms of racism. While prejudice and bias, as attitudinal 
values, may be rife they may or may not be transformed, through 
action, into discrimination and differential enforcement. 
Further, if differentiation is based upon real difference in 
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crime rates for particular groups, then it is not discriminatory. 
This latter position is the one frequently resorted to by senior 
police officers to defend intensive policing operations. For 
instance, in defence of their Swamp 81 operation which preceded 
the Brixton riots, Camunanders Fairburn and Adams went to great 
lengths to explain that the police were responding to a massive 
increase of street crime in the Brixton area. (Scarman 
Report, 1982). As Lord Scarman summed up in his enquiry: 
"It may be that to describe the street crime situation as 
unique was to indulge in hyperbole. But the submissions 
do not explain away the practical import nor the 
seriousness of the crime problem in "L" District as it 
presented itself to Commander Adams, and subsequently to 
Commander Fairburn " (Lord Scarnnan, 1982: 85). 
Interestingly, such a position is supported by Jock Young, 
previously one of the leading lights of the New Criminology 
(Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973). In an almost complete 
volte-face (Lea and Young, 1982; Lea and Young, 1984), Young 
maintains that there has been a "real rise in crime among the 
West Indian population", and that the police, in responding to 
it, were not "simply responding to figments of their imagination" 
(Lea and Young, 1982: 166). 
On the other hand, Blom-Cooper and Drabble argue, in 
criticism to the evidence presented to Lord Scarman, that the 
police were involved, partially at least, in a self fulfilling 
prophecy. The prejudice of the lower ranks, manifest 
in the 
higher arrest rate for West Indians, results in the 
organisational policy being switched to more aggressive 
patrolling, which comes to be presented as neutrally responding 
to higher crime rates (Blom Cooper and Drabble, 1982). 
A far more strident attack cones from Bridges and Gilroy who 
maintain that the link between crime rates and ethnic origin 
is 
purely a function of police prejudice. 
(Bridges and Gilroy, 
1982). Furthermore, they argue that to engage in any discussion 
of race and crime is to give 
"intellectual support to racist 
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stereotypes of the black community as socially and economically 
disorganised" (Bridges & Gilroy, 1982: 35). For Gilroy, black 
crime is an essentially political act and, in this position, he 
goes further than Hall et al who, in "policing the Crisis" 
tentatively suggest that mugging is a proto-political act (Hall 
et al 1981: 397). Instead, they argue: 
We will not be drawn to debate the extent and character 
of ethnic crime. Instead we have chosen to examine 
policing practice and the laws and criminalisation 
processes which attend it (1982: 152). 
By refusing to engage in such debates, Gilroy is guilty of 
romanticism. On the one hand, most crime is intra rather than 
inter-related: whites steal fran whites, blacks from blacks, (cf: 
Stevens and Willis, 1979), on the other, the police role is 
equated with law enforcement whi ch is only a marginal aspect of 
their work. Gilroy wants to see black crime as a revolutionary 
act: 
Under certain conditions the struggle to define crime and 
criminals not only acquires a political character, but 
becomes central to the process of class formation (Gilroy, 
1982: 150). 
While the process of definition is indeed a political act, 
it is 
hard to see how mugging qua mugging is a political expression on 
the same level as that of the Tolpuddle Martyrs. 
(Gilroy, 
1983). 
The race crime debate is important because 
it illustrates 
how views tend to become polarised without regard 
to the 
available evidence. On the one 
hand, writers such as Gilroy, 
1982/1983; Bridges, 1983; Bridges and Gilroy, 
1982; Gutzmore, 
1983; Colman and Gorman, 1982 take the evidence of prejudiced 
police attitudes to be sufficient 
in attributing discrimination 
in practice, uncritically accepting a simplistic and questionable 
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perspective from labelling and deviancy amplification (Cf Mawby, 
1979). On the other hand, Waddington, 1983/1984 rejects the idea 
that the police are individually racially prejudiced. Rather, he 
sees their hostility to West Indians, in particular, as resulting 
from the abrasive nature of the encounters that the police have 
with West Indian male youth. While this is a powerful prop which 
underpins the lower ranks' hostility, Waddington fails to analyse 
the other dimensions of discrimination which, while not operating 
on an individual level, serve to increase the criminalisation of 
particular subsections of the population. 
Reiner, in his thorough review of the literature on the 
operation of police discrimination and differential enforcement, 
illustrates the complexity and multilayered elements involved 
(Reiner, 1985). Taking the evidence fron various observation 
studies, (including James, 1979; Holdaway 1983 and the PSI, 1983 
Vol iv), he argues that categorical discrimination (i. e. action 
against members of a particular group only on the basis that they 
are rr nbers of the group and not on any other legally relevant 
criteria (Reiner, 1985: 125)) is a marginal and indiscriminant 
form of police prejudice. If discrimination does occur it 
is 
more likely to be operative because of other forms of 
discriminatory practice which are outside of the purview of the 
individual police officer, or not related to his or her 
attitudinal values. These additional features of 
discrimination 
Reiner terms, Interactional, Institutional, Statistical and 
Transmitted discrimination (Reiner, 1985: Ch4). 
Transmitted discrimination operates because the police are 
heavily dependent on calls from the public (Cf Eckblom and Heal), 
and thus differential enforcement rates may result. 
If the 
public are more likely to call the police 
to incidents involving 
n rtbers of ethnic groups, then 
it is discrimination by sections 
of the public, rather than 
the police, that is operative. 
Further, in their role as dispute settlers, the police are 
heavily dependent on the preference of the complainant as 
to what 
action to take (Bittner & 
Bayley, 1983; Black, 1980), and a 
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higher arrest rate for ethnic groups nay be the result of public 
prejudice. 
Interactional discrimination results from the officer using 
discretion, not on the basis of legally relevant criteria but on 
the level of respect accorded by the suspect to the officer. The 
greater the disrespect shown the more likely that an arrest will 
follow (Black, 1980; Sykes & Brent, 1983; Smith & Visher, 1981). 
As Reiner notes, while 'contempt of cop' is not a valid reason 
for arrest it may provide a possible basis for a valid booking of 
a suspect who would otherwise have been let off (Reiner, 1985: 
134). 
Institutional discrimination arises from the differential 
application of resources to particular problans. (Cf. Carr- Hill 
& Stern, 1979. ) Thus, particular sections of the community are 
disproportionally stopped, searched and arrested (Blau-Cooper & 
Drabble, 1983; Willis, 1983; Stevens & Willis, 1979). In 
Kimberley, for example, one relief inspector consistently 
deployed his officers to a particular square which was a popular 
meeting place for young West Indians, even if this meant letting 
other beats go unpatrolled. 
Statistical Discrimination is a predominant factor in 
proactive policing and is especially apparent in stop and search 
operations. If the known lifestyle of a group involves a legally 
proscribed activity, e. g., hippies or Rastafarians using 
marijuana, those identified as a number of that group become a 
potential target for police action. Officially such procedures 
are prohibited. However, the evidence suggests that the practice 
is widespread (Willis, 1983; Stevens & Willis, 1979; PSI, 1983: 
Vol iv). Even so, it should be remembered, as Reiner points out, 
that the basis for such action is not prejudice per se but a 
concern with maintaining the appearance of efficiency. 
The available evidence suggests that police discriminatory 
practice is widespread, but that it is only marginally related to 
prejudiced attitudes. The question still remains that, given the 
documented hostility towards West Indians, what purpose does it 
serve and why does it manifest itself so forcefully? Part of the 
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answer might be that the police are drawn from that section of 
society that is most likely to be overtly prejudiced (cf Bagley & 
Varma, 1979; Reiner, 1978). The problem with such an explanation 
is that it fails to explain why the butt of police racism is 
almost soley West Indian. Indeed, in Kimberley, where a 
substantial minority of the population are Asian and a smaller 
but visible minority are Jews, there is little overt hostility to 
either group. And this lack of hostility is reflected in the 
smaller number of pejorative labels applied to these groups. 
I would suggest that the following explanation might be more 
in keeping with the available evidence and my own experience. As 
Albert Cohen noted (1965), subcultures do not so much invent new 
forms of social life as tend to borrow elements from the wider 
society and rework than to provide solutions to their own 
problems. The prejudice of police officers is, then, borrowed 
fron the range of attitudes available in the wider society, and 
used for their in purpose. The important point is that race,, as 
a category, is less relevant to police officers than other more 
occupationally salient categories. The most important of these, 
I would argue, is "trouble". While West Indians, to the police, 
represent a particularly troublesome group, there are other 
groups who also fall into the same category. These are not 
racial groups, in fact the only thing that unites them is the 
police perception of than as either "symbolic assailants", to use 
Skolnicks term, or "Challengers", to use Holdaway's. 
Police negative stereotyping is, therefore, less dependent on 
race than upon the occupationally relevant criterion of 
"trouble". Consider the following example which is not untypical 
of many daily encounters with West Indian males: 
Paul decided to stop everything that cane down the road 
that we were on "to see what was moving about at this 
tine of night". As the first car approached, Paul 
stepped out into the road and flagged it down with his 
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arms. The driver was a West Indian man in his mid 
thirties and the passenger was a white male of the same 
age. 
Paul approached the driver's window, "Would you mind 
stepping outside onto the road please. " As the man 
stepped out onto the road he started to banter: "Ey why 
you always picking on ire. I just driving my friend home 
and you always picking on me. That's four times you 
stopped me this week. You shouldn't be allowed to go 
round harrassing people. What's your number? I'm going 
to make a complaint against you. ", he taunted 
aggressively. Paul stood impassively on the curb, not 
reacting to the torrent. "657, that's my number", he 
eventually interjected. "Anyway I've never seen you 
before. " 
"Four times you stopped ne and I'm going to make a 
complaint. " "Please do-have you got my number? ", 
replied Paul with mock politeness. (Missing Data: the 
man is moving around and I cannot hear what is being 
said). 
"You know where the station is ?" asked Paul. 
"Yes I know. " 
"Now, what's your name? ", demanded Paul in an 
authoritative voice in an effort to re-establish the 
purpose of the stop. The man gave it and Paul asked him 
if he had his documents with him. 
"No. But I'm going down to the station to make a 
complaint". 
"Well then", retorted Paul with mock politeness "you can 
take your documents in at the sane tine. I'm giving you 
this form and your.... " The man interrupted, "Yeah I 
know. I got five days" and with that he got back into 
his car and drove off. 
Such incidents are troublesome to officers because they challenge 
their right to authoritatively intervene and present them with 
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the problem of control. However, as I have indicated, the 
concern with trouble is not just applicable to racial categories 
but underscores the entire patrol officer's enterprise. 
People: Political Categories 
The political categories of "Trot", "Commie".. "Leftie", 
"Trendie Leftie", "anti", "Greenham Waren", have to be understood 
with reference to the growing campaign for police accountability 
within the country at large, and specifically within the NET, 
since the publication of Lord Scarman's Report (Cf. Policing 
London, Smiley, 1982; Spencer, 1985; Jefferson & Grimshaw, 1984; 
Waddington, 1984). In the aftermath of the inner city rioting of 
1981, the battle for police accountability has become a major 
issue, and nowhere has it been more keenly fought out than in the 
crumbling inner city areas such as Lambeth, Brent, Hackney, and 
Toxteth. (Cf. John Cunningham in the Guardian 2/8/85: 13). The 
result has been an increased polarisation between elected 
representatives and the local police Commanders (Cf. Cunningham 
in the Guardian 29/7/85 p 5; Okojie, 1985). In Kimberley the 
effect is felt not just at senior management levels as the 
following extract illustrates: 
The inspector saw the left wing council as putting 
"serious obstacles" in the way of establishing good 
community relations. "They see everything as political. 
This has been the problem of setting up Local Tenants 
Groups and Neighbourhood Watch Schemes. They want 
political control of the police. The council thwarts us 
by telling their officers that they may not talk to us. " 
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The effect of this policy is also keenly felt on the ground as 
well. As one P. C. explained: 
"I went down to this new place that they've got for young 
adolescent offenders about a burglary. When I'd finished 
I asked the manager if it would be possible to pop in one 
night to get to know the kids. " 
'Not until you've sorted out who killed Colin Roach', he 
replied. 
'OK', I said 'but I'll leave you with my name. If you 
want to contact me at the station anytime. 1 'I dont need 
your name. If I want it I'll contact the station. "' 
This is not an isolated incident, many of the officers, and 
specifically Hare Beats, talked about the problem of 
non-cooperation. Officially, at least, they were excluded from 
schools, youth clubs, nurseries, residential care homes, etc. As 
another officer related : 
"It was a bit bad of me. I should have gone down there 
before, but you know, I just didn't seen to get round to 
it. Anyway last week I finally got to this youth club. 
This woman who ran it said I could pop in at any time. 
Anyway I finally got down there and put my head around 
the door and she came out. I got the feeling that she 
didn't want me to come in. She was sort of blocking my 
way with her body. Well I didn't say anything about it 
at the time, but when I saw her later I asked if she was 
trying to stop me getting in. She said that some of the 
kids didn't like police officers about. Well what a load 
of rubbish is that? I went to see the vicar who was on 
the committee, to ask him if he knew what was going on. 
He said he'd look into it, but it seems as if some of the 
other workers, who are a bit left you know, have gone in 
and stirred up anti police feeling. " 
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Such anti-police feeling is not seen as indicative of true local 
opinion. It is viewed as alien to the "respectable" people in 
the area and unrepresentative of the "silent majority". 
Hostility towards the police is the product of deviants whose 
motives are suspect. As one sergeant expressed it: 
"The council and the Police Monitoring Group are not 
comprised of 'real politicians' but 'bandwagonners'... I 
dont mind if someone's a commie, if that's what they 
really believe in, but, " he lamented "most of the people 
in this area are not really sincere. " 
Or as one P. C. put it rather less subtly: 
"The lefties on the council just squander money on such 
things as 'Babies Against The Bomb' which is full of 
fucking lessies anyway! ". 
Although such challenges are potentially less threatening than 
those that arise from direct police intervention on the streets, 
to the patrol officer they represent a more difficult form to 
handle. In fast moving incidents on the streets, challenges can 
be net with a variety of responses, turning a blind eye, arrest 
or even extra-legal violence. In some instances, at least, such 
challenges, although not seen as legitimate are seen as 
understandable - the fleeing felon has a lot to lose from being 
arrested. On the other hand, political challenges come from 
people who, in the patrol officers' eyes, have no personal gripe 
with the police. Rather, their aim is to challenge the 
legitimacy of police action on a broader, perhaps legal or 
constitutional basis. Given that much policing is of dubious 
legality (although cf Macbarnet, 1981) such challenges not only 
threaten the individual police officer, they undermine the whole 
basis of police action. 
Interestingly, the political categories were almost entirely 
absent from Surrey, their salience being generated fran the 
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tensions within the inner city. In this case, then, the negative 
characterisation of particular groups is more likely to be 
related to occupationally relevant criteria than pre-existing 
prejudice. There existed other categories, particularly 
"Greenham Waren" which was applied to any middle class female 
challenger, and the label was often designated with reference to 
the woman's attire. This category was highly pertinent since the 
station was supplying ten officers a week to Greenham Coirunon at 
the height of the Anti Missile Protests. Significantly, it is 
one of the few negative labels for females other than "Pro", 
"Tan", Tart" which are all related to prostitution. This is 
hardly surprising given that women rarely come into contact with 
the police other than as victims, and the patrol officer 
willingly casts them into that role. The most cotrnon category, 
however, applied to the white working class youths who were 
mainly resident on one estate. Although the intensity of 
hostility shown to this group was less than that towards West 
Indians in the MET the negative characterisation remained. As 
one W. P. C told me: 
"You can be sure that if s have any trouble it will be 
from the yobs on the Estate. " 
Or as another expressed it: 
"Fucking animals, that's what they are. " 
Such stereotypes were operationally visible, specifically in 
relation to car stops. Joy-riding was becoming an increasing 
problem in the area, with youths from the estate stealing cars, 
driving them around for an evening and then dumping them on the 
common behind the estate before 'firing' them. Indeed, one area 
of the cone on was littered with the burnt out shells of cars: 
As patrolled the estate a Cortina with four white 
youths in it was spotted heading in the direction of the 
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common. We turned and followed. As far as I could 
gather, any car with four youths in it, especially a 
Cortina, in this part of Fakeston was a possible IDA. 
Similiarly, in Kimberley one of the less subtle justifications 
for a car stop I heard was: 
"Four Niggers in a B. M. W., must be orth a pull. " 
Thus, while race provides the immediate justification, in the 
context of the Surrey data there are other situationally relevant 
criteria for the stop. Four young men, possibly joy-riding, in a 
poor neighbourhood with high youth unemployment nay not give the 
legal or the organisationally necessary justification for a stop 
but it is occupationally sufficient regardless of race. 
In the main, police hostility is directed towards the lower 
stratum of society. However, in Surrey middle class challengers 
who argue about being ticketed for parking tickets and similar 
of fences are viewed with equal contempt, "Yes madam, please do 
write to the Chief Superintendant" and gave rise to a well 
appreciated joke from the canteen audience: 
Q. What's the difference between a hedgehog and a Range 
Rover? 
A. A Range Rover's got all the pricks on the inside. 
One final group of people who represent "trouble" is worth 
mentioning, but it does not possess such readily identifiable 
characteristics as "spades", "yobs" or even "trendy lefties". 
These are the "nutters", "loonies", and "headcases". This 
category of person ranges from the senile old lady who is 
convinced that her neighbours are tapping her phone, to the 
aikido wrestler who has gone beserk with an axe. 
Behaviours That Are Indicative of Trouble 
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On the one hand people such as "loonies", present a problem 
because the evaluation of the truthfulness of their claim is 
difficult. They are interactionally difficult to handle and they 
are seen by the relief as unproductive of police work. But this 
category not only includes the "timewasters" but also the 
unpredictably violent. They are potentially the most 
threatening, since rationality is hard to ascribe and, therefore, 
correct action hard to predict. It is this group that is most 
likely to "throw aw bblie" or to go "ape-shit" and it is this 
behaviour that is potentially the most troublesome for patrol 
officers. 
The terms do not refer to the rough and tumble of the 
ordinary street tussle or to someone trying to resist arrest by 
being aggressive or non co-operative-. Rather, they refer to 
uncontrolled violent behaviour such as frenzied kicking, biting, 
scratching, punching, and flailing which necessitates the use of 
force in order to quell it. Consider the following example of a 
woman who is being arrested after losing control in a public 
library and damaging the reception area. 
The woman was dragged to the back of the van, still 
struggling and screaming. A crowd of about fifteen or 
twenty people had gathered loosely around the forecourt 
of the library. 
The distance from the ground to the back of the van is 
som two foot, and it was extremely difficult to get the 
struggling roman into the back. The four of us (three 
PCs and myself) held her and forced her into the back of 
the van. She sprang out again. She was held by the 
neck, arms and middle, lifted up into the air, struggling 
all the way, and pushed futher into the van. PC 'Y' and 
PC 'Z' collapsed around her to stop her struggling in the 
confines of the van. "Don't you bite me! ", ordered PC 
'Z' as he grabbed her hair to avert the sinking teeth. 
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"Get some cuffs", suggested 'Z'. "I haven't got any" 
replied 'Y', still trying to contain the writhing body. 
"Take them off me then". 
'Z' was restraining her legs, 'Y' her arms and I her 
middle. 'Y' managed to retrieve the hand cuffs from 'Z's 
belt. The 'sunan started to scream and thrash 
hysterically as 'Y' struggled to get the hand cuffs on 
her. Finally they ware securely on, and she remained in 
an ungainly heap on the floor of the van with three pairs 
of hands restraining her movements". 
Such behaviour presents the officer with several inter-related 
problems with regard to competent practice. It is generally 
understood by their sergeants and peers that people go 
"completely apeshit" for no reason. However, it is equally 
recognised that successful policing requires the handling of such 
situations so that the officer maintains his control without 
recourse to excessive force. Rock has illustrated this problem 
nicely with regard to bailiffs. 
Their chief concern is to avoid violence and they place 
great reliance on their ability to persuade a debtor to 
come to prison with them. They may reconcile a debtor to 
his fate, by disarming them with humour. A bailiff of D 
court, for instance would routinely tell a female debtor 
that he would wait fifteen minutes before they left the 
house together. When asked why, he would reply. "I'll 
give you ten minutes to wash your feet and five minutes 
to change your unmentionables ." In many cases the woman's 
amusement would make her cc mital easier. 
(Rock: 1973; 215-16) 
When a person goes "apeshit" it represents the officer's loss of 
control and, although to be expected in isolated incidents, if an 
officer has a reputation for prisoners going 'apeshit' on them, 
then questions will be raised about their ability to handle 
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people. Officers are keenly aware that seemingly trivial 
incidents and comments can provoke a prisoner and make them less 
amenable to control: 
After arresting three shoplifters, and having placed them 
in the back of the panda, P. C. 'H' called back to the 
station to report to the sergeant that he had "three 
coming in". He explained to ne later that he never calls 
them "prisoners cos that really winds them up" . 
Not only does "going apeshit" represent a threat to an 
officer's competence, but also to his or her physical well being. 
As the example showed, when people go beserk they possess 
enormous reserves of strength. Indeed, during my first week in 
Kimberley, a station sergeant was charging a prisoner and, when 
he "threw a bblie", in the ensuing fracas the sergeant was 
seriously injured and hospitalised for three Keks. 
In spite of the occupational necessity of controlling 
violent and aggressive people, the police are not routinely 
taught how to control beserk people. Admittedly, shield training 
does include a set manoeuvre for taking an armed offender in an 
enclosed space (a knife or bottle, not a gun) but this is not 
readily available to the patrol officer on the street or in the 
charge roam. Generally, if someone does go beserk, everybody 
'bundles in', the principle being that sheer %eight of numbers 
will literally crush opposition. The problem with such a 
strategy is that it is unpredictable in its outcome. The 
prisoner may suffer injuries which could result in the need for 
hospitalistion and possibly result in the officers being charged 
with assault. 
If "throwing a sobblie" and "going apeshit" represent 
physical challenges to the officer's authority, then "taking the 
micky" is the term for symbolic resistance. When an officer has 
warned someone to desist frccn an activity, such as p laying very 
loud music in the street, if they increase the velum' rather than 
Page 76 
turn it down then this sould represent "taking the micky". 
Although such incidents raise problems for officers, particularly 
what Muir terms the "paradox of face" (Muir 1977 ch2), they can 
be handled so that there are no ramifications beyond the 
encounter itself. However, other incidents can lead to an 
officer's competence being called into question if there is any 
internal organisational come back. For instance: 
"I got this bloke for cheque fraud, he'd really been 
living it up, £800 in four days. Anyway I got him and 
charged him. He was granted bail for the weekend before 
going to court on the Monday when he was sent down. But 
do you know what that bastard did. While he was out on 
bail he got the cheque book, which was never recovered 
and did another £400 over the weekend. That's really 
taking the micky that is. It's only just come to light 
and I've got to go down to prison and interview him. He 
ain't half going to get a good kicking when I get him on 
my own. " 
As Peter Manning points out, the elements that combine to give 
officers a satisfactory termination to their work are rarely 
present in encounters. If they are, the officer: 
.... will make an arrest and charge, 
he will obtain thanks 
and obtain closure and he will manage an agreement 
between the parties, and he will accomplish the knitting 
together of "loose ends". Final and actual termination 
occurs when the "right paper" is submitted which ensures 
that the termination will not come back at you. 
(Manning: 1982; 127) 
In the above exanple, for a uniformed officer to obtain an 
arrest, charge and conviction of a cheque fraud represents a 
"good pinch" and should enable the officer to enjoy a 
satisfactory outcome. By using the cheque book to continue the 
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offence while on bail, the offender has effectively spoiled the 
chance of a satisfactory outcome for the officer. Further, the 
officer's competence is called into question. If the offender 
had access to the cheque book, why did the officer fail to find 
it? 
Police behaviours that are indicative of trouble 
Behaviours which are indicative of trouble for police officers 
are not just confined to members of the public. There are 
several terms which usually, although not exclusively, refer to 
police behaviours which are the harbinger of trouble. 
Specifically, "over the top", "out of order" and "lost his 
bottle". 
When used about the public, "out of order" is similar to 
that of "taking the micky" although it does not apply to the 
deliberate and intentional disobedience to police instruction. 
For instance, a car driving down a one way street could be "out 
of order" since the term implies a flagrant abuse or either a 
legal or normative standard. When used to refer to the 
behaviours of police officers its meaning is more specific: 
After a violent pub fight, which had resulted in over ten 
arrests and injuries to several of the prisoners, the 
canteen was busy with the chatter of the night's events. 
There seemed to be an uneasy feeling that some of the 
violence had been caused by the inspector's heavy handed 
behaviour. As one P. C. expressed it. "He was out of 
order". One man had lost his front teeth in the affray. 
And as another officer suggested, "When he's (the 
inspector) got the cavalry behind him he gets into strong 
arm tactics, pushing and kicking people. " 
The criticism of the inspector was not based upon his use of 
force per se: to not sanction the use of force when required 
would have opened the inspector up to the criticism that 
he had 
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"lost his bottle". Rather, it was implicit in the criticism that 
the amount of force was situationally unjustified. As such, it 
is not based on the concern with the legal niceties of minimum 
force but with the occupational desire to lay low and stay out of 
trouble. Such "heavy handed tactics" raise the possibility of 
awkward questions having to be answered and jeopardise the 
security of the relief. If they have to stage a cover up there 
is always the chance that they will be discovered. 
Strategies for Avoiding Trouble 
"Bottle" and its corollory "lost his bottle" have wide currency 
within the police argot, but are elusive concepts to pin down. 
Powis in his "Glossary of words and phrases commonly used by 
thiefs, cheats, and ponces" (1977) defines it thus: 
"Courage, forceful character or nerve. 'He has plenty of 
bottle" or 'He has lost his bottle". A variation is 
where something of no value moral or material is said to 
have 'No bottle''. 
Drivers are often said to have "bottle", when they indulge in 
high speed chases. Squeezing through a gap between a stationary 
car and on coming traffic while travelling at eighty miles an 
hour is a sign of "having bottle". Conversely, the driver who 
always plays it safe, never taking any undue chances is 
considered to have "no bottle". 
The risks are not only confined to driving but to dealing 
with potentially violent interactions in a forceful and decisive 
manner. In this way senior officers are often said to have "lost 
their bottle", since their concerns with legality and due process 
temper the more practical impulses of the relief. For instance, 
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a senior officer was said to have "lost his bottle" because he 
would not authorise the breaking down of a suspect's door without 
a warrant. In this example, "Bottle" is not just related to 
physical risk-taking but being prepared to take personal and 
organisational risks which might jeopardise one's career. 
"Bottle" also has a more subtle meaning which is closely 
related to the origin of the term. "Bottle" is cockney rhyming 
slang for "Bottle and Glass": "Class". The class being alluded 
to is that of a boxer. In boxing, "class" does not just refer to 
the strong man who hits and punches his way through a bout, but 
also to the fighter who can duck and weave, tiring his opponent. 
Similarly, in police usage, "bottle" refers to the ability to 
keep one's nerve in a situation which is potentially violent and, 
with skilful use of talk and bluff, calm it down without recourse 
to force. 
Paperwork 
Having "bottle" is one way of avoiding trouble in a 
situation, but another strategy exists which is primarily related 
to the use of organisationally derived rhetorics to 
retrospectively justify action. The vehicle for such a device is 
paperwork. In general, police officers hate paper work. They 
see their job as overrun by it which diverts them from the real 
task of policing. In one way though, the mastery of 
organisational report writing, although viewed as unnecessary, 
can be used as a key device for staying out of trouble. 
The centrality of paper work, the written report on various 
incidents, is accentuated by the isolation of the police 
officer's task. Most incidents are dealt with either alone or 
with one other officer, and there is very little supervision of 
actual incidents. Instead, the written report often 
becomes the 
sole criterion for making judgements about whether an 
incident 
has been correctly dealt with. (Cf PSI, 1983: vol iv). But as 
Manning notes: 
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Incidents as recorded in formal reports bear a 
problematic relationship to the actual event. The 
incident record and the behavioural record are two 
phenomenologically independent matters. They are twv 
parallel, but slightly disjointed strips of experience". 
(Manning: 1982; 126 ) 
Paperwork is an occupational necessity as the following extract 
fron my fieldnotes makes clear: 
On car patrol, an officer will often pull up into a minor 
side road and "sit up" for a while taking the time to 
f ill in his or her pocket book. If there are two of them 
they will often confer about time, date, place, etc. so 
that their entries will be roughly the same. Many minor 
incidents are recorded in the pocket book, especially by 
probationers who are keen to be able to justify to their 
sergeants what they have been doing. All major incidents 
are recorded by everyone. 
There are several reasons for the use of a pocket book. It is 
supposed to provide the first record of an incident, written up 
soon after the event. As such, it is presumed to be an accurate 
record of what took place during an incident, undistorted by 
memory or other factors. This has particular salience for court 
appearances which are often months after the event, and as a 
basis for generating other written reports at a much later date. 
There are other reasons for using the pocket book which are 
not concerned with organisational efficiency but occupational 
survival. They are directed at the possibility that something 
might go "bent" or "griefy" on an officer. Such strategies are 
called "Umbrellas" or "Covering". As one P. C. explained: 
Paperwork can be used as a good covering device: 
"Umbrellas". "If something should go wrong", he told me 
"a complaint against you or something like that, if 
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you've got it written in your pocket book it can be used 
as evidence to support you. For instance", he went cn, 
"Say you arrested someone in a fight and there was a 
delay in getting them to the station because the van had 
broken down. You must write down what the delay was, why 
it occurred, as accurate as possible. Otherwise the 
man's lawyer could say you'd taken him up to the corinon 
and beat him up. Unless you've got it in your pocket 
book and it can be justified to your sergeant, and the 
courts, you're going to be in the shit. " 
Bearing in mind Manning's point about the disjunction between the 
incident and the reported details of it, officers are aware that 
the reports are not reproductions of incidents but 
reconstructions. The reconstructions are for a particular 
audience and therefore they are written in a style and manner 
which is framed by organisational expectations. For the patrol 
officer, the crucial relevancy is to try and ensure that only 
information which portrays him or her in a favourable light 
reaches senior managers. On the other hand, senior managers are 
more concerned with ensuring that the correct administrative and 
legal procedures have been adhered to. Such reconstructions are 
often used as stylistic devices, for instance: 
'I`mo officers sat in the canteen trying to get their 
reports straight. They had arrested two men and were 
trying to reconstruct the events. "I said to him, 'would 
you mind'', one officer read from his pocket book. "Well 
I didn't really, I said 'get your fucking arms against 
the wall ', but you can't put that in a report can you? " 
The concern with presentation over accuracy can go further. This 
is no longer referred to as "covering" or "umbrellas" within the 
argot, but "story-time" or "Jackanory", the latter often being 
alluded to by the singing of the signature tune of a popular 
children's television programme that bears the same narr. 
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Consider: 
As we are sitting in the canteen, a 'suspects on 
premises' call comes through. Z and Y jug fran their 
seats and rush down to the area car. The location is 
only half a mile from the station, and we are there in no 
time. A pane of glass is smashed in the front door which 
is open. Z and Y rush in and search the house which 
appears empty. There is, however, one door on the ground 
floor which is locked. "Shall I break it down? " asks Z 
and answers himself with a smiling but considered "yeah". 
Two hefty cracks with his boot and the door is open. All 
the woodwork on the door surround is splintered. The 
roan is empty. As Z comes out he looks at the broken 
frame, turns to we and says conspiratorially "You didn't 
see that". 
Back in the canteen, Y and Z are discussing what they 
should do about the paperwork. Z has written his initial 
report, it reads: 
"We searched the whole house and, as we believed that the 
suspect was still on the premises, there was only one 
room in which he could be in and that was locked on the 
inside. I thought I heard a noise fran inside the roam 
and so broke the door down". 
Y adds with a smile "I heard the noise", and then 
suggests. "If you like you could add that the adjacent 
room was only separated by a thin partition wall and the 
noise you heard was another P. C. moving about 
in the 
room". Z added this, read through the report and thought 
that "it would do". 
While such examples illustrate minor reconstructions, primarily 
for the sake of organisational requirements, they are unlikely 
to 
compromise the officer legally. But such strategies can 
be used 
to substantiate a shaky legal position 
for an arrest. By 
falsifying the evidence, reasonable grounds can be provided 
for a 
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course of action. "Jackanories", then, move from being a 
question of style to one of perjury. For instance: 
The inspector came into the canteen and asked if someone 
"wanted a body". It was apparent that one of the 
prisoners had been arrested, but nobody knew who the 
arresting officer was. The inspector was looking at the 
ten or so D. S. U. officers hoping that one of them would 
volunteer. Nobody did. Instead they volunteered an 
officer. "361 will take it sir. " Reluctantly 361 got up 
to deal with the prisoner. "I need a witness too". This 
was awkward also, but after a few nnents of silence 
another officer volunteered, "I'll be a witness sir". 
"But you were round the back", came another voice. 
Nobody seemed to care. Somehow the reports would get 
sorted out. 
Extra-legal violence 
By far the Trost controversial resource at the patrol officer's 
disposal to avoid trouble is the use of extra-legal violence. 
Within the culture, such behaviour is termed, "sumnary justice", 
"street justice", "a good kicking" or a "good hiding". The 
extent of such behaviour is enornDusly difficult to gauge. This 
is not just a problem of "observer" effect. A lone observer, 
even corking for lengthy periods in the field, is unlikely to 
come across many situations where any force is necessary, let 
alone extra-legal force. Even then, it is difficult judge what 
constitutes extra-legal force. For instance, a prisoner is 
struggling and an officer has got him in a half Nelson position, 
with his arm twisted up around his back. Gradually the officer 
is nudging his arm upwards to try and quell the continuing 
restistanee. At what point, if any, does the force used become 
"excessive"? 
The PSI researchers, Smith and Grey (PSI, 1983: Vol iv) 
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witnessed eight separate incidents during which, in their 
opinion, excessive force was used. Excessive force is not the 
same as "street justice" or "summary justice". It may result 
from. an officer "going over the top" or losing his or her temper. 
"Summary justice", on the other hand, has a more specific meaning 
referring to extra-legal violence which is used as punishment or 
retribution. The following story told by an officer illustrates 
this more exclusive meaning well: 
The desk sergeant also told Roger of the fight that had 
occurred the night before in the charge roan. The 
station sergeant had been questioning a large West Indian 
suspect when the suspect suddenly went berserk and 
attacked the sergeant who was alone with the prisoner. 
It took four officers to restrain the man. The sergeant 
had been knocked unconscious and had to be taken to 
hospital. The desk sergeant ended the story with. "But 
they got him later, right between the bollocks". 
Stories like these are frequently related by officers, detailing 
how they eventually got the upper hand and taught a violent or 
cheeky offender a lesson. Thus "suumiary justice" can be used to 
reinstate lost authority on the street. During a conversation 
about the level of hostility shown by young West Indian males in 
Kimberley an officer from another division stated: 
"I'd fucking nick 'em. Even if you can 't do 'em then 
because of the numbers I'd get them later when nobody was 
around. I don't forget a face you know". 
A rather subtle variation on this process was 
indicated in the 
following story which illustrates how "summary justice" can 
be 
seen as making up for what is perceived as a deficiency of 
the 
legal system, which is too lenient on offenders: 
prisoner had started to complain of feeling ill, 
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stomach pains and the lot. A doctor was called who said 
there was nothing wrong with him and left the staticn. 
The prisoner continued to display the symptoms with more 
intensity and the doctor was called again. The doctor 
still did not believe that the symptoms were real, but 
decided to play safe and had the man admitted to 
hospital. The hospital doctor could find nothing wrong 
with the man either. He then asked what the man had 
done. "I told him all about his violent crimes and, on 
hearing this, the doctor said with a wry smile, 'Well, I 
think we'll have to have his appendix after all . "' The PC 
chuckled with glee at the justice of it all. 
"Summary justice" and the use of extra-legal force were not 
just evidenced by the use of stories. On three separate 
occasions I witnessed behaviour which, in my opinion, constituted 
the extra-legal use of force and on two occasions was definitely 
related to retribution. For example: 
The inspector started to move the crowd to the outside of 
the pub. He pushed on towards the door and the lad 
started to strugle. He was grabbed by three officers and 
dragged outside still struggling. More officers joined 
in until there was a circle with the man on the ground in 
the middle being kicked. Later I heard that the man had 
lost his front teeth. 
The Consequences of Trouble 
As with the use of paper work for a covering device, the use 
of "sunmary justice" presents the officer with the possibility of 
organisational and legal sanction. Officers are well aware that 
such behaviour, as ill as less questionable actions, can result 
in things going "bent", "griefy", "pearshaped", or banana shaped 
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on them, and therefore resulting in the possibility of a 612 (a 
formal complaint) being issued against them. These are all the 
organisational consequences of something "coming back at you", 
and therefore jeopardising an officer's position. At best he or 
she will receive a "bollocking" from a superior officer, at 
srst, formal disciplinary proceedings will be undertaken. This 
raises the possibility of the case being referred to the Director 
of Public Prosecutions and a formal legal action being 
instigated. 
The consequences of trouble are not only related to formal 
organisational sanction but also have a bearing on occupational 
concerns. To be a competent organisational member, requires an 
understanding of the working rules of the occupational culture 
because these provide a mechanism for lessening the chances of 
trouble arising. For instance, officers will typically castigate 
their fellows who are found guilty of wrongdoing, not for the 
act itself, but for being caught. Although such a reaction may 
seem cynical, it reflects the realisation that "You can't police 
by the book" and must, inevitably, "bend the rules" in order to 
successfully perform the job. If an officer fails to avoid 
"within the job" trouble too often, it indicates to their 
colleagues that they have not understood the basic principles of 
policing. Therefore, they may land their colleagues in "the 
shit" by their ineptitude and cannot be trusted to protect their 
fellow officers from organisational sanction. 
The terms of trouble represent a culturally derived solution 
to the organisational and environmental problems posed by the 
practice of policing. While it is true that most encounters 
police officers have with the public are essentially trouble 
free, officers are aware that these encounters have the potential 
to go 'griefy' on them. The result of this awareness 
is to 
highlight the officer's need to establish control over incidents, 
by creating the conditions under which their authority to 
define 
and determine resolutions is upheld. The issue of control 
is not 
confined to "on the job" matters. There is a spill over effect 
fron incidents on the street to events in the station. A 
Page 87 
satisfactory temination of an encounter does not just depend upon 
the resolution reached at the incident but on the organisational 
resolution. Unless the paperwork is written with reference to 
acceptable organisational rhetorics, then the incident can still 
go 'bent'. 
Page 88 
Chapter 6 
TIE POLICE OCCUPATION AND THE POLICE ORGANISTAION 
Introduction 
The terms of trouble indicate how the occupational 
relevancies of patrol officers are shaped through the interaction 
between organisation and environment, which create, sustain and 
transform the nature of the police task through the operation of 
the cultural rules of the lower ranks. Thus, concern with 
trouble and its avoidance does not result fron the primary 
organisational mandate of order maintenance or crime control, it 
is consequent upon the legal and organisational forms through 
which such tasks are structured. In this sense, while it may be 
permissible to talk about an organisational goal, for the 
individual members there are more salient rhetorics, such as 
career, security, camaraderie, status, etc., which assume far 
greater significance. 
The terms of trouble only relate to one aspect of the patrol 
officer's work world, the wish to avoid negative consequences as 
a result of performing street work. An equally important aspect 
of the officer's work world is the relationship he or she has 
with the organisation within which they work. This relationship 
is mediated by senior officers and the relationships that they 
develop with their colleagues on the street. Of course these are 
not independent of their "on the job" relevancies, in fact they 
are heavily dependent upon them. 
Paradoxically, despite its hierarchical authority structure, 
the police organisation has a strong permissive element. This is 
partly due, as many commentators have noted, to the discretion 
which is inherent in the office, but it is also a result of the 
reliance on an inhibitory rule book which is acknowledged rrore in 
breach than by observance. The result is an organisation which 
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is tolerant of many different styles of orking. (Chatterton, 
1981) The discretionary power of an officer means that for many 
offences it is within his or her purview to choose not to 
exercise discretion. One officer will apply the letter of the 
law and another will not. Nor can either claim by extraneous 
standards that the other was right or wrong. If criticism is 
levelled it is more likely to be that "it Auuld have made a good 
arrest", or been a useful "figure", and thus stressing either the 
personal utility to the officer or the collective utility to the 
relief. The discretionary nature and differing interpretations 
of arrest practice is illustrated by an officer who, after 
attending a pub brawl, was asked by a colleague: 
"Did you get a body? " 
"No. I could have", he replied "but I calmed him down 
instead". 
Or, as the following example illustrates: 
"How the fuck did you manage to get an arrest for 
criminal damage in the middle of all that? ", asked a 
younger officer in amazement. "Well, I went up to this 
bloke and said, 'are you DHV. He said 'no', so I 
lifted up his dark glasses and said, 'Yes you are. 
You're nicked'. While you were getting P. O. arrests I 
was getting a crime arrest. ", intimating that he didn't 
think much of Public Order arrests. "If you read the 
collator's reports every day and look at the photographs, 
that's how you get them. " 
The latitude which discretion and the organisational 
structure encourages also allows for the construction of 
particular organisational roles which can 
be moulded by the 
selective use of organisational rules and rhetorics. 
The 
organisation in this way becomes a resource 
from which various 
versions of policing can be constructed and sustained. 
(van 
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Maanen, 1983: 278). While this suggests an anarchic 
organisational structure allowing unrestrained individual 
autonomy, it would be naive to travel too far down this road. 
Autonomy there may be, but it is both relative and constrained. 
Previous . research indicated that there is a fairly rapid 
convergence of attitudes as the recruit is socialised into the 
occupation. (van Maanen, 1974 & 1978a). Central to this 
convergence is the role of the occupational culture, which for 
the newcomer becomes increasingly relevant in defining the 
crucial relationships of the patrol officer to senior officers, 
colleagues and criminals. (Cochrane & Butler: 1980). Clearly, 
the construction of roles is not independent from the particular 
occupational and therefore collective relevances that the patrol 
officer faces. Thus the oft quipped claim by both academics and 
police officers themselves that there are "as many styles of 
policing as there are policemen" can be understood as one of the 
many rhetorics available which serve to emphasise difference at 
the expense of similarity. 
As has been stressed, it is the occupational culture which 
provides the most salient version of policing for the lower 
ranks. In this way it can be seen as a "coping device" 
(Summer, 1907) which acts "as a means of smoothing over the 
vicissitudes of practice under the organisational mandate". 
(Fielding, 1984). The occupational culture holds within it, 
albeit loosely, one version of policing which derives its power 
by mediating the contradictary position of the patrol officer. 
This contradictory position can best be conceptualised as arising 
from the tension between autonomy and dependency, and isolation 
and solidarity. (Cf. figure 1). 
As can be seen from the diagram, the continua stretch from 
isolation to solidarity and from autonomy to dependency. On one 
level, the organisation of policing and the police organisation 
place the patrol officer in an isolated and autonomous position. 
On the other, however, this isolation and autonomy give rise to 
solidarity and dependency. Ironically, the legally autonomous 
and socially isolated position of the constable creates and 
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Fiqure One 
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sustains the conditions which breed organisational dependency and 
the occupational solidarity. 
Autonomy 
Autonomy is related to both "within-the-job" and 
"on-the-job" control. On the street, the first problem for an 
officer is establishing and maintaining the right to 
authoritatively intervene in a situation. Often the presence of 
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the uniform is enough. When it is not, restitutive action may be 
necessary, ranging fram verbal command through to physical 
constraint. (Cf Sykes & Brent, 1983; Muir 1977). Where 
restraint and force are used this is not an extra-legal resource. 
If compliance is not given by members of the public, this in 
itself is sufficient to justify the use of force and possibly 
arrest. 
Police officers jealously guard their right to act 
authoritatively, but they are not mere puppets of the law. They 
are legally equipped with wide discretionary powers which enable 
them to use the law selectively on an incident by incident basis, 
evaluating what is the best resource to use to reproduce order. 
In this respect, the hierarchical conIInand structure of the 
police organisation resembles a "mock" bureaucracy (van 
Maanen: 1983). In spite of the pretention to a military chain of 
command, patrol work is structurally inappropriate for such a 
system. It is largely invisible, non routine, open to wide 
discretionary interpretation and characterised by sporadic 
activity. Thus the hierarchical corrmand structure possesses far 
more of a symbolic rather than a substantive character, since the 
patrol officer is both legally and practically autonomous fron 
supervisory officers for decisions taken on the street. 
(Chatterton, 1981; Manning, 1977; James, 1979). 
This autonomy on the street from the demands of senior 
officers is tempered by an organisational dependency upon them. 
Decisions have to be framed with reference to the formal and 
informal sanctioning power of those higher within the rank 
structure. It is this tension between autonomy and dependency 
which is mediated through the occupational culture. This serves 
to neutralise the power of superior officers by undermining their 
credibility to make decisions that affect the practice of street 
policing. (Holdaway: 1983; 10) 
For the relief officer, the organisational hierarchy does 
not present itself as a continuous chain but is split into two 
distinct segments. In the cause of clarity, I shall term these 
segments as senior officers, comprised of chief inspectors and 
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above, and supervisory officers comprised of sergeants and 
inspectors. Supervisory officers are concerned with the day to 
day operational management of policing and, as such, are in 
regular and sustained contact with the front line officers. 
Conversely, senior officers are distanced from the day to day 
problem of operational policing and are more concerned with 
management, long term objectives and overall policy. In 
different ways, both segments challenge the relief's conception 
of policing, and both challenges are mediated through a 
culturally held stereotype of superior officers. 
Typically, senior officers are viewed as out of touch with 
the reality of everyday policing, "they haven't got a clue" or 
"they're on another planet" are comments often used to surnar i ly 
dismiss references to senior officers. Behind these statements 
is an implicit challenge to senior officers' capability to 
determine operational policy and their competency, once removed 
from the front line, to put forward an alternative conception of 
police work. As one P. C. expressed it: 
"What amazes rre is that the job gets done in spite of 
them. It's the relief that gets it done. For all their 
fancy plans, it's the lads on the street that have got to 
implement then. " 
At the operational level, at least, there is plenty of scope 
for 
subverting organisational policy. For 
instance, as one P. C. 
related : 
"With the introduction of this new scheme the beat crimes 
section has been abolished under the 
instruction of the 
guv' nor" (Ch Supt). However it fulfilled an 
important 
function, namely being able to direct a small group of 
officers to a particular problem especially that of 
theft 
from and theft of motor vehicles. "The problem still 
exists, though, so each relief is putting men on 
to it 
but not telling the guv'nors upstairs. They think 
it's 
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all hunky dory. They just think what they want to think 
without knowing what's going on on the ground. " 
Once an officer is promoted beyond inspector, as one American 
comirentator on the English police observed: 
...... they no longer experience direct contact with 
social groups and persons who are seen as representatives 
of evil, and are thus permitted to move symbolically 
closer to the socially sacred and traditional values of 
English society. But these senior officers are then 
deprived of their legitimacy within the organisation 
which is granted by constables to officers who maintain 
intermittent contact with the men and activities defined 
by policemen as containing the essence of the entire 
enterprise. (Manningl977, pl47-48). 
The problem for senior officers as they become further 
removed from the ground is that the control they exercise becomes 
more and more symbolic. Surprisingly, this is not as a result of 
their efforts being diverted elsewhere, for instance to policy 
development, rather, it is taken up by the retrospective checking 
of decisions taken by those lower in rank. The job description 
in General orders for a chief superintendant in charge of a 
division focuses almost solely on the retrospective nature of the 
job. This is to the exclusion of any forward planning or 
strategic management role. The Males report on force 
organisation and management pointed out: 
It may seem anomolous that there are instances where a 
constable makes the decision to arrest, the charge is 
authorised by a sergeant, yet a senior divisional officer 
is required to check certain its of the resultant 
documentation solely to ensure clerical accuracy. " (Males 
Report, 1983: 26) 
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The retrospective nature of the supervisory task means that 
senior officers are often only concerned with evaluating accounts 
written in official reports. In some cases, this is executed by 
evaluating an account against an ideal standard, i. e. this is 
how a process form should be filled in. In others, they are 
evaluated by comparing the validity of different accounts to 
arrive at an assessment of what actually occurred, i. e. when 
investigating a complaint made by a civilian against a police 
officer. Therefore these procedures can very easily become one 
where the quality of the account is far more important than the 
quality of the act. For instance, one relief officer dented 
about a senior officer. 
"Chief Inspector 'A'", she told ne, " was very nit 
picking about certain things, especially how process 
forms were orded. For instance, I stopped someone for 
speeding the other day. On the form I put 'Car A was 
travelling at eighty miles an hour in a restricted zone', 
but that wasn't good enough for him. He wanted 'car 
travelling at eighty miles an hour in a restricted zone 
on a road kept at public expense'. That's just typical 
of him. " 
From the relief officer's point of view, managerial control 
can be seen as transparent, related to appearances rather than 
realities or ends rather than means. As long as the job is done 
and, on paper at least, the right (or plausible) account is 
given, then senior officers are happy. What actually occurred 
and how a resolution was achieved is not a relevant criterion for 
assessing whether an action was successful. Retrospective 
checking is concerned with the appearance rather than the 
actuality of competency. Autonomy is therefore maintained from 
higher level interference by the lower ranks emphasising the 
importance of appearance and the control of information. 
The situation of competing definitions of policing, and the 
practical ascendency of the lower ranks' version has been tardily 
acknowledged by police managers as a crucial limitation on their 
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effectiveness to bring about planned organisational change. (Cf 
NP docs). Utilising the rhetorics of modern business management 
theory, "participative management" has been introduced into the 
Metropolitian Police at the behest of Commissioner Newman. The 
primary aim of this innovatory step is to increase the level of 
information flow from the bottom up and create a forum for policy 
discussions. It is hoped that this consultative process will 
increase the commitment to organisational change from those who 
are most likely to have to implement it. In practice, however, 
participative management is seen as an incorporationalist 
strategy which offers little power to the lower ranks. As one PC 
described it: 
"When the new action plan came out sere all excited. 
They introduced it by saying that, for the first time in 
the history of the MET, we- are going to ask you, the PC, 
what you think about how this job should be run. We put 
forward a number of proposals and sent them up to the 
next level..... when the document finally came back it 
bore no relationship to what we had said.... What's the 
point of asking us what to do if what you say is ignored. 
They might as ill not have bothered and let the chief 
superindentent write his own report. They came back to 
us this year and I said 'Get lost. What's the point of 
getting involved since you've already made up your 
minds . "' 
Or as another expressed it: 
"Participative management hasn't made any difference the 
way it's operated here. It's had no significant 
impact 
because the guv'nors have already made up their minds. " 
Perhaps, albeit inadvertently, Participative Management 
has 
served to heighten the distance 
between the ranks. By seeking to 
reduce the autonomy of the lower ranks 
by increasing their stake 
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in organisational decision-making, while at the same time being 
seen to be engaged in a cosmetic excerise, it merely heightens 
the feeling of distance by allowing expectations to rise and then 
leaving them unfulfilled. 
In summary then, for the relief, the further up the 
hierarchy a superior officer is positioned, then the further away 
he or she is from the day to day problems of patrolling. Senior 
officers' concern with legal and procedural adherence is seen as 
indicative of having "lost their bottle". Rather than having as 
their primary concern the welfare of the officers under their 
command and the day to day problems that arise from the practice, 
of patrol work, their new reference group is their own superior 
officers whom they are striving to join. It is this situation 
that gives rise to another common epithet about senior officers, 
"He's just after his next pip. " 
From the point of view of the relief officer, the senior 
officers on the division are often remote and distanced fran 
their every day concerns. Indeed, many of the officers I spoke 
to did not even know the names of their senior officers at the 
station. This lack of contact and knowledge adds to the feeling 
that senior officers represent the anonymous face, of the 
organisation, thus providing an abstract threat to the autonomy 
of the relief. 
Conversely, the relief inspector and the relief sergeant 
play a crucial role in determining the quality of an officer's 
working life. In the MET at least, the role of the relief 
inspector is somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, they are 
concerned with the day to day function of the relief in its 
patrol duties. They work the sane shifts, patrol, and, at night, 
are often the highest ranking officer available on the division. 
Increasingly, however, the role is becoming more management 
orientated: liaising with senior officers, implementing policy 
changes at ground level, instigating community 
initiatives, and 
so on. The inspector is thus caught between the roles of the 
'practical cop' and the 'management cop'. (Lanni, 1983; Ianni & 
Ianni, 1983; Chatterton, 1981) 
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As van Maanen has noted with reference to sergeants, it is 
possible to draw an ideal typical construct of the differing role 
performances that sergeants' create for themselves depending on 
how they choose to locate themselves within the various 
organisational rhetorics (van Maanen, 1983). Following van 
Maanen, Chatterton(1981) has illustrated how some will emphasise 
their administrative function, carving out their role from a 
particular version of the organisation, while others will see 
themselves as practical policemen, using different but no less 
plausible versions of the organisation to defend and generate 
their role. The administrator is primarily concerned with making 
sure that the official records are kept in order, that paperwork 
is properly filed and that the demands of senior managers for 
statistical information is provided. On the other hand, the 
'practical copper' is orientated to the everyday problems of 
patrolling, with providing moral and physical back up to the 
relief, protecting them from disciplinary action and so on. In 
short, the administrator is orientated to the management version 
of the organisation and the 'practical copper' is orientated to 
the street level officer's version. 
Inspectors are placed in an ambiguous role position which 
means that they have to embrace both supervisory styles. 
Sergeants are able to individualise their role, with one being a 
patrol sergeant and another a station sergeant. The inspector 
has to combine both roles under the same persona. This duality 
creates a high degree of tension and leads to the almost 
unanimous disdain of inspectors. For instance, one inspector saw 
his job as supportive and supervisory: 
"I don't tell the rren what to do. They know their job 
and I know each of than personally and have faith in 
everyone of them that they can come and see ne and we'll 
try and sort it out. " 
Much of this inspector's time was spent patrolling in an unmarked 
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car which he saw as necessary because: 
"It's a bit different here, because anything can flare up 
so you've got to be around. " 
The inspector portrayed his role as that of the practical copper, 
leaving his officers to get on with the job, sorting out 
problems, and providing back up and support. While the inspector 
may have seen himself as part of the relief, the relief officers 
did not. For instance, when he patrolled in his unmarked car 
this was not seen as providing back up but as underhand 
surveillance of his officers, for example: 
Sergeant to PC: "What's ... (insp).. up to? " 
PC: "Snooping around" 
Sergeant to me: "As you can gather we're not very 
impressed by our inspector. " 
The same inspector's concern with community liaison also caused 
derision and was seen as indicative of his management rather than 
street level orientation, and his intervention in street work was 
unwelcomed: 
PC: "So what did you talk to our boss about. " 
CN: "Politics mist of the time. " 
PC: "Typical - he's just after another pip - not that I 
mind, its just the way he goes about it". 
CN : "What do you mean? " 
PC: "Nicking bodies off people for a start, re-arresting 
someone after they've been arrested. He interferes. " 
Other inspectors ire viewed in a similiar vein: 
"Inspectors! They can't be trusted to give you back up. 
I went to this serious R. T. A. A senior officer reeds to 
be there. Although he was out and about he didn't arrive 
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at the scene. When he came back to the station he asked 
if it had all been quiet. John asked him if he hadn't 
heard anything over the radio. 'Oh it mustn't have been 
working', he replied. " 
Similarly: 
"Last year there was some trouble on the estate and the 
P. C who was dealing with it lost his cool. Rather than 
offering him support Inspector 'T ' balled him out. But 
he couldn't handle the incident, you should have seen 
him, he was shaking all over, he'd lost his bottle. 
In spite of this universal disdain for inspectors, the 
relief does have a feeling of what constitutes a good inspector - 
the practical copper, who is orientated to the concerns of the 
relief not to those of management, as this example from Surrey 
reveals: 
"Inspectors! Got no fucking bottle, that's their 
problem. B..... is the only one who comes down into the 
station office, the only one who knows what it's about ." 
From casual observation he was the only inspector to be 
regularly found in the station office and therefore in 
close contact with the relief. Yesterday he was still 
there at 3am, playing handball in the front office with 
the station officer. 
This feeling about what constitutes a good inspector also extends 
to those who are prepared to get their hands dirty, both 
literally and metaphorically, in the grime of police work. For 
instance : 
"I was out one night in the middle of January, freezing 
cold, and I came across this old inspector - he's moved 
now - he was on his hands and knees, covered in snow, 
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hands covered in dirt. What was he doing? Replanting 
all the plants that the yobs had ripped up - Now that' sa 
good inspector! " 
Even so, inspectors are inspectors and perhaps the most telling 
comment came from an experienced officer (PC A) who had just been 
transferred from another force. He'd been working on the relief 
for about a month and had just been interviewed by the inspector: 
PC A: "The Guv'nor seems alright". 
PC B: Looks askance 
PC A: "For an Inspector I rrean". 
Dependency 
The relief officers' vehemence against inspectors has far more 
force than that directed against senior officers. Regardless of 
their efforts to undermine and neutralise the power of the 
inspector to influence and check their autonomy, they are 
organisationally dependent upon them. Like sergeants, the relief 
inspector in the MET plays a central role in the organisation and 
administration of the relief. John van Maanen has suggested 
that, in the USA, the role of the sergeant can be classified into 
three distinct activities. In the MET this is also applicable to 
inspectors: (van Maanen: 1983) 
a) Personnel Brokering: organisational deployment, 
arranging leave and rest days, assigning people for 
courses, handing out and sanctioning overtime, etc. 
b) Institutional Display and Documentation: sanctioning 
charges, checking paperwork, keeping various station 
records, informing officers of changes in General Orders, 
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taking part in parades, and front line supervision. 
c) The Mobilisation of Ef fort: motivating officers to be 
pore than just uniform carriers and, therefore, to keep 
their figures up; deploying officers to particular 
problems, e. g. vice, traffic etc.; distributing formal 
and informal rewards for work well done, public and 
private praise, the slap on the back or recomTending an 
officer for condation. 
All these activities bear a direct relationship on the 
patrol officer's working environment. While they may have 
theoretical autoncimy on the street, within the station the 
sergeants and inspectors hold enormous institutional resources to 
gain adherence to their demands. They can deploy officers to 
unfavourable beats; assign them to inside duties, such as VDU 
operator, front desk gaol-keeper; refuse permission to go on 
courses; assign them to a difficult working partner; block or 
sanction promotion, and so on. All of these informal sanctions 
are readily available to sergeants and inspectors and can be 
manipulated to an effective mechanism for informal social 
control which can be far more effective than the formal system of 
control contained within the disciplinary procedures. 
An instance is the informal sanctioning power that is held 
within the distribution of overtime. In Kimberley, there is a 
theoretical maximum of fifty hours of overtime, per person per 
month. Given a relief strength of forty and an average rate of 
overtime pay of four pounds per hour, this gives a theoretical 
potential of £96,000 worth of overtime per year at the sergeants' 
and inspectors' disposal. It is unlikely that the theoretical 
maximum is every reached, (although during the miners' strike it 
was exceeded many fold), but, even if only one-third of it is 
allocated, there is still £32,000 worth of bonus money to be 
distributed per year. 
Since overtime is keenly sought, its distribution presents 
senior officers with a powerful tool to reward compliant 
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officers. However, favouritism has to be tempered in line with 
the relief's own conception of fairness: 
Sane people had been banned from applying for overtime as 
they had got too much. I got the impression that the 
problem was not finding people to do the work but of 
allocating it fairly so that everyone got a slice of the 
cake. For instance, the sergeant was complaining that 
one P. C. had rung in of ter being sick on the Thursday to 
see if he could work on the Friday, (a Bank holiday and 
therefore at double time). The sergeant had refused even 
though he was short staffed, saying it was "a bit cheeky 
and not fair on those who had worked". 
Deployments can also be used as rewards, even if they do create 
tensions: 
That's four fucking times he's been gaoler this week. I 
wouldn't mind if he pulled his weight at other times, but 
it's only so he can swat for his fucking promotion exam, 
while the rest of us work ." 
Or they can be used as punishments: 
"I don't know what I've done, but I've upset the sergeant 
somehow. All week I've been on beat six and seven. It's 
like a morgue, it only needs a car patrol. You don't see 
anyone, and there's nowhere to have a tea stop". 
The above concerns represent internal organisational aspects 
which link the inspectors and sergeants to their officers. 
Paperwork, on the other hand provides the link between an 
officer's work on the street and the police organisation. In 
this way paperwork represents the formal intelligence system of 
the police organisation. Without it the police organisation is 
blind to the activities of its officers. Once paperwork is 
Page 104 
submitted there is the possibility of organisational comeback. 
Sergeants and inspectors, by checking paper work and "squaring" 
it if formal sanction could be applied, can lessen the risk of 
such sanction. For instance, a young probationer of only a 
couple of months' service had just completed a process form for a 
minor traffic offence and handed it to the sergeant to check: 
"What colour was the vehicle? You haven't filled it in? " 
"I think it was yellow but I'm not very sure". 
"Is it in your pocket book? " 
"No Sarge" 
"Well, unless you know, we might as well lose this form 
because you're going to look pretty stupid if the car 
turns out to be black. " 
This form of protection extends past the probationary period as 
another example illustrates: 
Jeff didn't spend a long time eating as he had to try and 
find some missing documents on a drugs arrest. After 
searching high and low he still couldn't find them and 
they sre needed tomorrow for charging. 
"Sarge, what shall I do about those papers? " 
"What's it for? " : 
"Drugs" 
"How much? " 
"Not much" 
"It sounds like a caution or an NFA (No Futher Action)". 
Dependency is not just a one way relationship for, although 
sergeants and inspectors hold the institutional power, they need 
the co-operation of their officers to gain campliance. Over- 
reliance on formal discipline could be taken as indicative of an 
officer who cannot control the relief. Thus, both inspectors and 
sergeants are constrained by their own images within the 
organisation. If it is possible to square a mistake before it 
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goes any further then their in supervisory skills are not called 
into question. It is the managing of appearances that is crucial 
in this respect. Small displays of insubordination, given the 
wrong audience, can put a supervisory officer in a bad light as 
the following example illustrates: 
PC 'A' (an officer of three years experience) walked into 
the canteen. The sergeant looked up as he approached. 
"Don't you ever do that to me again", he snarls "Not 
in front of someone from another relief ... just learn to 
keep your mouth shut". The sergeant turns to me to 
explain what has happened. "I says to him ..... 'Would 
you mind answering that call? ' as everybody else was 
busy. He turns to me and says 'Sarge quite honestly I 
don't give a shit' ". The sergeant turned back to the PC 
"Just watch that mouth of yours, because next time 
..... (Missing Data)... 
" "I can only offer you my 
apologies" replies the PC as he moves across the canteen 
to get his dinner. "He's a nice enough lad", continued 
the sergeant "but every time he opens his mouth.... " 
But this dependency goes further; relief officers, regardless of 
rank, are vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the internal 
discipline code. This is particularly so if they are engaged in 
the unpredictability of street work. While constables are 
dependent on their sergeants and inspectors to "square" things, 
the converse can also be true. For instance: 
"Over the radio came a call to a sudden death. Although 
officially at meal break the sergeant thought he should 
attend and collared PC 'F' on the way out to accoiripany 
him. When arrived on the scene the patrol car was 
already there. The sergeant backed up the car. There 
was a loud crash and crunch. "Fuck it" he exclaimed, as 
he gently eased the car forwards. "Nothing damaged", he 
stated hopefully as Andy inspected the rear of the car. 
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He had backed into the patrol car. There seemed to be no 
damage to his car, but the other's left-hand tail lights 
were all smashed...... Once the incident had been dealt 
with we headed back to the station, the sergeant trying 
to figure out ways of covering up for the accident. (If 
he reported the accident he would be immediately 
suspended from driving and possibly banned for a fixed 
period. ) The plan therefore, was to buy a new tail light 
and fix it himself that evening with the help of the rest 
of the relief. Whether they were successful I do not 
know. However, several days later the sergeant was still 
driving. 
Neither are sergeants immune from organisational problems which 
require the intervention of a higher ranking officer to put 
right. As one sergeant aoffplained about his inpector: 
"He never backs you up, he just drops you in it". He 
scanned the canteen for uninvited ears and then went on 
to explain what had happened. "I was supposed to go on 
this one day course, but I was on nights, really shagged 
out, I forgot. I could have cancelled it but I just 
didn't think. " 
As a result, he was in trouble with a Divisional Officer 
who wanted an explanation. "I went to Mr (insp), 
expecting some support. He just said, 'It's your 
problem' and he wouldn't back me up. Anyway I squared it 
myself. I went to the C. I. (Chief Inspector) -a really 
great bloke.... put my hands up to what I'd done. He just 
said 'It's alright', and squared it like that. That's a 
good bloke he stands by us and backs us up. " 
He went on talking to everyone around the table about not 
getting any back up, and then to me, "If someone comes to 
me I might give them a bollocking myself, but then I'd 
square it and that'd be the end of it. " He hesitated 
slightly, "but don't get me wrong, not for anything 
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serious like - just trivia. " 
The discipline code represents the most effective resource 
at a supervisory officer's disposal to gain compliance, since it 
covers working practice, the relations of deference and demeanour 
between ranks and peers, and the private lives of officers . Its 
power lies not so much in the explicit nature of what is 
sanctionable, but by being sufficiently vague to rely heavily on 
interpretation and to be all embracing. For example, the 
discretionary power of the constable has to be reconciled with 
point f, section four of the discipline code (4f henceforth) 
which specifies that a police officer will be neglecting his or 
her duty if they "fail to report anything that is their duty to 
report". Similarly, what constitutes "any unnecessary violence 
to any prisoner or other person with whom he may be brought into 
contact in the execution of his duty" (8b)? As Chatterton 
illustrates, such issues are not merely academic. Sergeants do 
threaten their officers with neglect of duty if they fail to 
exercise discretion in a particular way. (Chatterton, 1983). 
Due to the difficulty of detection, these more serious 
breaches of the discipline code provide but a scant resource to 
senior officers in their quest for deterrent factors to ensure 
compliance, although they do serve as powerful reminders of the 
penalties involved in breaking the discipline code. More 
important, are the host of minor and less substantial rules, 
infringement of which can result in being "stuck on". For 
instance, an officer is in breach of the disciplinary code if 
s/he "idles or gossips while on duty" (4b), "is uncivil to any 
member of the public" (8c), is "insubordinate by word, act or 
demeanour" (2a), "omits to make any necessary entry in an 
official document or book" (4h), "directly or indirectly solicits 
any gratuity, present or subscription without the consent of the 
commissioner" (7c) . 
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The crucial point about the discipline code is that, in the 
main, it is neither observed nor enforced. Officers regularly 
receive free and discounted food and refreshment at the local 
cafe, fail to record stops, leave their beats, do not put their 
hats on when leaving the patrol car, fail to report damage to a 
police vehicle and, perhaps more importantly but less frequently, 
sign false statements, make false misleading and inaccurate 
statements, and do so both with and without the approval of the 
supervisory officers. 
Of the 57 separate points contained within the disciplinary 
code (Police Federation, 1965: 69-72) my field notes document 30 
separate and different infractions, many of them routine. In 
addition to the ones listed above, they include drinking on duty, 
being absent without leave, using unnecessary force and being 
rude to members of the public. 
Many infringements of the disciplinary code are informally 
sanctioned by supervisory officers. Consider the following 
example: 
It was an extemely cold horning. Although we had 
been posted to beat 2, John had decided to walk to the 
other side of beat three and see if we could get a cup of 
tea in the sentry post of the military base. We knocked 
on the window and were warmly welcomed as tea was duly 
made. Five minutes later Janice and Phil arrived, joked 
that they thought that they would find us here, and 
joined us for early morning tea. Shortly afterwards Mick 
arrived. The entire sub-divisional foot patrol was now 
ensconced in the warmth of the sentry box. "Oh shit" 
declared John,, as the sergeant's patrol car pulled up 
alongside the tea hole. Everyone looked a little uneasy 
as the sergeant got out of his car and entered the sentry 
box. "We're just off sarge", declared John. The 
sergeant gave a broad grin. "It's alright. Stay and 
finish your tea", he declared as he helped himself from 
the pot. 
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Or similarly: 
The inspector was deploying his officers "...... have you 
been out in a vehicle this week? ", he asked one of his 
younger officers. 
"Yes, I was out last night". 
"Officially I Wean". 
"It was sir, but I don't mind going out again". 
Such toleration of disciplinary infraction has a double edge for 
relief officers; while it makes their job pore pleasant, they 
realise that it can be used against then at any time if they get 
on the wrong side of a sergeant or inspector and, since the rules 
are all-pervasive, finding a justifiable reason would not be 
difficult as the following example illustrates: 
"As we were driving down the high street, Steve saw that 
Dave was walking again. We stopped and Dave hopped in 
the back. He was bubbling with a story. "That Mr 
... insp... is a real wanker, he just threatened to stick 
me on". 
"What for? " 
"Farting! " 
Steve and Mick roared with laughter. Dave explained what 
had happened. He had been in the front off ice and felt 
the need to "break wind and I let out the most deadly 
fart. " Mr ...... heard 
it but could not identify the 
culprit so, when he asked who was responsible, Dave 
blamed Mark, and Mark turned it into a joke that Mr..... 
could not rebuff. Sane minutes later Mr..... was in an 
adjoining office and Dave felt the need to "break wind 
again and, due to the angle of my buttocks, produced a 
loud and resounding fart. Mr..... stormed in and went 
loopy". He threatened Dave with discipline and told him 
that he'd "get him for every little thing from now on". 
"What could he stick you on for? " joked Steve. 
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"Flatulence !" suggested Mick as he took hold of his radio 
and produced a loud and unmistakable farting noise with 
his lips. As soon as Steve had finished Mick did the 
same again and then Steve again, until Dave begged than 
to stop, as he would get the blame. 
Rather than using the discipline code to gain ccxnpliance, a 
more important strategy, recognised by both patrol officers and 
their supervisors, is using supervisory power to offer protection 
fran the disciplinary code and thus ensure compliance to other 
more valued norms. This is especially the case for incidents on 
the street that have gone "griefy". By "losing paper", "shutting 
one's eyes", sanctioning a false statement, "putting in a good 
word", providing written reports for disciplinary inquiries, a 
supervisory officer can lessen or avert the impact of 
disciplinary proceedings. This is no light incentive to stay on 
the right side of one's supervisors. As the PSI report revealed, 
"within the past ten years the man number of complaints per 
officer was 4.4. " (PSI 1983, vol iii: 114) Therefore, at sate 
point or other, a patrol officer will undoubtedly need such 
protection. 
This dependency is double edged. Sergeants and inspectors 
are sometimes guilty by deed, but more often by association. "If 
the shit hits the fan" and they are called to account, they are 
equally dependent on the support of their officers to maintain 
their integrity. Dependency then, leads to reciprocity. 
Isolation 
It is not only the disciplinary code that creates 
dependencies and reciprocal relationships between officers. 
There are other factors which isolate the police officer, 
limiting their range of social contacts with people outside of 
the job and thus, at the same time, making them more dependent on 
each other. Social isolation creates group solidarity. There 
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are two broad factors which serve to isolate patrol officers from 
wider social contacts. The first is the demands of the shift 
system, the second is the nature of the work itself. 
The shift system is arduous and disruptive. Over a twenty 
eight day period, starting on a Monday an officer works seven 
nights (2200-0600), followed by a quick change over to two days 
of lates (1400_2200) which means coming off duty at 0600 on the 
Monday and returning to work at 1400 on the same day. Two days 
off are followed by three early turns (0600-1400), Monday and 
Tuesday are off again, returning on Wednesday for five late 
turns, followed immediately by four early turns finishing on 
Thursday afternoon. Friday through to Monday 2200 are free and 
the cycle starts again. Within this twenty eight day system, to 
make it comparable with an ordinary five day week, there is a 
floating rest day which, theoretically, means that an officer 
will have one working day off during the month. In practice it 
is worked more often than not, due to under manning. The 
disruption to an officer's private life is exacerbated by other 
factors such as court appearances, which mean that rest days 
often have to be worked and overtime, which although it is 
supposedly voluntary, often has to be worked at short notice. 
Clearly, working such hours makes outside social contact 
difficult to sustain. Evening classes, sporting activities, 
social engagements, courtship, etc., do not fit easily into such 
a variable and unpredictable system. The result is that officers 
are heavily dependent upon their immediate families and 
colleagues for off duty support, but even this presents problems 
since shift work is not conducive to family life. 
I've been doing nights now for sixteen years. I'd like a 
break. It's hard on your family. When I'm on nights I 
only get to see the kids for an hour or to. I'd like to 
move to an administrative post maybe or perhaps the 
juvenile bureau, but I don't think that that is likely. 
I'm not due for a move for another three years. " 
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The housing policy also means that police officers are isolated 
from members of the public and are thrown back on to colleagues 
for off duty support. All single probationers are expected to 
live in a police section house. This is a practical policy as 
they are often posted away from their family home and, as they 
are likely to be moved about at short notice, it is therefore 
convenient for getting to work. In Surrey, all but one of the 
probationers and several of the more experienced officers lived 
in the section house. There are also large financial inducements 
for doing so. The rent allowance allotted to each officer was 
deemed to cover full board in the section house. Thus for £52 
per month (1983 prices) a small but adequate furnished roan was 
provided, with freshly laundered sheets once a week. There was 
constant hot water, a cormunual roan, and a washing machine and 
tumble drier. In addition, four good meals a day were provided. 
In effect, officers were fed and housed from their rent allowance 
at a cost of thirteen pounds per week. Such a financial 
inducement is hard to forsake as the cars that lined the station 
forecourt and the hifi systems and record collections in the 
roans testified to the life style that it helped to subsidise. 
But there are other less instrumental reasons for living in 
the section house. As section 3. b(2) of the disciplinary code 
states, "A member of the force shall not reside at premises 
which are not for the tine being approved by the commissioner. " 
This regulation has probably a greater effect in limiting the 
range of housing choices available to officers by creating an 
ethos of control rather than by its actual enforcement. 
Officers automatically rule out certain possibilities as 
unsuitable. For instance sharing a house with a group of 
students from a local polytechnic. However, stories are 
recounted of officers being asked to move and thus reinforcing 
the perception that the job has the power to influence the choice 
of residence: 
John also talked about a colleague from Essex who had 
lived on a council estate before he joined the job. His 
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senior officers wanted him to move out of the council 
flat where he had lived for some time, saying that it 
wasn't suitable. But he said he was happy and complained 
to the council who kicked up a fuss, saying "what's wrong 
with the estate.? " The force had to back down. 
Similarly: 
Sally, who had been a nurse before joining the job 
several months previously, complained that she hated the 
section house. "I used to live in a rented flat with 
same friends before I joined, but you can't do that in 
the job. Joan(another WPC) and I are thinking of buying 
a place though. " 
The combination of being liable to transfer, pecuniary 
advantage, and force policy in the field of housing serves to 
isolate the neophyte from the general housing market and, 
therefore, to restrict the development of social contacts outside 
the working group. 
This tendency is not limited to probationers. Even with the 
demise of police houses which grouped police officers in a 
particular area, there is a trend for officers to reside in the 
same area. In Surrey, many of the married officers lived on a 
new estate giving rise to the comment from one PC that, "If 
another police officer moves into our road there won't be any 
civilians left. " 
This drift towards "police ghettos" is exacerbated by 
several factors in Surrey. The development was in easy reach of 
the station yet far away enough not to be "living on top of the 
job". Further, the price range between £30,000 and £60,000 was 
affordable for most officers and contained enough variation for 
individual needs. 
In the MA'I' the range of housing available is much wider than 
in Surrey. However, with the exception of those who lived in the 
section house, none of the officers lived on the division. As 
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many officers put it. "Who'd want to live in a dump like this! " 
Officers did not want to live near where they worked, an 
understandable factor given the level of hostility displayed to 
the police in the area and, to give substance to this, an off 
duty officer had recently been attacked and severely injured on 
the sub-division. Further, like many of the aspiring and 
upwardly mobile groups, they have taken to abandoning the inner 
city for the pleasanter and safer environment of the suburbs. 
Thus many officers lived out on the Essex border land. 
One of the consequences of this is that, rather than 
officers being part of the communities in which they work, they 
are absent from them. This has a direct bearing on their 
relationship with the poorer section of the working class who 
suffer most heavily from the problems of poor housing, 
unemployment, discrimination, etc. It is this stratum of society 
which makes the most demands on the police service, but also 
bears the brunt of proactive police work. If, in reality, the 
Dixon of Dock Green image of the local constable living on his 
beat and knowing everybody on it ever existed, it can now surely 
be laid to rest. 
The control that the organisation possesses over where 
officers work and live is in stark contrast to that found in most 
occupations. For instance: 
John had just brought a new house in Essex near the 
station where he worked. He had sold his car to pay for 
the legal fees and was going to either cycle or walk to 
work. But then he was told "out of the blue" that he was 
being transferred to Kimberley. So now he has to walk 
half an hour to the station to take a tube, then get a 
bus from the tube to the police station. "All in all 
about an hour and a half. " He appealed against the 
decision but the guv'nor had said, "You can get a lift 
from one of the lads in Kimberley. " John asked, "What 
happens if he's on annual leave? ", and was told curtly, 
'We'll cross that bridge when %e come to it. " 
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Another officer told a similar story. 
I got the order on a Friday, quite out of the blue. I 
wasn't working when it was posted in the order book, my 
mate brought it round the next day. I had been planning 
to move futher into the country to B ...... and buy a new 
house. I had to pull out of that, it would have meant 
too much travelling. 
Whether such incidents were the result of informal discipline I 
do not know, but it was generally recognised that such a policy 
could be used as a particularly pernicious form of social 
control. As a sergeant who had transferred from a county force 
illustrated: 
"In the county, force discipline can be far more 
effective. " He said. "When you've got an area the size of 
that, you can post somebody one hundred and fifty miles 
away. So they got a house and a mortgage. If you're 
moved that far it hurts. And if you sell up and move, 
they can always move you back again .I know one chap who 
used to spend five days away from home on a camp bed and 
only come home at weekends. It isn't like that in the 
Met. They only tend to transfer you on the district so 
you can always commute, but it's still pretty 
inconvenient. " 
The control over housing provides the organistion with a powerful 
resource which can also be used for other ends; for instance, to 
sanction how an officer chooses to conduct his private affairs. 
"I'd been a perfectly good copper for seven years, then 
my marriage broke up, and I ran off with somebody else. 
I told what I thought to be a friend on the relief who 
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told the sergeant, and soon everybody knew. I went from 
being on annual report, to being on three monthly". He 
saw this as a form of demotion which, in a way, it was 
since, "I could no longer work alone, was under constant 
supervision, just like a probationer. " The rrost 
embittering part of the experience was that his reports 
had gone down, "despite the fact that I was doing the job 
just the sane. It was only because of my private life. " 
He then transferred to another station and his reports 
immediately improved, "The last one was very good. " 
"What really got rre was the job insisted that I moved 
back into the section house while 'I sorted myself out'. 
I didn 't want to rove back in but felt that I had to. If 
I want to get divorced I don't see that it' s any concern 
of theirs. As you can probably tell I'm quite bitter 
about this job at the moment. " 
Isolation not only comes from force policy but it is 
inherent in the organisation of patrol work. Generally, 
preventative patrol is carried out either singly or in pairs. 
Although the relief is a team, the organisation of preventative 
patrol means that, for most of the time, patrolling is an 
individual and lonely affair. This sense of isolation is 
heightened by the statistically unlikely, but ever present, fear 
that danger could be just around the corner. As officers 
continually reminded me, 'You never know what's going to happen 
next in this job'. This orientation to the dangerous aspects of 
the job is constantly reworked by the recounting of stories 
highlighting dangerous and exciting incidents that officers have 
dealt with. The mundane, routine and uneventful aspects of 
police work are lost as tales of dangerous and fast chases, 
narrow escapes, and the disarming of armed suspects are recounted 
with judicious narrative embellishment. It is easy to dismiss 
such stories as Macho reconstructions which serve to recreate 
policing into conformity with the expectation of excitement, 
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danger etc. which is contradicted by the mundane reality. 
However, within the inner city there are enough serious assaults 
on officers to make such talk a powerful reminder of the everday 
threat. When I first worked in Kimberley I was told by three 
separate people of an officer who, six Keks earlier, had been 
responding to "a suspects on premises call", and narrowly missed 
death as he was attacked by a man armed with a machete. He was 
only saved by his helmet deflecting the blow fron his skull. 
Or as another example from my fieldnotes illustrates: 
It was my first day on patrol, I was sitting in the 
station office waiting for briefing to begin. I watched 
and listened as news of Yvonne Fletcher the policewoman 
killed outsided the Libyan embassy came in. Information 
about her condition was avidly sought and given. At just 
after two o'clock news came over that she had died. As 
the relief gathered there was no mock sympathy or even 
outrage. There seemed to be a resigned acceptance and a 
quiet anger about the events. It was not just that a 
woman had been shot, but a police officer just like them, 
which served to remind them of their potential 
vulnerability. As one officer turned and said to her 
neighbour "It makes you wonder, when you go out there, 
doesn't it, will I be next". 
This omnipresent concern with physical threat was also 
brought out clearly by an officer who, as we left the station on 
night patrol, turned to me and asked: 
Are you racially prejudiced"? 
"No, not really", I tentatively replied, wonderering 
what such an upfront question was leading to. 
"I wasn't 'till I worked here but I an now, so if they 
jung on your back I' 11 jurrp on theirs and if they jump on 
my back you junp on them. " 
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I nodded. 
As other com-nentators on 
Muir, 1977; Westley, 1970; 
occupational concern with 
categorisation of people 
confined to marking hours. 
carried over to non work 
observation and suspicion. 
the police have noted (Skolnick, 1975; 
Van Maanen, 1978b; Riener, 1978), the 
assessing people's moral worth and the 
as potential assailants is not only 
The development of a "police mind" is 
ing hours and, with it, the habit of 
As one FC expressed: 
"You can take nothing at face value in this job. I've 
been in this job ten rronths and I'm walking down the road 
off duty and I double take. You just can 't help it. " 
It is then difficult to break out of a police mentality when off 
duty and this gives rise to the common expression that "you're 
never off duty in this job". 
The content of the work also serves to promote a feeling 
among officers that they are different from other occupational 
groups. Not only do they have to routinely deal with the 
dangerous and the violent, but also the down-trodden, the ill, 
the unbalanced and the insane. Such work is both symbolically, 
and sometimes literally, "shit work". Van Maanen noted that 
dealing with the "rubbish" of society leads police officers to 
view themselves as contaminated, being tainted by association. 
As one of his respondants expressed it, "This is the only job 
where you've got to wash your hands before you take a piss. " In 
Kimberley a sergeant voiced a similar sentiment as we surveyed 
the blood stained floor after a violent siege had ended in an 
attempted suicide. The victim had been brought into the charge 
room before being taken to hospital. 
"That's what Kimberley's like. It's full of fucking 
nutters, we're just a dustbin for the trash of society. 
You've seen it and you've seen people getting hit. 19 
and 20 year olds come in here green, they're expected to 
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deal with this rubbish all day. In twelve months they 
get hard .... we're just a fucking dustbin. A twenty four 
hour social service. " 
This feeling of constituting an out group is further 
illustrated by police officers' perception of being stigmatised 
by the general public. Maureen Cain's research in the 1960s 
illustrated that a substantial minority of officers thought that 
they had difficulty in sustaining relationships with people 
outside the force. In Riener's study (1978) fifty-tom per cent 
of officers mentioned examples of hostility, suspiciousnes and 
ostracism by members of the public. This was reflected by 
officers' behaviour in Kimberley. For instance: 
As we were patrolling down ---- street, a busy 
shopping area, a man approached Steve. "I thought it was 
you, " he said "I didn't know you were a policeman". They 
chatted for a while and then the man went on his way. 
Steve told me that the man was a regular in his local 
and, although he'd been drinking there for sometime, he 
didn't let on that he was a police officer, because, 
"people are a bit funny sometimes. " 
This feeling was echoed by another officer: 
"I don't know what happened, somebody must have laced my 
drink or something. I had to be carried hone. That's 
the last time I'm going to drink at a civilian party. " 
This distancing from civilians is also inherent due to the fear 
that is engendered by their authority role. As one officer 
explained about the problan of setting up a police contact bureau 
on an estate: 
"It's mainly advice work, people with problems, wanting to 
know about the law. But most of the information comes off 
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the street. If people have got something to tell you they 
don' t want to be seen caning in here ." 
Police officers are also reluctant to talk to the public about 
what police work is really like. As one experienced officer 
expressed it, "If people knew what this job was really like 
they'd have a fit". Since the reality of police work involves 
habitual rule breaking, at times amounting to rank illegality, 
cover-ups and perjury, it is indeed difficult for officers to 
talk about their work. As one of van Maanen's American 
informants eloquently expressed it: 
"How the fuck can I tell anyone who ain't a cop that I lie a 
little in court or that sometimes I won't do the shit on the 
street 'cause I'm tired or that I made some asshole 'cause 
he was just all out wrong. If I told people that they'd 
think that I'm nothing laut a turd in uniform. The only 
people that can understand are people who've had to pull the 
same shit. " (van Maanen, 1974: 103). 
Solidarity 
The corollory of social and occupational isolation is the 
development of a strong sense of occupational solidarity. This 
solidarity takes the form of group norms which serve to minimise 
both "on" and "within the job" trouble . While "on the job" 
trouble creates the need for mutual support and protection 
against physical harm, "within the job" trouble, on the other 
hand, stems from the problems created by the routine infraction 
of the discipline code. To a degree it is recognised that 
disciplinary infraction is avoidable and officers court trouble 
by flouting the rules too often. Even so, patrol officers are 
aware that you "can't police by the book" and that "the guv'nors 
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are quite happy for you to break the rules, until the wheel climes 
off, then they just drop you in it". As already indicated, the 
"guv'nors'" are still implicated by their relief officers' 
disciplinary infraction and illegality and will sometimes cover 
for their officers, but this cannot be taken for granted. Thus 
there is a mutual insurance policy which is related to the 
control of information. For both lesser and more serious 
infractions the least that is expected is silence and, where 
necessary, active collaboration to keep them hidden either from 
the guv'nors or fron the the scrutiny of the courts and the 
internal complaints department. Consider the following lengthy 
extract from my fieldnotes which brings together many of the 
themes discussed in this chapter: 
It is a sticky summer's night. Although it is after 
midnight, there are still many people on the streets - 
mainly young revellers, either returning home after a 
night on the town or the late birds, who are just 
starting out. It has already been a busy night, and John 
has decided to take his meal break later than planned as 
he is expecting it to be even busier when the clubs start 
to turn out. 
We drive down to the King's Arms, a pub and local night 
club with a reputation for trouble. John pulls up the 
van. He is watching the bouncer who is arguing with four 
men. John just waits and watches until the matter 
appears to be resolved and the parties go their separate 
ways. His main focus of concern is that the bouncer is a 
disqualified driver and, as he lives several miles away, 
he almost undoubtedly drove to work. He and Sarah 
discuss which of the cars in the vicinity might be his. 
John decides to go and have a word with him and, when he 
comes back, he radios through to the station to say that 
there might be trouble outside the pub later, so it would 
be worth keeping an eye on. John continues to sit, 
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watching and waiting. The Panda car pulls up on the 
other side of the road and Mark gets out and comes over 
to John to find out what is going on. I cannot hear 
exactly what is going on, but it appears as if the four 
men who had been arguing with the bouncer are out for a 
fight 
. 
Two of the four men are now walking past the front of the 
pub. The Panda driver goes and talks to them. They are 
both fashionably dressed in their early twenties. They 
explain to Paul that the other two men are trying to pick 
a fight with them. Paul and Mark decide to go and have a 
look for than. John gets in the van and resumes watching 
the front of the club. More people are leaving now, and 
many of then are very drunk. John cccnplains to me that 
the trouble at the club is all the manager's fault, 
"Because he doesn't give a damn who he lets in". After 
about five minutes Paul and Mark can be seen struggling 
with the two men on the opposite corner. (According to 
the story told later by Paul, when he approached the men 
they gave him a drunken torrent of abuse, and Paul 
decided to "nick en"). Both rren are white, in their 
early twenties, they are very drunk. John quickly moves 
the van in and jumps out. The men are writhing and 
struggling. They are roughly carted over to the back of 
the van, still thrashing. Mark puts his handcuffs on 
Blondie, Paul throws Brown into the back of the van. 
There is the sound of a struggle. As I look into the van 
Mick is pushing Brown down onto the seat, his hand on his 
shoulders. Brown is kicking. Paul brings his fists up 
in front of the man's f ace. He turns., sees me , the fist 
turns int to a pointed finger. "You fucking ........ " 
The other man is put in the van, his arms hand cuffed 
behind his legs. He is laughing at his predicament as we 
drive off. Mark and Sarah join in the merriment. 
"Don't you fucking laugh at my brother. " Blondie roars 
Page 123 
with more laughter. Sarah is giggling, almost 
hysterically. "He's good at yoga isn't he". John and 
Mark laugh. Brown is still swearing and screaming about 
not laughing at his brother. 
Paul follows the van into the station yard. Paul 
escorts Blondie into the charge room, his hands on 
Blondie's shoulder, they look rrore like old buddies. 
John brings Brown in. The situation has calmed down now. 
Brown is told to sit behind the charge desk. Blondie is 
left standing, gaurded by one officer. Someone fetches 
the station sergeant. He comes in, finds a charge sheet 
and asks what they're being brought in for. Paul 
suggests Drunk and Disorderly conduct. 
All of a sudden Brown leaps from the bench, at the 
station sergeant. (Why I do not know). He is thrashing 
and flailing, kicking and scratching. He is felled onto 
the desk and the five or six officers in the charge roan 
rush to hold him. Hearing the fracas, other officers 
rush in from the front off ice to lend a hand. They join 
the melee despite the five officers all ready holding 
him. The man is still thrashing violently. John has an 
arm a long way behind his back, other officers have each 
of his legs and his middle. He is pinned to the table. 
Paul is holding his face and, with the palm of his hand, 
hitting the side of his jaw. "Let's get him in a cell". 
Someone rushes and opens the cell door. Brown is picked 
up and carried by the officers to the cell and thrown in. 
The door is hurriedly s lain ned shut. The other man, 
Blondie, has started to go beserk. (I have missed this 
because I am watching the other scene. ) Several officers 
are restraining him. He is screaming and shouting. He 
is surrounded, picked up and thrown into another cell, 
Paul and Mark follow him in, six or seven officers around 
the door. There are the sounds of a beating screaming 
and swearing emanate from the cell. 
The other prisoner has started to thump his cell 
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door. The cacophony of screams, blows, swearing and 
pounding is electrifying. 
The other officers are trying to get into Blondie' s 
cell but keep pulling back. The inspector is at the 
door. "Paul", he orders sharply, "Take it easy! " The 
sounds of the beating go cn. "Paul!, take it easy", he 
commands again. Mark drags Paul out of the cell. The 
door is slam-rd shut. Mark's shirt and hands are covered 
in blood. 
Fron inside the cell the screams are getting louder. they 
are ignored as the ten or so officers in the charge room 
try and recover their composure. The inspector turns to 
Paul, "This is going down as more than a D. D. " 
The screams fran inside the cell continue more 
hysterically and violently. "Oh fuck, we haven't trapped 
his fingers under the cell door ," suggests Mark. There 
is laughter at the prospect, born of tension rather than 
hun ur. "We can't open the door". The inspector and six 
or so POs wonder what to do. The screaming is becoming 
more and more piercing. The inspector says that he is 
not prepared to have the door opened. "He's having us 
on", somebody suggests. Nobody is convinced. The screams 
are too loud and too painful. 
Gail suggests using a ruler under the door to see if 
anything is trapped. The idea is accepted and she 
fetches a ruler from the front office. Mark slides it 
along the crack, anxiously watched by the surrounding 
PCs. "Scmething's under there but it's not his fingers. " 
The officers debate whether and how to open the door. 
Eventually the inspector agrees to the riot shields being 
used to protect the officers when they open the door. 
Paul and Roger volunteer that they are shield trained, 
and they fetch than from the finger print roan. The 
shields are placed in front of the cell door. Six men 
stand behind the flat of the door on the hinge side, 
ready to slam the door shut if need be. 
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The door is opened. Paul has the riot shield 
pressed against the widening crack. He pushes the man 
further in and the door is hurriedly slamed shut. 
Apparently it was the man's clothing trapped under the 
door. 
A doctor, who had been called out to an earlier 
incident and was in the charge roan when the fracas broke 
out, re-entered after a tactful withdrawal. The 
inspector has a word with him, indicating that the man is 
probably going to need treatment. The doctor agrees to 
wait around. 
John comes in to the charge room and points at the 
plastic bag he is carrying - somewhere in the middle of 
the goings on he managed to radio Dick to pick up the 
Chinese take-away before closing time at 1.30an. In the 
canteen there are more officers than will fit round one 
table, so John, giving substance to the communality of 
the night's events, pulls up another, making room for 
ten. The Chinese is put on the table and we start to 
divide it up. Slim, me , Dick and John, Sarah and Jan are 
also round the table. 
Someone starts to recount the night's events to Dick 
and Jan who missed it all. Mark walks in, his shirt 
still covered in blood. "Fucking Hell, I want words with 
that Smith ( Paul). That was over the top! " He slumps 
down angrily in the chair . 
Paul walks in. Mark follows him with his eyes for a 
moment. "Can't you keep your fucking temper..... Didn't 
you hear the Guv'nor calling you off. " Paul laughs it 
off. Everyone gets on with eating, more stories are 
swopped and the night's events are turned into 
amusement. 
About twenty minutes pass and then Paul and Mark are 
ordered down stairs by the guv'nor. When they come back 
they are clutching some report books. Slim starts to 
sing the there tune of "Jackanory", (a popular 
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children's television programme). He is told to shut 
up. John, Paul and Mark go off with their reports to the 
collator's office so they can get their story straight in 
peace and quiet. 
LATER: Back in the canteen, Dick, Mark, Dave, Ed, and 
John are sitting down drinking tea. The phone rings. 
Paul and Mark are ordered downstairs again. When they 
come back, it appears that the doctor has seen the 
prisoners. One has a "suspected fractured jaw" the other 
"suspected broken ribs". They are to be taken down to 
the hospital. It appears that the guv'nor wants a better 
story to cover themselves. Mindful of my presence, John 
and Mark go outside. They cone back in and everyone 
attentively waits for the conclusion. Someone is going 
to have bear the evidence of an "Assault on an Officer". 
Paul and Mark are the candidates. The problem is which 
of them shall it be. Paul says it should be him, but 
fair play dicates that they toss for it. Mark loses. 
John, Mark, Paul and Ed go outside again. There is the 
sound of scuffling and laughter. They re-enter, Mark 
"bottled out". John and Ed are laughing, "You'd have 
jumped 
on his fucking head". Ed gives a wicked smile, "That's 
right". 
"I'11 do it if you don't want to volunteer, " Paul again. 
"No" - Mark is adamant. "But look, " he says playing to 
the gallery in an exaggerated hero role, "I've just 
bought my house. I'm already going into hospital next 
week, and I don't want to land there tonight. What would 
my wife say !" 
Later, mark has been hit below the eye, a bruise is 
starting to come out. 
Informal work norms, then, also extend to the use of force. As 
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was clear from the example above to the officers involved, the 
level of force used to quell the beserk man, involving seven or 
eight officers and, at the border lines between reasonable and 
unreasonable force, was not questioned. The man was beserk and 
had to be contained. Until he was, almost any amount of force 
was judged necessary. However, Paul continued to apply force and 
issued a beating even when the man was safely imprisoned in a 
cell, and it was at this point that criticisms started to be 
raised about his conduct. 
I do not want to argue about whether the use of force was 
excessive in this example. What is important is that the 
officers involved thought that the level of force that Paul used 
was "over the top" and that it necessitated a cover-up. 
Although the officers involved were critical of Paul, (the 
inspector had called him off and Mark had directly challenged 
him), they were all prepared to involve themselves in an 
elaborate cover-up, thus preventing awkward questions being 
raised about the extent of the injuries to the suspect if a 
complaint should be made against Paul or, in the event of it 
going to court, that a barrister should allege brutality. 
The reciprocity and solidarity among officers has its price. 
If formal sanction is to be avoided then officers are expected to 
conform to informal work norms. Thus it is expected that easing 
behaviour will not become skiving (Cain, 1971). When the work 
load is light it is quite acceptable for someone to sneak off to 
a quiet tea hole or kip in the back of the van. When it is busy, 
everyone is expected to lend a hand. Consider the following 
extract drawn from my field notes two days later involving the 
same group of officers: 
As we were driving back to the station, we passed Dick 
who was parked up in front of the Chinese Take-away, 
eliciting the comment from Jan, "First the liquids and 
then the solids. " (Dick had been drinking in one of the 
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local pubs while he was supposed to be on duty. ) 
Later in the canteen Dick sat quietly eating his take 
away. Mark carne in and sat down. There was no 
conversation. Gavin was filling in the log book, 
occasionally checking with Russell about the sequence of 
the night's events. 
Suddenly the quiet of the canteen was broken by Mark, 
"You make me sick Dick. What do you think that you're 
doing.... don't get ne wrong I don't mind, it's just that 
we're doing all the work". 
"What work?, " taunted Dick indifferently. 
"Take a look at the fucking message pad. " 
"What's wrong? It's not as if I'm fucking pissed. " 
"Is it fucking right! " Mark was starting to lose his 
cool and get more irritated at Dick's complete 
indifference. 
"No it's not. I'm wrong and you're right. OK? " 
"No it's not OK! " 
"Go off sick Mark - Something is eating you. " 
"Fucking hell! I called you up didn't I and told you 
that I was going out with the Guv'nor. What more do you 
want? " 
[Mark was alluding to the fact that he had arranged to 
meet Dick for a drink but got collared by the inspector 
to patrol with him]. To warn Dick that the Guv'nor was 
out and about he had radioed him under a pretext and 
surreptitiously dropped the information into the 
conversation. ] 
"Yeah Yeah" replied Dick "Thanks a lot, what do you want 
me to do? Lick your arse! " 
Mark walked out angrily. Gavin and Jan were obviously in 
sympathy with Mark's stated position. However, they were 
a little cynical as to his motives. As Jan said, "Yeah, 
but torrunorro night it'll be Mark ." 
A few minutes later Paul entered the canteen and sat down 
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looking very glum. He slumped into the chair. Nobody 
said anything but everyone was wondering what was wrong. 
"He's had a Polac hasn't he? ", Dick broke the silence 
with almost sardonic pleasure. 
Dick told us what had happened. Paul caught the Panda 
coming into the station yard leaving a gash down the back 
wing. (This was Paul's second Polac in a week). 
Paul left the canteen. 
A few minutes later Dick radioed down to him indicating 
that he would cone and help sort out the mess. The 
result was that they "tippexed" out the scratch (which 
was very obvious, the brightness of the correcting fluid 
showing out against the off white of the Panda). They 
were hoping it would go unnoticed until much later when 
another relief had cootie on (and with luck two or three), 
by which tine it would be much harder to trace the 
culprit. 
Jan ca m ented about this to Gavin later. If he gets 
stuck on he's not going to be driving for a very long 
time..... but what does he expect when he goes chasing 
around these streets.... He's always on at Susan for 
driving so slowly but she's never had a Polac.... It's so 
obvious (the cover up). It's not fair. The driver on 
the other relief might get stuck on too if he doesn't 
notice it.... He's another 123. " (an allusion to another 
officer on the relief who has been barred from driving). 
Paul was the butt of criticism for his driving skills a few 
days later and for the realisation that he was prepared to put 
another officer in jeopardy due to his own misjudgement. 
However, what all these examples serve to illustrate is how the 
integrity of the relief, despite internal disagreements, has 
loyalty as a primary factor and how informal pressure, rather 
than formal pressure, is brought to bear to ensure compliance to 
group norms. 
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These displays of solidarity not only affect the on-duty 
working relationships but off duty working relations also. For 
instance: 
Malcolm had just got married and had caused some 
considerable offence by doing so without informing the 
relief. As this was discussed by those around the 
canteen table it was mentioned that John was also 
planning to get married. "You're not going to do a 
Malcolm on us are you and slip away for the weekend 
without telling anybody? " Saneone else suggested that, 
"We should get Malcolm a card or something with 
everybody's name on it and perhaps a little something, 
not expensive though. " The other PCs around the table 
were not so sure. As one stated bluntly, "He didn't tell 
us so why should we? " Eventually it was agreed that just 
a card would be in order, although they were still not 
happy that he hadn't told anybody. " 
Indeed the two other weddings of which I had knowledge, were very 
much police affairs. In one case, practically the enti re relief 
had attended, leaving only a skeleton crew on duty to cover the 
Friday night shift. In fact, the inspector had worked fran 2200 
until 0200 and was then driving through the night to make the 
country venue of the wedding . 
Ironically this display of solidarity could have a negative 
effect on officers' marital relationships. As one officer 
explained. 
"There's a high divorce rate in this job because there is 
always the temptation to wander off the straight and 
narrow. There's always a piss up to be had at least once 
a week. It's difficult though because its necessary to 
go even if one's missus doesn't always approve. Getting 
drunk with the lads sort of bonds you together. " 
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This bonding process cements elements of reciprocity and 
solidarity which provide a powerful resource for officers to draw 
upon in the face of the vicissitudes of both the organisation and 
environment. All officers face the same potential threat from 
the negative sanctioning power of the discipline code and 
physical harm from the public. Both are equally unpredictable. 
Since the discipline code is used arbitrarily by their line 
supervisors as a means to secure conformity to more valued ends, 
it makes a correct reading of supervisory intentions problematic. 
Not only do different sergeants vary in their demands, sonne are 
sticklers about paperwork, others about generating "good 
arrests", but the same sergeant can use all the infractions of 
discipline to which he normally turns a blind eye in an effort to 
secure compliance fran a recalcitrant. Assessing the best way of 
managing the supervisory relationship is made even more difficult 
by the constant turn-over of sergeants and inspectors. How best 
to act in a given situation cannot be determined by an appeal to 
the written rule of the discipline code, it is always 
contingent. 
In isolation the patrol officer has little scope to 
neutralise this power. Collectively, however, they do. The 
occupational culture mediates the tensions between autonomy and 
dependency. It provides a set of recipe rules which derive 
their utility from an alternative power base, the collective 
resources of the working group. As we have seen, to be able to 
draw on these resources requires conformity to other work group 
based norms, and thus the officer is equally open to sanctions 
applied by their working partners. 
Isolation and Solidarity - Autonomy and Dependency 
The consequences of isolation and solidarity, autonomy and 
dependency are not felt in isolation. They combine and 
inter-relate to create the unique occupational mileu that the 
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patrol officer inhabits. This combination is most cogently 
revealed in the following extract. However, it does not arise 
from any activities that are a direct consequence of police work 
as such. There is no call to answer f ran the public, there is no 
request for back-up and it does not relate to any internal 
acccmmxodations arising from doing the work. Rather, it concerns 
a situation which is constructed entirely by the officers for 
their own amusement, a spontaneous and complex practical joke. 
Like all jokes it is funny because it makes a play on the 
contradictions faced by the participants arising fran the 
structural constraints they face in their everyday lives, in this 
case from their occupational position. Here we see officers at 
play. As with children at play, it reveals and serves to reflect 
the key saliences of the participants. 
At about three-thirty we headed back to the station 
for tea. The canteen was littered with the debris of the 
night, dirty cups and plates strewn over the tables. I 
put the kettle on while Jock and Bill sorted out some 
paper work. The rest of the relief trickled in. A heavy 
boredom hung over in the air. So far it had been a very 
quiet Wednesday night, and it wasn't likely to liven up 
now. We had tea and at about 4am Viv and Leslie declared 
that it was tine to go out again. A few minutes later 
Bill and Jock got up to go. 
As we were walking across the station yard, the 
tranquility of the early morning was rent by a scream of 
"RUN! ". Jock charged passed me. From behind a parked 
car Leslie and Viv proceeded to empty the entire contents 
of a water pistol and a squeezy bottle, filled with 
water, over Bill. Jock managed to get to the car but, 
before he was in, Leslie turned the water hose on him, 
soaking his back and legs. Leslie and Viv were in 
hysterics at the success of their attack. I managed to 
get into the back, and Bill in the front. Jock quickly 
locked the windows and the doors to prevent a further 
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soaking. After a few minutes of gloating over their wet 
colleagues, Viv and Leslie got into the van and left the 
station yard. 
Bill and Jock were soon plotting their revenge. 
They armed themselves with Bill's water pistol which, as 
he told me, was stored in his locker for just such 
occasions, and another squeezy bottle. Then Bill headed 
out for the quiet early morning streets, excitedly 
awaiting revenge. 
The oportunity came about twenty minutes later. Viv 
radioed back to the station to say he was going off 
division to get some petrol from the all night petrol 
station which was used when the divisional garage was 
shut. Bill sped through the deserted streets. Hopefully 
they would arrive at the petrol station a few minutes 
before the van, park up in a quiet side road, just 
in front of the garage, and sit in wait for their prey. 
Bill left the engine running to ensure a speedy ambush. 
The van came into view, Leslie got out to f ill her up and 
Dave went in to buy some sweets. 
"Now" ! commanded Jock. The Panda lunged forward, 
across the road, and into the petrol station forecourt. 
Before Leslie had a chance to know what had hit him, the 
contents of the squeezy bottle had been emptied over his 
back. Jock manged to score a direct hit on Dave. 
"Mission accomplished", screamed Jock. "Let's get out of 
here". The Panda sped off into the night. "Fucking 
Magic, Yahoo", Bill declared. Jock, carried away with 
the euphoria of success, continued emptying the water 
pistol at the pigeons as the Panda chased away, shouting 
gleefully when he scored a hit. 
A few minutes later, Bill caught sight of the crime 
car in his rear view mirror. It started to accelerate, 
close up and then over-take the Panda, the driver 
offering two fingers as he passed. Bill rose to the 
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challenge, accelerated and, for the next fifteen minutes, 
an eighty mile an hour chase ensued, involving the van, 
the two Pandas and the crime car. Then, without warning, 
but as if by design, there were no cars in sight. Bill 
cruised trying to locate the other units. "We're being 
set up, " declared Jock, "I can feel it. " We cruised for 
fifteen minutes, Bill and Jock, recounting the heroic 
deeds of the night. 
Then it came. "Could C99 rendezvous with C38 at 
". Jock accepted. "They must think we're fucking 
stupid. " Bill headed slowly towards the location. As we 
neared, Jock checked that all the doors and windows were 
locked. We rounded the corner of a quiet, low rise, 
council development. The other Panda was in the middle 
of the road, bonnet up and, from underneath the engine, 
we could see two legs sticking out. "They've got to be 
joking", declared Jock, "They must think we're really 
stupid. " Dave turned to me, "Whatever you do, don't open 
the door. " 
We edged fowards towards the Panda, and Bill stopped 
the car. Leslie cane over fran the Panda and pleaded 
with Bill to "give then a hand". Mick, secure in the 
locked Panda, smiled a smug smile and shook his head. 
Leslie pleaded some more. Bill just continued to smile 
and shake his head. 
Suddenly from nowhere, the van screeched to a halt, 
blocking the Panda's exit, and the crime car positioned 
itself behind. Leslie ran for cover. Bill tried to 
reverse out, but the gap was too tight. Above, on the 
second floor balcony, Andy came into view. Without 
warning, a bin liner full of water canes flying over the 
balcony. And then another. They both missed the Panda 
but, as they hit the ground, a huge shower of water 
engulfed the car. In the heat of the attack, Bill had 
managed to reverse the car out of the trap and was now 
heading towards the road junction. The crime car 
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followed, overtook and blocked the %ay. Bill mounted the 
pavement and headed free. 
The four cars were in pursuit now on one of the main 
Kimberley through roads. The unmarked car overtook and 
forced the Panda to a slow halt. The other Panda blocked 
it fran behind and the van to the side. Bill and Jock 
were surrounded. Leslie, now out of the van, was 
fiddling with some keys at the lock of the besieged 
Panda. The door opened, Bill desperately tried to hold 
it shut, but Viv yanked it open. Andy was ready with a 
squeezy bottle and emptied it over Bill and Jock. Bill's 
foot must have hit the accelerator as he tried to defend 
himself. The car lurched fowards. CRUNCH! 
There was silence. With no discussion the drivers 
got back into their cars and parked them up neatly. They 
then got out to inspect the damage. Luckily, the crime 
car was unscathed. The Panda had not come off so well. 
The front light was completely smashed. "Oh fuck" 
somebody declared, and the company started to giggle 
nervously at the predicament, the adrenaline and 
excitment of the last hour still rushing. 
It was nearly 5.20 am. They only had thirty minutes 
until the next shift came on for briefing. This left 
little time to prepare a cover up. "CK", declared Bill, 
taking charge, "We'll meet back at the station in ten 
minutes. Don't all arrive together though. I'll have a 
story worked out by then. " The cars split up. Bill and 
Jock, still laughing prepared their story. "What time 
was the last call? " Jock checked his communications log. 
"Three-Ten". "OK, this is what we do. We say that we 
were giving back-up, parked up and left the car 
unattended. Someone must have come and kicked the 
headlights in then, but we only just noticed it now. " 
When we arrived back at the station yard, the other 
units were all in. A huddle formed and Bill repeated 
them the story. Everyone agreed. As the huddle broke 
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up the sergeant appeared. (The inspector had gone off at 
two and this, the only sergeant on that night, was a 
temporary from the adjoining police station standing in 
because they were so short. He was leaving early, 
presumably having been relieved by the sergeant coming on 
for the six o'clock shift). Bill approached the 
Sergeant. Everyone nonchalantly got on with their 
business, cleaning out the cars etc, pretending not to 
listen. Bill repeated the story. The sergeant's face 
started to strain with the signs of disbelief. Jock 
tried to come to the rescue by offering corroboration of 
the story but, before he could get very far, the sergeant 
interrupted. "What do you take me for? I can hear the 
radio you know". There was a brief silence. "C Sarge, " 
declared Bill, "It was my fault. We were pissing about 
and I knocked it. " The sergeant smiled, "CK, I'll square 
it. " And with that he went back into the station to file 
a report. Bill gave a sigh of relief, as the ensemble 
tried to decide where to go for an early morning drinking 
session. 
There are a number of features in this exanple which mirror the 
skills and techniques that officers utilise in their day to day 
role as police officers: driving fast, lying and bluffing, 
evaluating the truthfulness of other people's claims. However, 
it is the form, rather than the content of the incident which is 
of most significance. This is pertinent in two ways. 
First, the form of the practical joke is always that of 
surprise, of something happening that was not expected, generally 
something unpleasant. In the above situation the generally 
held fear of being attacked by an unpredictable and violent 
member of the public is played out using water as a safe 
substitute. The consequences are different, a soaking rather 
than a hiding, but the form reveals a structural identity. The 
isolated patrol officer facing adversity from unknown and 
unpredictable events. 
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Second, the specific practical joke that is played and 
replayed to its climax precisely resembles the structure of the 
"extortionate transaction", the escalating spriral of threat and 
counter-threat (Muir, 1977). When officers do become involved in 
extortionate transactions with the public they rarely lose. If 
they are in danger of so doing they can normally rely on back-up 
to ensure that they regain control. In the context of the 
practical joke, however, the extortionate transaction has no such 
limits. It is a police versus police event. Moreover, as the 
stakes get higher and higher, with each subsequent attack being 
more elaborately planned and executed, the symbolic winners and 
losers become merged into one. On one level, the game of attack 
and counter attack is merely being played out between the 
individual participants. On another level, all the participants 
are united on the sane side which stands in opposition to the 
organisation and its attempts to control them. In short, they 
are celebrating their autonomy. 
There is an almost inevitable logic to the crash that 
terminates the waterf ights and therefore the extortionate 
transaction. The situation could have conceivably just fizzled 
out, but the personal stakes, the adrenaline flow and the 
excitement that had been built up in the cycle of revenge and 
counter revenge suggest that a resolution would have to be 
imposed rather than chosen. No one was in the process of backing 
down. The crash provided that imposed resolution, but it has 
greater significance than just the end of the extortionate 
transaction because it gave substance to that nebulous 
phenomenon, "group solidarity". At once, opposing sides in the 
game are united. The soakings evaporate into the more 
substantial concern of how to manage the cover up. 
There was never any question that they must all accept the 
responsibilty of covering up the crash. Although they could have 
left Bill to carry it individually, they were all guilty by 
association; it could have happened to any of the vehicles. The 
unfortunate timing of the incident, not long before shift 
changeover, and the obvious nature of the damage rreant that 
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effecting makeshift repairs was impossible. The only possiblity 
was to admit the accident but to cloud its circumstances. Bill's 
admission, however, rests on the rather optimistic, (and, in the 
event, unfounded) assumption that the sergeant can be hoodwinked 
when, quite clearly from having access to the radio 
communications, he cannot have failed to notice that something 
was going on. In the end, then, Bill had to admit to both the 
accident and its circumstances. Bill has now placed himself in 
the hands of the sergeant, and is completely dependent upon him 
to minimise the consequences. If the sergeant is so inclined, he 
can ensure that Mark is barred from driving, or he has the power 
to "square it". The celebration of autonomy has becare a 
reminder of the dependency between the patrol officers and their 
superiors. 
There is, then, not one joke but three. The first is the 
water fight which is a joke against each other. The second is 
encapsulated by the crash which is a joke against the 
organisation and the fragility of its attempts to control than. 
And the third, perhaps the funniest, is that they are not 
autonomous after all. They are dependent upon the sergeant and 
his mediating power within the organisational structure to 
"square it". 
The patrol officer is caught within a web of contradictory 
and competing pressures. The autonomy which arises fran the 
legal constitution of the off ice is tempered by the dependency on 
others, both peers and superiors. This dependency is made 
necessary due to the problem of having to cope with the 
threat of negative sanctions. The socially isolated position of 
the constable, both generally, because of the stigma attached to 
the off ice and, specifically, because of the manner in which 
patrol work is organised, leads to a strong sense of solidarity 
among officers. The occupational culture provides officers with 
a set of recipe rules which help mediate the various tensions. 
The rules are not binding, nor are they followed blindly, but 
they provide one, and of ten the most convincing and practically 
relevant, resource for avoiding trouble. 
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The preceding examination of the occupational milieu 
provides the backcloth for the way in which patrol work is 
achieved on the street. With this in mind, trove on to Part 
III which deals with the nature of the communications system; how 
officers conceive of the environment and how they manage and 
resolve the incidents with which they are called to deal. 
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PART III 
PATROL WORK 
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Chapter 7 
Communications 
The capacity of the police organisation to control an area, its 
ability to regulate the work of the patrol officer, and its power 
to respond to calls from the public is greatly facilitated by the 
uses of its radio communications system. The radio enables the 
organisation to mobilise a fast and effective response in the 
case of large scale emergencies such as rioting or banbings. In 
a personal crisis, the radio can mobilise a unit for swift 
action; for example, to break down the door of a collapsed 
epilectic and arrange for them to be transported to hospital. 
Further, it enables patrol officers to be supervised more closely 
by their superiors and dispatched at the expediency of the 
communications officer. 
The personal radio, which all officers and relief officers are 
expected to carry when out of the station on patrol, consists of 
a transmission unit and a send and receive microphone. The 
transmission unit is a heavy rectangular black box about one inch 
thick, eight inches long and two and a half inches wide, with a 
small rechargeable battery in its base. The send and receive 
microphone is attached to the transmission unit by a thick wire 
about two feet long. On its side is a small button which has to 
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be pressed to broadcast. 
The design of the radio enables the transmission unit to be 
clipped around the back of a male officer's belt, so that, when 
he is walking, it hangs down unobtrusively by his side. Police 
women carry the transmission units in their handbags which are 
carried over their shoulders. The microphone is then attached to 
the lapels of the jacket. 
Officers go to great lengths to ensure that their radios are 
broadcasting and receiving properly. At the beginning of each 
shift each officer goes to the cupboard in which the radios are 
stored and selects a radio, takes a battery fran the the 
recharging cabinet, and signs them out. Although the recharging 
unit indicates whether the batteries have been sufficiently 
recharged, the equipment is unreliable and often gives a false 
indication. Officers therefore test their radios and batteries, 
before leaving the station, by blowing into the microphone while 
in ear shot of other PCs with radios and seeing if they are 
receiving them. Even when this procedure is followed the radio 
still sometimes malfunctions. If the officer is out of the 
station s/he will freqently make a special return trip to replace 
the battery. This is as much to protect him or herself against 
accusations that they were skiving as to ensure back-up can be 
summoned if necessary. It is the centrality of the radio to the 
officer's work world which leads many officers to talk about 
being, "married to their radios". 
The radio serves to link the patrol officer to both the 
organisation and, less directly, to the outside events with which 
they have to deal. As a link to the organisation, the radio 
offers a degree of security against uncertainty. It can be used 
to ask for assistance, to elicit further information or to seek 
advice. On the other hand, as a link to the environment, the 
information that the radio brings actually serves to heighten 
uncertainty. As Manning (1983) makes clear, this is due to the 
complex nature of the encoding and decoding processes that take 
place as an incident passes through the police communications 
system. Since the patrol officer stands at the end of this 
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complex process, it has already undergone a transformation from 
raw data (the original message from the public) to a highly 
refined police shorthand e. g., assault in progress. 
In simple terms there are three distinct stages that occur 
before an event in the environment becomes the basis of a 
reactive police response. First, an event occurs which somebody 
deems as warranting police attention and they call the police. 
Second, information about the event is processed through the 
various segments of the communications system. Finally, if the 
processing has resulted in the decision to mobilise an immediate 
police response, a call is put out. 
The patrol officer is aware that the relationship between 
the message and the original incident is problematic and that it 
can only be understood in reference to particularistic 
organisational and occupational knowledge which acts as a cipher 
to unpack its meaning. As Manning writes: 
In other words, the police connect or draw pragmatic 
interpretative connections between signs representing the 
incidents heard or seen and the event. They generalise, 
regardless of their position in the police corrmunications 
system,, that events are problematic; that cannunication 
of events is on the basis of the perceptions and 
interests of the caller; that received incidents are 
abstracted and coded by civilians (at two levels by the 
caller and by the operators... ); that incidents are 
passed on by decision processes that they may not 
understand (for example, the ways in which operators, 
dispatchers and controllers queue and send incidents for 
attention); and that incidents are changeable 
(temporally, spatially and interpersonally) and uncertain 
(in appearance, in sequence or in order, in frequency of 
consequences and in context. ) (Manning, 1983: 187). 
The central focus of this chapter is the manner in which the 
technological organisation of the communications system affects 
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the pattern of work load distribution and the way that the 
individual patrol officer translates information into the basis 
for action. In general, although there are exceptions (Manning, 
1979a & 1983; Rubinstien, 1973), the literature has focused on 
the organisational aspects of information processing (Manning, 
1984,1983; Eckblam & Heal 1982 ) or on the limitations of 
information received from the public as a basis for police action 
Melling, 1974; Bercal, 1971; Bieck & Kessler, 1977). The 
predominate frame of reference, then, has been that of the 
managerial problem of resource allocation. The police 
organisation has been viewed as a supplier of a scarce resource 
(law and order), due to demand fron the public. The police, 
therefore, are seen on the supply side of the equation. From the 
patrol officer's position, however, it is more useful to turn the 
model on its head and conceive of them on the demand side. This 
would be far less of an issue if it were not for the method of 
allocation adopted by the station based coannunications officer. 
Rather than calls being assigned to particular officers, more 
often than not they are put out to tender. The first unit to 
accept the call is assigned to it, although other units may offer 
back-up or attend without permission. 
I want to argue that, rather than conceiving of the police 
organisation as demand led, from the street officer's position 
there is a shortage of "good calls". In the same way that 
classical economic theory tells us that when demand outstrips 
supply, ccapetition results and the value of the goods increases, 
for patrol officers, scarcity of 'good' calls leads to 
competition and increases their value. For the patrol officer, 
the scarce resource happens to be incidents. Further, like most 
consumers, they are discerning about the quality of the incidents 
supplied. Not all incidents have the same value, nor do 
incidents have any intrinsic value. Value is constructed through 
a particular occupational and organisational reading of the 
police mandate, laid down in the formal organisational goals. 
(Cf Rock, 1973; Manning, 1977; Metropolitian Police, 1985). 
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From the organisational perspective, the classic problem of 
resource allocation and work load distribution is solved by a 
laissez faire approach to deployment. In practice, this allows 
the problem of the intensity and speed of reaction to a call to 
be determined by the aggregate effect of individual descision 
making. From the officer's perspective, it leads to competition 
for the "best" calls and strategies to mininimise dealing with 
the least favourable. To understand how this process is worked 
out in practice it is necessary to focus our attention on four, 
theoretically distinct, but practically inter-related areas. 
1) The organisation and technology of patrolling. 
2) The patrol officer's conception of the nature and importance 
of different types of work. 
3) The situated interpretation of the ressage. 
4) The manipulation of the technology and communications system 
in line with officers' conception of their task. 
The Organisation and Technology of Patrolling. 
The organisation of uniformed patrol is detailed in chart 1. 
At the tAu extremes are the Haie Beats and the IRUs. In 
Kimberley at least, the Hare Beats have little involvement with 
the day to day pressures of reactive policing. Their work is 
largely uninfluenced by the technology of modern policing. At 
the other extreme lies the IRU. Like the Home Beats, the IRU is 
protected from the pressure of everyday reactive irk. They are 
on permanent standby for deployment during civil disorder and 
major incidents. They are linked to both the divisional and 
force wide communications system giving them a wide geographical 
area to cover, and they are equipped with a 20 seater van, riot 
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helmets, shields, and batons. 
In between these functions there lies the relief which, as 
the chart illustrates, contains elements which approach both of 
these extremes. In spite of the aims of neighbourhood policing 
to create a more proactive relief, it is primarily a reactive 
unit. The exigencies of the shift system, training, sick leave, 
the floating rest day, aid commitment, over-time restrictions, 
and so on, particularly during the miners' strike and Libyan 
Embassy siege, mean that a nominal relief strength of forty 
officers is whittled down to an average of 12-15 officers per 
shift. Under these conditions, priority is given to the reactive 
capability of the relief. In practice, this means that the area 
car, van, and Pandas are all crewed, whilst the station office 
personnel must also be deployed, to act as communications 
officer, VDU operator, gaoler and 'man' the front desk. Only if 
anybody is left over will foot patrols be deployed. Even then, 
the foot patrols are most likely to be selected to cover for the 
station personnel during meal breaks etc. 
It is the communications system which links the officer to 
both the organisation and events in the external world. As can 
be seen from the chart, formally at least, the foot and Panda 
patrols are under the supervision of the station communications 
officer and are limited in their trobliity. Walkers cannot easily 
react to events occurring more than a few hundred yards away, and 
the Panda is neither fitted with sirens nor lights, making fast 
response dangerous, even if it is invariably attempted. 
The area car, on the other hand, is equipped to be the first 
line of emergency response. It is a powerful 3.2 litre Rover, 
capable of high speed, and is equipped with sirens and lights. 
The area car crew is linked by a mainset radio to the incident 
room at New Scotland Yard and receives, and is expected to 
answer, all the 999 calls on the division and to provide back up 
to area cars in other divisions. The area car is always double 
crewed, with a driver and an operator. The operator is 
responsible for using the mainset, and this also facilitates a 
fast response, as the functions of driving and handling the 
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communications system are split. As %ell as the Einset, the 
crew carry personal radios which link them to the station. 
However, they are not obliged to respond to calls deriving from 
the station communications officer and could legitimately refuse. 
In practice, if it is busy and the area car is uncommitted, they 
will often take calls. 
The van is in a slightly different position to the area car 
although it can pick up both sets of calls. It is controlled 
from the station and it is not protected from performing duties 
assigned to it from the station communications officer. However, 
it may legitimately be deployed from NSY if the area car is busy, 
or offer back up to emergency calls. 
Levels of reactive demands and working patterns 
Of course, patrol officers have many duties other than 
attending to calls from the public. There are reports to be 
written and filed, prisoners to be dealt with, court warnings to 
be delivered, enquiries to be made about matters outstanding, and 
so on. To try and gain an understanding of the levels of demand 
and the various activities that fall under the purview of the 
relief, I am going to make use of various internally produced 
studies and reports on deployment and resources in Kimberley. 
They must be treated with some caution since they were produced 
to address slightly different questions to the one posed here. 
However, they do provide a useful indication as to the level of 
reactive demand, and how officers' time is spent. 
In Kimberley there is an average theoretical relief strength 
of 22 constables per relief who are supervised by two sergeants 
and one inspector. However, various abstractions due to 
sickness, aid comni tments , annual leave, officers temporarily 
posted to the Instant Response Units or Adminstrative units, 
there is, on average, only 45% of the theoretical relief strength 
available at any one tine. This means that, of the original 
twenty-two officers, on average only eleven will be available for 
deployment. Of these, one will be deployed as the communications 
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officer and another as the assistant station officer (ASO), 
leaving nine officers from the theoretical strength for 
deployment. 
Usually four vehicles will be put out: the area car which 
is always double crewed, two Pandas and the van. These are 
generally single crewed during the early turn and the first half 
of late turn and double crewed for the second half of later and 
all of nights. Those not allocated to a vehicle will be posted 
walking. 
Table 1 
Tasks of Relief Constables by the Percentage of Time 
Spent on Activity between the hours of 07.30 & 21.30 
Tasks 
Other Inside Station Duties 
Refreshments 
Law Enforcement & Social Service Work 
Random Patrol 
Report Writing 
Court 
Dealing with Prisoners 
Relief ASO 
Enquiries 
Assigned Journey 
Planned Journey 
Other 
Total 
% by shift 
Average Early Late 
23.0 22.0 24.0 
17.5 18.0 17.0 
16.5 07.0 26.0 
09.5 12.0 07.0 
09.5 10.0 09.0 
03.5 07.0 00.0 
03.0 02.0 04.0 
03.0 04.0 02.0 
02.0 03.0 01.0 
01.5 01.0 02.0 
01.0 01.0 01.0 
10.0 13.0 07.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0: 
To gain an indication of how officers who are actually 
available on relief spend their time it will be useful to 
examine t he results of a "slice of time" study produced by the 
station. (See Table One above). Forty " nrinents" of time were 
selected over a seven day period and all relief officers' 
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activity at that time was recorded. Since the study was ai med at 
assessing the possibility of increasing the amount of patrol 
officers' contact with the public it excluded a ten hour period 
at night and so the sample is only drawn fran the hours of 07.30 
to 21.30. However, it still provides a useful guide to ear ly and 
late turn. 
For relief officers as a whole, we can see that 56% of time 
available is spent in the station, and 44% outside of it. If %, ýe 
do not include attending court in outside duties, since it's not 
related to patrolling, we can see that only 40.5% of the relief 
strength is available to respond to calls from the public. 
Looking at how this time outside the station is spent gives 
a rough approximation of what officers do when they are out on 
patrol. Thus: 
Table 2 
Percentage of time spent on various activies by 
officers on patrol 
Type of activity % time 
Law Enforcement and Social Service 41.00 
Random patrol 48.00 
Enquiries 05.00 
Assigned Journey 03.25 
Planned Journey 02.50 
100.00 
Nearly sixty percent of officers' time is spent on 
activities other than responding to calls from the public. In 
fact, much of it is spent aimlessly wandering around waiting for 
the next call to come out. By examining only the amount of work 
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generated by calls from the public, it is possible to indicate 
the average amount of time officers spend dealing with reactive 
incidents. 
An analysis of calls that demanded a response from the 
reactive capability of the relief was undertaken by the station 
in 1983. Two samples ire drawn from different seven day 
periods. I have combined the two. The results are presented in 
the table below. 
Table three 
Average number of 
Messages that required a reactive response by shift 
Shift No. of 
Messages 
Early Turn 13 
Late Turn 23 
Night turn 13 
Total 49 
It is neccessary to consider this information in the light 
of the capacity of the organisation to respond. The data in 
Table 3 excludes 999 calls and, therefore, it would be 
unreasonable to include the area car in the analysis. Apart f ran 
the area car, then, my observations suggest that, in general, the 
level of deployment would consist of three mobile patrols and 
between one and three walking patrols per shift, the tendency 
being for more walking patrols on late turn. Taking an estimate 
of four reactive patrols per shift (three nubile and one 
walking) on early and night turn, the units, on average, deal 
with just over three reactive demands each. Accounting for 
refreshment time of one hour per shift, this means one incident 
every two hours. For late turn, the number of reactive demands 
per officer is just under six, or one incident every one hour and 
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ten minutes. 
Of course, such bland statistics hide as much as they 
reveal. It is in the nature of police work that the level of 
public demand for service is unpredictable. One indication of 
this unpredictability is how varied the demand on Kimberley 
police officers can be. This has importance beyond the immediate 
argument because police managers often argue that they must have 
a sufficient reactive cover to allow for wild fluctuations in 
public demand. 
From the seven day samples, it is possible to compute the 
average of the highest canbined totals for the same day of the 
week across each shift. The result is documented in table 4. 
Table Four 
Highest Number & Lowest Number 
of Messages Requiring Dispatch 
Shift Highest Lowest 
Early Turn 16 9 
Late Turn 30 15 
Night Duty 17 9 
Accounting for refreshment time and an average of four 
reactive patrols per shift, the highest level of demand per 
patrol, for early turn, is four incidents per shift, or one every 
hour and forty five minutes. For late turn it is seven and a 
half incidents per shift, that is just over one every hour. For 
Night turn it is just over four incidents per shift or one every 
hour and forty minutes. 
At the lowest level of public demand, the number of 
incidents per patrol, for early turn and night shift, is just 
over two, or one incident every three and a half hours. For late 
turn it is just under four, or one incident every hour and forty 
five minutes. 
It is important to place the demand for reactive reponse in 
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the context of the patrol officer's work day. As we have seen, 
patrol officers are expected to perform a myriad of tasks in 
between responding to calls. Consider the following "log" of the 
activity of the Panda car during a late turn: 
Table 5 
Sample Operational Log 
of Panda Patrol 
14.00 - 14.10 
14.10 - 14.30 
14.30 - 14.40 
14.40 - 14.50 
14.50 - 15.10 
15.11 - 15.25 
15.26 - 16.00 
16.01 - 16.30 
16.31 - 16.45 
16.46 - 17.00 # 
17.01 - 17.05 
17.06 - 17.25 
17.26 - 17.35 @ 
17.36 - 17.50 * 
17.51 - 18.00 
18.00 - 18.05 
18.06 - 19.00 
19.01 - 19.30 
19.31 - 19.45 
Briefing 
Transport PC to hospital 
Back to Police Station to deal with a front 
counter enquiry. 
Dealing with enquiry 
Getting Petrol from divisional Garage 
Delivering Court Warning 
Random Patrol 
Dealing with Fail to Stop accident. 
Delivering Message to DI 
Tail and stop speeding motorist, warned and 
asked to produce docurrents at station 
Pick up 3 Court Warnings from station 
Attempt to deliver two of the court warnings: 
both out. 
Providing Back up to disturbance call being 
dealt with by area car. Called off before we 
arrived. 
Dispatched to attend burglary, no reply at 
address. 
Deliver the other court warning 
Drive Back to Station 
Meal Break 
* Attend PI accident (with patrol sergeant) 
Go to station, pick up officer, transport PC 
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to hospital. 
19.46 - 19.55 # Tail and stop suspect car. All in order. 
19.56 - 20.00 Random patrol 
20.01 - 20.05 * Youths starting machinery - No trace 
20.06 - 20.15 @ Back up to Area Car. Fight. 4 officers on 
scene already. Stay in car 
20.16 - 20.20 Randara patrol 
20.21 - 20-25 # Stop cyclist for going wrong way down a one 
way street. Informal warning 
20.26 - 20.45 Random Patrol 
20.46 - 20.55 Deliver message 
20.56 - 21.05 Randara patrol 
21.06 - 21.20 @ Back up to Fail to Stop chase. Four officers 
already on scene. Stay in car. 
21.21 - 21.35 @ Back up to area car: Post office insecure, 
suspects on premises. Area car already 
dealing on arrival. No trace of suspect 
21.36 - 21.45 Transport Sergeant back to station 
21.46 - 21.55 Randren patrol then back to station. 
Key * Reactive response at direction of communications 
officer 
# Self ini tiated activity 
@ Back-up: official and unofficial. 
(N. B. The data for this log was gathered while I was 
accompanying a single crewed Panda. The driver asked me 
to act as operator and write down all the calls. This was 
the only occasion that I wrote anything in the field. I 
kept the piece of paper .) 
It is apparent from the above log that, although the officer 
is assigned to four calls in response to demands from the public, 
these constitute only a small proportion of the officer's work 
load. While reactive policing has the highest priority and will 
override prior claims to the officer's time, it certainly does 
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not predominate. However, from the officer's point of view, this 
under estimates the amount of reactive policing he engaged in, 
since he provided back up, both officially and unofficially to 
another four incidents, although on only one occasion did this 
require him to leave his vehicle. 
It is clear that, for much of the time, although there may 
not be a shortage of work, there is a shortage of incidents to 
react to. Moreover, it is generally these reactive incidents, 
which provide police officers with the "good calls" that lead to 
valued arrests. The consequences of this are two fold; not only 
are good calls competed for but also posted to the units that are 
most likely to receive them. The effect of the distribution of 
technology and the split level communication system is to make 
certain deployments more favourable than others. Probationers, 
particularly, seek out postings to cars which they realise will 
give them rrore opportunity to deal with crime related incidents. 
But as probationers are not eligible to enter for the standard 
driving course until they have two years service, they are 
dependent upon sponsorship from their sergeants and inspectors to 
give them postings as "observer" in the area car, or to act as 
second on one of the Pandas. There is keen competition for such 
posts and some friction if officers feel that they are being 
passed over unfairly. For instance: 
Round the table Mark is winding up Howard for being in 
"the inspectors good books" and being part of the "Golden 
Four". "They can't do anything wrong, " sneers Mark, 
"when anything comes up they get it... Howard's been 
posted to the crime car six times in the last four 
months. " Howard appeals to the audience "Don't listen to 
him he's just got a chip on his shoulder. " 
This competition is not just restricted to deployments but 
extends to the selection for driving courses, since becoming a 
qualified police driver enhances the possibility of engaging in 
"real police ork". Officers avidly await news of their 
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impending course. For example: 
"Pam had told me earlier how she was hoping to get on a 
driving course soon. Her application had been submitted 
and supported by the inspector. The inspector walked in 
to the Front Office, saw Pam, and asked if she wanted to 
do a course at the end of the month. Pam's face lit up. 
"Right I'll put you down for the sexual offences 
course ." Pan's face dropped and, as she told rre later, 
she had presumed that he was asking about her driving 
course and was very disappointed. 
Other courses and specialist deployments can also be used to 
minimise the possibility of having to deal with "rubbish". One 
officer informed ire that he wanted to become a dog handler 
because "I want to fight crime". Or, as the following 
conversation illustrates, CID and Crime Squad work is also seen 
as a route to avoid certain types of work : 
Two officers fran the Crime Squad had arrived at the 
scene of a domestic dispute which had required several 
units of back up. They mainly seemed to be there to 
watch rather than offer any practical assistance. As the 
incident was dragging on, one of the officers turned to 
his partner, "We might as well fuck off now". "Yes. " 
replied his colleague, "That's what I miss, being on the 
Crime Squad, all the rubbish! " With that they left. 
From the relief officers' perspective, gaining the formal 
skills of driving and the informal practice of keeping on the 
right side of their sergeants and inspectors enables them to 
maximise the quality and quantity of their encounters with the 
public. From this point of view it is clear that the area car is 
the choicest deployment. However, the supply of officers 
eligible to take the advanced driving course and, therefore, be 
entitled to drive the area car is restricted to those who have 
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taken the standard driving course and, although there is no fixed 
minimum, generally have at least six years' experience. 
Bearing these constraints in mind, the formal organisation 
of deployment and the communications system is an important 
starting point for the analysis of the distribution and 
allocation of work. To gain a more rounded analysis, it is 
necessary to focus on the shared understandings that give meaning 
to the various functions and place on than differential values. 
The Patrol Officer's Conception Of the Nature 
and Importance of Different Types of Work 
There are two primary factors which influence the method of 
call allocation from the station. First, as a collective unit, 
once the police organisation has committed itself to a response, 
it is more concerned that the incident is dealt with at all than 
who, in particular, deals with it. As long as the necessary 
paperwork connected with it is filed, and the incident is neatly 
terminated on paper, at least, there will be no organisational 
come back. Second, the station based communications officer is 
not a fixed assignment, the responsibility is spread across most 
of the members of the relief .A flexible rota system ensures 
that an officer does not get "stuck inside" too often. The CO is 
therefore a fully integrated member of the relief who is expected 
to share the same norms and values and will be brought under 
informal pressure if he or she does not. The OD is aware that 
officers who are officially available for dispatch, may be "tied 
up" with another incident, involved in self-initiated work, 
riding in the back of the van when they should be walking, 
skiving, or unable to receive a message because of the 
transmission breaking up, a faulty radio, and so on. 
The combination of these two factors means that, in general, 
calls are not assigned to individual officers. Messages are put 
out to tender, and the first unit or officer to answer the call 
is allocated to it and, perhaps, a second unit detailed as back 
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up. While not all calls generate the same re 
difficult to discern which would be the most 
from a literal reading of the messages. The 
to reinterpret the message in the light of an 
occupational understanding of the meaning 
instance: 
sponse, it would be 
sought after calls 
patrol officer has 
organisational and 
of ork. For 
At about 3.30 a call came over the radio, "Can any unit 
go to 199 Old Mansion Street. " There was no answer. 
After waiting about twenty seconds or so, Nigel accepted 
the call. "I'll make my way there, if you give me the 
details when I arrive. With no haste A walked towards 
Old Mansion Street. This is going to be a rubbish 
call..... you can tell because they don't let you know 
what it is about until you've accepted it. " 
When we arrived some three minutes later, Nigel radioed 
back to the station. "I'm outside. Can you give me the 
details". The operator explained that Mrs. Brown was 
canplaining that her neighbour had been throwing dead 
pigeons on her roof. "I think she's a bit of a Nutter", 
the dispatcher ended with. 
In the above example, the officer is unpacking the meaning of the 
call by reference to the form that the message takes rather than 
its content and, at the same time, by his hesitation revealing 
his priorities, hoping that someone else might accept it. As the 
call relates to his beat he can only delay his response, or 
questions may be asked about why he did not answer. Contrast 
this with the following example: 
As we were getting back into the car a call came over, 
"suspect trying doors on ----------- -- Road". We are 
only four hundred yards away from the incident. Chris 
does not bother to answer the call but starts the car up 
and speeds off towards the scene. It took us several 
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minutes to arrive, we got stuck behind another car and 
Chris complained bitterly that the Pandas were not fitted 
with a siren or light. He therefore had to rely on the 
horn and headlights to indicate to the traffic that he 
was in a hurry, but he had to be much more circumspect 
than the area car in taking chances while over taking. 
In the above example, the officer is not officially assigned to 
the call and he does not acknowledge receipt of the message. In 
fact, the area car is dealing with it and the station was 
relaying a message passed on to them from the operator). His 
almost instantaneous response' is related to his and his 
colleagues' conception of the work, and to the value placed on 
such prime calls which offer the chance, albeit slim, of a crime 
arrest. 
In this respect, the priorities of Kimberley officers are 
not very different frans those documented by police researchers in 
other areas. (Manning, 1977; Holdaway, 1983; van Maanen, 1974). 
They are related to occupational and organisationally derived 
categories which stratify and prioritise the work in line with 
the perceived mandate of an organisation committed to crime 
fighting. In Kimberley there are four major conceptions of 
work: 
"Work", which involves doing anything other than sitting around 
in the canteen drinking cups of tea, such as delivering court 
warnings providing transport for other officers etc. 
"Shit Work / Rubbish", which is usually reserved for the social 
service aspects of policing, such as dispute settlement, 
attending noisy parties, dealing with drunks, letting people into 
their homes after they have locked themselves out, and so on. 
One of the reasons why this type of work has such a low status 
and is viewed so disparagingly is that there are few 
organisational rewards for dealing with it. It also remains 
hidden from view. For most of the time the only formal record 
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that an incident has been successfully terminated will be such 
catch phrases found on the message pad as 'Parties seen and 
advised. No further Action. ' Success is deemed to be no call 
back. The other reason is that they are often the most difficult 
and dangerous to handle, involving people in highly charged 
emotional states. 
"Process", refers to routine law enforcement, which could be 
typically dealt with without recourse to arrest, such as a road 
traffic offence or driving a defective vehicle. Process 
is particularly sought after by probationers as it i s used by 
their sergeants to give a concrete indication that they are 
working. 
"Real work", is ideally encapsulated by the ritual of chase and 
capture. It results in a "good arrest", for example, for mugging 
or burglary. "Real work", provides the concrete manifestation of 
officers' symbolic conception of their mission. 
Such conceptions of work, coupled with the ability of the officer 
to manipulate the technology in line with their understanding of 
"real police work", has a direct effect on the level and type of 
service that police officers deliver to their publics. Some 
calls will receive a huge imput of front line effort, mobilising 
all the vehicular patrols within seconds while others will be 
largely neglected and reluctantly dealt with by one unit. For 
instance; 
Dave walked into the station off ice, dripping wet as it 
was pouring outside. The station officer asked him if he 
would go and deal with a 10/8 (accident without injury) 
down on the High Street. He didn't want to go since he'd 
just come back from dealing with another incident and 
wanted to do the paperwork on it so he could go and 
interview the victim in hospital before he went off duty. 
He tried to get a car to deal with the 10/8 but the Panda 
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was committed. Dave reluctantly accepted to go to the 
call. As we were leaving, the van driver came into the 
off ice and offered him a lift down to the High Street. 
Once in the van all the plans changed. Dave, who was 
trying to get to the hospital to take a statement, was to 
be dropped off there. The van would deal with the 10/8, 
pick up a prisoner from ----- Road and pick Dave up from 
the hospital on the way back. When we got to the scene 
of the accident there was no trace. Steve radioed back 
to the station to find if they had got the right 
location. They had, but the two drivers were now arguing 
it out in the station office. 
Rather than just drive Dave to the hospital, Steve 
decided to go straight to ----- Road Police Station. 
Thus leaving Dave with no choice but to stay. Dave 
protested that he needed to get an accident statement 
from the woman in casualty, but Steve dismissed him with, 
"the process section can deal with it during the week. " 
While some types of work are devalued and avoided, other 
types are actively sought. Certain calls are guaranteed to 
produce a 'good turn out', although this is partially dependent 
upon the origianl source of the message. If a call is put out 
over the station radio, then all the patrols, foot, Panda, van, 
and area car can pick up the call. If it is broadcast over the 
mainset, then only the area car and van have access to it, and 
only if they decided to broadcast details over their personal 
radios will other units on the division be able to respond. A 
call involving 'real police work', such as 'suspects on premises' 
would almost certainly be broadcast over the station 
conmunication system by the area car and generate a fast and 
enthusiastic turn out. In line with this, it is possible to 
suggest a tentative hierarcy of calls, whose importance can be 
seen by the number of officers responding, both officially and 
unoffically, and the speed and urgency of the response: 
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Table 6 
Selective hierarchy of most important calls 
1) Officer in need of urgent assistance 
2) Officer requests assistance/back up 
3) Officer requests back up (Don't break your necks) 
4) Suspects on premises/burglary in progress 
5) Chase in progress 
6) Assault/Robbery/Fight in progress 
7) Disturbance/Dispute/Danestic Dispute 
8) RTA Personal injury 
9) RTA Damage only 
10) Burglary (Cold) 
The above table was generated by an analysis of the speed of the 
response to certain calls, i. e. whether officers travelled on the 
wrong side of the road, used horns and sirens, jumped red lights 
etc ., and 
by the intensity of the response, i. e. how many units 
accepted the call, offered back up and how many units actually 
arrived on the scene. Even so, it cannot be read as an inu iutable 
listing since there are a host of factors which are weighed up in 
the decision to respond to each specific call. Unequivocally, 
officers will tell you that urgent assistance shouts are the most 
important to get to and that they will "break their necks" to get 
to then. Other calls are subject to a greater degree of 
situational reading. A "chase in progress" will usually 
generate a good turnout, both officially and unofficially. 
However,, during the rush hour,, many officers will not join them 
even if they are relatively close. The chance of getting there 
is slim and the risk of accident high. Conversely, at night or 
in the early mornings when the roads are clear, some officers are 
prepared to travel four or five miles at very high speed 
in the 
hope of a little excitement. 
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What is interesting about this prioritisation is that the 
top three categories do not refer to calls fran the public but 
calls from other officers. As I have described earlier, the 
isolation of patrol work and the constant fear of "on the job" 
trouble creates strong bonds of solidarity between officers,, and 
one of the most tangible forms is providing back-up and 
assistance. Officers are expected to, and do, risk their lives 
to help each other and manbers of the public, and the importance 
that the organisation attaches to this can be judged from the 
list of commendations found at the end of every Chief Constable's 
annual report. For example: 
For courage initiative and devotion to duty displayed whilst 
rescuing three people from a serious fire in which three 
people lost their lives. (CMND. 8928 p 85) 
For courage and devotion to duty in effecting the arrest of 
a violent man armed with a machete. (CMND. 8928p 84) 
For bravery in effecting the arrest of a violent man armed 
with a loaded shot gun whereby both officers sustained 
personal injury. (ibid) 
The motivation for such "heroic deeds" cannot be instilled 
by any application of rule book stricture. It may be a 
disciplinary offence to fail to attend a call, but there are no 
rules governing when and where it is necessary to risk life and 
limb. These ultimately rest on the choices of individual 
officers. While officers are aware that danger is an inherent 
and unpredictable part of the job, their only real insurance 
policy is the response of their colleagues. The demand for such 
a response carries the reciprocal price of offering it in return. 
Under these conditions it is hardly suprising that back-up calls 
receive the highest priority. For instance: 
A report of a chase and a request for back-up is 
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broadcast over the mainset. It appears to be heading 
towards Kimberley's ground. The siren goes on. At full 
speed, we jun-p the red lights and, where neccessary, 
drive on the wrong side of the road. Peter is listening 
intently to the radio and picking up the details of the 
location and relaying them to Tom. The chase is now 
being directed by a helicopter which rAe can hear circling 
above. As s approach nearer the scene the radio informs 
us that the suspects have abandoned their cars and are 
heading into an estate: "Believed armed, approach with 
extreme caution. " Peter cracks that this will mean that 
every police car for miles around will be 
there... "Policemen love trying to get themselves 
shot... and playing at being heroes. " As we speed round 
the corner onto the estate the radio blurts, "Assistance 
cancelled. Enough officers on scene". We slow down and 
head off back towards KH. There is a tension in the car, 
the adrenaline having been built up without an outlet. 
When assistance or back up is requested it is assumed that 
officers will put themselves at risk to respond as quickly as 
possible. In the light of this knowledge officers will often add 
the proviso "don't break your necks" to alert their colleagues 
that although they require assistance, they are not in immediate 
danger. And although officers will drop whatever they are doing 
to attend an assistance "shout", they are highly critical if they 
think that the call was unnecessary: 
A young officer asked for back up while trying unsucessfully 
to break up a fight between two black youths looked on by a 
group of five black teenagers. As soon as the first car 
arrived, he cancelled the additional assistance. However, 
other cars had arrived on scene. The patrol sergeant 
emerged from one and surveyed the scene from the pavement. 
The officer now had complete control of the situation. The 
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sergeant turned to me, "I've got eight PCs here and a murder 
up the road. Stupid isn't it? " Just as he finished the 
sentence, the DSU came screeching around the corner. The 
doors flew open. Before the crew could scramble out, the 
sergeant indicated with his hands for them to stay put. 
They complied with his request. 
The next day, two other probationers on the relief asked 
me what the assistance shout had been about. I explained 
and they seem very surprised that, having asked for 
assistance, the officer hadn't made an arrest, subtly 
intimating that it was an unnecessary "shout". 
Situated Interpretations 
As is evident from the sergeant's response, some calls are 
granted more legitimacy than others. However this does not just 
occur after the event, but before it. Even the least equivocal 
will be interpreted in the light of situated knowledge. This 
will include such factors as the officer putting out the call, 
the location of the incident, and the time of day, and they will 
all be used to judge the urgency of the request. For example : 
As we were heading back to the lift, a crackle came over 
the radio. One of the area car drivers was putting out 
an 'all officers assist call'. Although I hadn't heard 
the message, I assumed what it was fran Alistair's 
response. His finger did not even reach the lift button. 
He flew to the stairs and sprinted down the eight 
flights, his feet hardly touching the floor as he went. 
Alistair got to the car a good ten seconds before me and 
Steve and, as I tried to climb in the back, the seat 
jammed and I fumbled. "Get in! ", conlded Alistair like 
a regimental Sergeant Major. I fumbled again. "Get 
in! ", he ordered again and this time with more edge to 
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his voice. I yanked at the seat with all my might and 
shot into the back. As soon as we were on the road 
Alistair apologised for shouting at me but, he explained: 
"One of our men might be getting himself killed out 
there. " As Alistair told me later, this was "not just 
any 'all officers assist' call but one from an officer of 
17 years' experience who wouldn't put out a "shout" 
unless he was near to being killed. " 
This also appeared to be the interpretation of 
practically the entire division. Within six or seven 
minutes of the call being put out, there were nearly 
forty officers on the scene. Officers had run from the 
station which was about three hundred yards away; the 
adjoining divisonal area car responded, as well as the 
unmarked crime car, the inspector's car, the two Pandas, 
the van, and the DSU. 
This process of situated interpretation is not just limited 
to the answering of back-up calls, but is used to decide what 
priority should be given to responding to any call. This process 
is most easily understood from the area car for two reasons. 
First, because the area car is capable of receiving all the calls 
relating to the division, it has the widest choice available to 
it. Second, since the area car is permanently assigned an 
operator, the decision making process is more readily observable. 
Consider the following detailed account of how the communications 
system is used by an area car crew: 
on every occasion a mainset call came out the operator 
listened intently. The first information that she wanted 
to hear was the location. This is not given by an 
address, but the district and divisional call sign. 
(Thus "K" is Kimberley's District, "KH" Kimberley police 
station's subdivision, "KN" and "KD" are the other 
divisional areas on the district. ) These call signs were 
listened to intently, and the operator wrote down the 
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relevant details even when they were not answering the 
call or providing back up. The call sign of the 
adjoining districts ( "N" Northtown, which has a long 
arbitrary border to the North and "S" Southville which 
borders to the South) were also listened to and, if the 
incident was serious, details may have been noted. 
Where the call sign was for one of the "K" divisions, the 
operator would note the address and any other relevant 
details such as the description of the suspects involved, 
even though the driver would not necessarily accept the 
call. If the call was for KH, the operator would accept 
without hestitation and the driver would accelerate and 
start to head towards it. However, if it was for one of 
the other call signs on the division, the operator would 
consult with the driver before accepting. This is done 
often with no mire than a gesture or a nod, or by 
inference as the car starts to accelerate, reverse and 
turn round to head towards the call. 
A call to a dispute came over the mainset to an incident 
on "HIV's" ground. Pam wrote down the details and then 
asked the driver if he wanted to accept it. "No", came 
back the answer. "It's too trivial and too far. " 
Over the PR an "alarm call" is broadcast. We are a long 
way from the scene but Kevin wants to accept it. Pam 
informs the station. We speed there but without lights 
or siren and without driving on the wrong side of the 
road. When we arrive, the crime car is already on scene 
and reports the premises secure. 
A call comes over the mainset "K2,12 year old 
threatening other children with axe". Pam accepts 
immediately as the car shifts gear. The siren and lights 
go on. Pam broadcasts the message to the station. When 
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we arrive the van is already there. 
The three examples above serve to illustrate the complexity of 
choice that is involved in making decisions about how to respond. 
In the second example, Kevin did not have to accept the call. It 
was issued from the station and no questions would have been 
raised if they had remained silent. Further, alarm calls are 
generally known to be false alarms. Indeed, in Surrey, where 
their call sign is 10\9, it is often quipped that this is because 
"nine times out of ten it is a false alarm". On the other hand 
the area car was at the time uncommitted and, to a degree, doing 
something is better than doing nothing. This is particularly the 
case with an alarm call because, if it is a false alarm, then, as 
soon as it is discovered that the premises are secure, the 
incident is over. There is no paperwork involved and there is 
little chance of "on-the-job" trouble arising from the incident. 
There is, however, the remote possibility that a burglary has 
occurred and, if the suspects are still on scene, the chance of a 
good arrest. 
In the first example, again, the area car did not have to 
accept the call since it was for "KDs" ground. Although the 
operator thought that it was a legitimate call to respond to 
(otherwise she would not have asked) the driver, who has the 
ultimate decision, did not. A call to a disturbance can relate 
to a large variety of incidents. It is a catch all phrase behind 
which can be anything from kids messing about to a violent 
argument between husband and wife. As a rule any arrest that 
arises out of a disturbance call occurs due to the demeanour of 
the offenders rather than any specific infraction that may have 
resulted in the police being contacted. Disturbance calls rarely 
result in "real police work" and will be more likely to involve 
dealing with stroppy, and distraught people. 
In the third example, the driver and the operator are in 
immediate accord. The call originates from the mainset, it is on 
their ground and it is indisputably the area car's responsibility 
to respond. However, it is understood that such calls are 
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unlikely to have a tangible result. The suspects may have fled 
the scene, the "axe" is possibily a toy, and the person who rang 
the police misinterpreted children at play for reality. On the 
other hand, the call may genuinely be as stated and the 
possibility of someone being injured high. In this case the 
speed of the response is crucial. Therefore, not only does the 
area car rush to the incident, it also broadcasts the details to 
the other units on the division. These units will not have 
picked up the call because they do not have a mainset, but they 
may be nearer and can therefore respond more quickly. 
As I have already indicated, with the decision as to whether 
or not and how to respond to back-up calls, officers use 
particularistic and localised knowledge about officers, location, 
etc. to determine the voracity and urgency of calls. The sum of 
these individual decisions will partly determine the overall 
intensity of the response. This also applies to the decision as 
to whether or not to respond, officially and unofficially, to 
certain types of calls frau the public. Locations within a 
vicinity have a reputation for trouble: certain houses are known 
to be the scene of violent domestic disputes; particularly 
warehouses and shops are known to be an easy target for the 
burglar; some clubs are known to have a rowdy clientele. 
Contrast the following extracts: 
A call came over to attend a "domestic dispute" at 139 
.... Road. The siren went on as the area car 
lurched 
foward. Paul, the operator, accepted the call. "He's 
going to kill her one of these days", frets the driver. 
We head at full speed on the wrong side of the road where 
necessary. The car pulls up and the officers jung out 
and rush up the steps. 
11.30pm .A call came over 
to attend a domestic dispute. 
The operator accepts. "This is a tea and sympathy job, 
then? ", he asks Sally. "Yeah", she replies and explains 
that she has been there before and the wrn is "a bit of 
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a nutter". Although we proceed with normal speed there 
is no urgency in the response. 
Messages, then, are not only unpacked and translated by 
reference to occupationally and organisationally derived 
conceptions of work, but with reference to specific situated 
knowledge. In the first example, the previous knowledge of the 
woman, her family and the history of beatings that her husband 
meted out, coupled with the fact that the man was probably drunk, 
(it was just after closing time) led to a very fast response to 
what is considered by many officers to be the lowest status 
kind of police work. The second example which, ostensibly, is an 
identical call is also read in the light of previous knowledge. 
Since the woman is "a nutter" and "tea and sympathy" is not part 
of "real police work" there is no need to hurry. Such 
typifications are often related to a police reading of the 
spatial and normative dimensions of the city's streets which 
combines to form a basis for interpreting behaviour and events in 
specific locales. 
Situated interpretations and the concept of place 
The backcloth for patrol work is the street. Even where 
officers are called to deal with incidents that occurred on 
private property such as break-ins, thefts etc., generally only 
the victim is present. Therefore, any chance of apprehending the 
offender will be as they flee from the scene. Policing, then, is 
essentially played out in public places and, while sometimes 
related to criminal law enforcement, as is the case with the 
fleeing house-breaker, it is more often concerned with order 
maintenance. 
This distinction between public and private space is an 
important feature in the determination of patrol practice 
(Strinchcombe, 1963) as the police are limited by both legal 
and normative standards of privacy. A deafeningly noisy 
party occurring in a private dwelling will be attended and a 
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request for the music to be turned down issued, but failure to 
ccmtply will not result in arrest. Instead, civil proceedings 
will be brought by the environmental health officer. The same 
behaviour, and non-compliance, on the street, however, would 
almost undoubtedly result in arrest for disturbance of the peace 
etc. The importance of the distinction between public and 
private is well illustrated by David Powis' book, "The sign of a 
crime, a field manual for police" (Powis, 1977). of its 15 
chapters, 12 relate to the surveillance (and recognition) of 
possible suspects in public spaces by alerting officers to 
behavioural clues that can be used as indicators of persons with 
suspect motives. For instance, Powis exhorts his colleagues to 
watch for : 
Any person who seems nervous of you especially one who 
avoids passing you on the foot way and crosses the road. 
Persons loitering near motor vehicles in warm surer 
weather who are wearing leather gloves. 
Men in vehicles watching you 
The possibility that male and female loiterers in plain 
view may be look outs for other criminals currently at 
work. 
Motor vehicles with trade plates in the evening or at 
night especially if there is more than one occupant in 
the vehicle. 
Such typifications, taken together, have behavioural, 
spatial, stereotypical and temporal referents. However, they 
cannot be applied indiscriminantly since they are also dependent 
upon localised normative orders. What is typical of one area or 
street is not typical of another. For instance, consider the 
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following extract from my fieldnotes: 
Any car that was parked hastily, looked old and battered, 
was partially stripped or just a plain old Cortina seemed 
liable to a check. Location was important. Particular 
estates had a reputation for dumping, those with with 
large open garages were a favourite. 
Although any car might be suspicious, suspicion increased 
with location, and previous situated knowledge of the local 
area is crucially important for the warranting of the 
decision to make a check. 
Where an officer is new to an area, the first problem is one 
of orientation. On one level, this is merely a geographical 
issue. Responding to calls requires knowledge of routes across 
the ground, short cuts, one way systems, and often, in the inner 
city, at least, a mental map of large council estates so that 
individual blocks can be located without recourse to the, often 
vandalised and therefore indecipherable, estate maps. The first 
problem for the newcomer, then, is to try and decipher the 
geography of the area. For instance, Brian and Chris had both 
been transferred to the division within the previous six weeks, 
and had been deployed to the station van. 
They both thought that it was odd that the inspector had 
put them together since neither of them knew the area. 
Consequently, much of the night was spent winding our way 
from one end of the division to the other, with both 
Brian and Chris trying to figure out where they were. As 
Brian put it, "It's fucking crazy putting us together. 
They should have put Karen with me, and John with you. 
(Both more experienced officers in Kimberley). If we get 
a call I probably won't have a clue where it is. " 
While geographical knowledge is important, the environment holds 
places which have a specific relevance for the patrol function 
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but are independent of geography: Places where tea can be 
obtained on a cold night shift, covered alleys and doorways which 
can be used to shelter from the rain, vantage points for 
observation work, clubs and pubs that have a reputation for 
trouble, badly signposted one way streets that are easy for the 
process hungry probationer to pick up a ticket to satisfy the 
demands of the relief sergeant. Thus, the geographical map is 
overlaid with a policing map which is predicated on situated, 
localised knowledge and provides a frame work for decisions about 
interventions and actions. 
For instance, consider the following example drawn from a 
Friday night-shift. There are two officers involved, one, 
Max, although having fifteen years experience has only just 
moved into the area, and the other, Graham, has four years 
experience of policing in Kimberley. Max has heard talk of 
a "Party House", and wants to investigate it in the quiet of 
the early morning. (A Party House is usually an qty house that 
is taken over by young West Indians to provide all night parties. 
Music is normally provided and there is an admission price, beer 
is available by the can at inflated prices, and the police 
believe they are often the site of drug dealing. ) 
As we passed the house, a large detached building, a 
couple of West Indian youths came out carrying some beer 
crates to place them in the back of a car. Max wanted to 
stop and look at what was going on, but Graham was not 
very interested. Max stopped the van, however, and got 
out to question the youths. Graham followed 
unenthusiastically. "Can I look in your boot? " asked 
Max. The young West Indian man did not answer but said 
to an older man, "He wants to look in the boot. " The 
older man opens it, it is full of beer. 
"Tennants aye" Max said smiling. 
"Yes", smiles the man back. 
"You been having a party? Can I come? " asked Max. 
"Sure", replies the man in a friendly tone. 
"How often do you have them then? " 
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"You know", replied the man in a disbelieving voice. 
Graham has moved away from the boot of the car and is 
standing several yards back on some steps. He is smiling 
at Max's ignorance, but obviously does not want to get 
involved. 
"I don't, I'm new to the area. " 
"You know", repeats the man, intimating that he thinks he 
is being wound up. 
"No I don't", replied Max grinning. 
"He knows", the man said, looking at Graham. 
"Yeah I know", Graham replied with a bored intonation. 
Max started to move away, not sure of his ground. As he 
got back into the van Graham explained about the "Party 
House" and how it operated. 
To gain insight into this process of localised sensitivity 
it is useful to invoke Sacks' concept of the incongruity 
procedure: 
Given that the police ply a route, they must, in order to 
use the incongruity procedure, learn to treat their beat 
as a territory of normal appearances. The learned normal 
appearances constitute a background of expectations in 
terms of which the beat is observed. Given these 
expectations, the patrol man must so sensitise himself as 
to be arousable by whatsoever slight variations appear 
which seem to be warrantable bases for making of the 
explanation of presented appearances a matter for 
investigation. (Sacks, 1978: 193) 
The problem for the neophyte is that there is no yard stick 
against which such variations can be judged. Even where they are 
experienced officers like Max, the importation of one set of 
expectations from one area to another fails to take into account 
the differences between them. For Graham, there was nothing 
unusual or out of place in people emerging from a house in a 
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residential area at five in the morning. Max, on the other hand, 
was not sensitised to localised patters of behaviour and such an 
event was worthy of intervention. Until the newcomer is familiar 
with the localised patterns of street life and the rhythms and 
patterns of an area, it is difficult for them to selectively 
filter the environment to decide what situations are worthy of 
intervention. 
What is particularly significant about such localised 
knowledge is that, despite an organisational commitment to 
developing local intelligence units (cf: Cemal, 1985) using 
sophisticated computer based information systems (Hough 1980) 
there is no effective, formal, mechanism for inculcating the 
newcomer with situationally relevant knowledge. Admittedly, 
briefing sessions can be used to transmit key information, such 
as a known car operating in a particular area, or that a spate of 
burglaries has been reported on a specific estate. This 
information is, however, organisationally relevant rather than 
occupationally relevant and is concerned almost exclusively with 
crime control rather than the more vague problem of order 
maintenance. 
Generally, occupationally relevant information about people 
and places is gained either through word of mouth or by direct 
experience. The oral tradition of story telling found in the 
police culture provides the vehicle through which particularistic 
knowledge can be tansmitted. Most cctmentaries on police 
story-telling, especially Holdaway (1983), have focused on the 
symbolic aspect of story telling in maintaining and transmitting 
the core values of the occupational culture. Holdaway, for 
instance, stresses how the stories told by the lower ranks are 
often at the expense of their seniors, thus acting as a mediation 
device between the different levels of the organisational 
structure and strengthening the lower ranks' definition. While 
not substantially disagreeing with Holdaway, he does fail to 
recognise the distinction between the form and the content of the 
police narrative. Attention is almost exclusively at the level 
of formal analysis which disregards the fact that the content can 
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be of great situational relevance, particularly for the neophyte. 
The content often includes information about people, places, and 
events that is only of localised importance and non transferable. 
The following extract from my fieldnotes is taken from Surrey and 
records a conversation between a probationer WPC of six weeks' 
service and an experienced WPC of five years. We are "sitting 
up" in the Panda by a roundabout avoiding the heavy traffic of 
the morning rush hour and waiting for a call. 
Jane, the probationer, proffered to Sue that she was 
looking forward to getting herself into more difficult 
situations to see how she would handle them. Perhaps New 
Year's Eve would be a good night for that, she thought. 
Sue reacted strongly to this suggestion, saying that New 
Year's Eve was not fun, but used as an excuse by certain 
members of the public to wind the police up. She then 
related the following story: 
One New Year's Eve there had been some trouble outside 
The .........., a local pub. Sue 
had been accompanying 
PC 'B'. They had three prisoners in the back of the 
Panda, which wasn't strictly allowed. Inspector "A" 
arrived on the scene and was standing around while the 
fracas continued. Rather than getting stuck in himself, 
he stood around chastising officers for not wearing their 
hats. Meanwhile, PC "B" had got into the car and was 
trying to calm the prisoners down. They really started 
to wind him up, shouting and swearing at him. Eventually 
PC "B" lost his cool and laid into one of the prisoners 
Sue had pulled him off and calmed him down. "What really 
got me", she said, "was that the inspector just stood 
around doing nothing and then gave the PC a bollocking. 
But you're going to lose your cool sometimes", she 
continued "you've got to take so much stick from the 
public, sometimes you just go over the top. You 
shouldn't but you do". 
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While this story is loaded with import about the occupational 
relevancies of the lower ranks, "You can't police by the book", 
"You can't trust senior officers", and so on, it also contains 
situationally specific information relating to a particular pub 
on the ground, to a named PC, and a named inspector, and about 
the behaviours of the public and of police officers. This 
situated knowledge is crucial for the patrol officer to perform 
effectively but, clearly, these concerns are not just those which 
are organisationally proscribed. The culture makes significant 
other features of the landscape which, although not 
organisationally salient, are occupationally relevant. 
A beat is not just a configuration of streets but the scene 
of past incidents. It contains people who are friendly and 
unfriendly to the police, places where future incidents are 
likely to occur. For instance: 
As we walked around, Jeff pointed out the significant 
landmarks and borders of the division; the post office, 
night clubs, famous shops, and so on. But the territory 
was not just marked by physical entities, certain places 
had particular meaning. A non-descript alley was pointed 
out as the scene of a police shooting. A street corner 
represented not just the intersection of two roads, but 
the site of an armed robbery, where an unarmed uniformed 
officer was gunned down. Cafes and restaurants were 
known not just by the quality and the type of food, but 
by whether they offered a friendly reception to the 
police. "They're a bit anti", "He's alright, very pro", 
No we don't go in there, they make us pay. " 
The Manipulation of Technology 
So far I have presented the officers as reacting, albeit 
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reflexively, to an external environment. However, as Holdaway 
has demonstrated, officers are not passive respondants to 
environmental stimuli, they actively intervene in the creation 
and recreation of that environment. The technology of reactive 
policing, the cars and the communications system enable officers 
to turn the boredom and drudgery of police work into excitement. 
The reality of long periods with nothing to do, except listen to 
the silent radio, can be translated through the selective use of 
technology and communications. The fantasy world of the "media 
cop" can be re-created. Car chases are particularly amenable to 
such translations. Drivers will sometimes follow a suspected car 
for a while, giving the driver ample opportunity to try and get 
away from them. Generally the suspect does no such thing, which 
gives rise to the ccnment, "That's a pity, I thought he was going 
to play". 
When chases do occur, it is cannon practice for the lead car 
to ask for the chase to be put out on "talk through". This 
enables all the drivers on the division to pick up the current 
status and location of the chase. Consider the following 
example : 
Our first port of call was the petrol station so John 
could pick up the £1 he had won in the lottery. Stewart 
had joined the van for the rest of the night, 
unofficially of course. He was supposed to be out 
walking. As John was getting out of the van, Stewart, 
who was lying out on the seats in the back of the van, 
sat bolt up right listening intently to the crackle on 
the radio. over the mainset came details of a chase in 
the adjoining sub-division. John continued to get out of 
the van. 
"For Christ's Sake, John" shouted Stewart. John 
continued on his path towards the cashier, determined to 
get his money. "Turn it up !" coannanded Stewart to Alan. 
Alan turned it up and they both listened intently to the 
progress of the chase. As it moved further away from the 
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sub-division Stewart got more despondent. The chance of 
excitement was lost. 
John got back into the van. "Corse on John", pleaded 
Stewart. "What? We are miles away from -------- 
Road? ", John replied by way of explanation for his 
disinterestedness. "It's only a mile away", retorted 
Stewart. 
"Okay, you direct me". 
The chase was now over four miles away, on another 
district, but we headed off to it at full speed. Over 
the mainset the progress of the chase was being given in 
every detail so that other units could assist. 
"Seventy miles an hour, Eighty miles an hour, and he's on 
the wrong side of the road now. He's turning back 
over...... " "Whoopee! ", went up the shout from Stewart. 
It looked as if the chase was heading back on to their 
sector. Stewart continued to direct .......... As we 
turned down the streets where the chase was coming to an 
end there were sirens and lights everywhere. I counted 
seven area cars, 1 IRU and, with us, that maked nine 
units. As John expressed it later, "Half the Met. seemed 
to turn out". 
The ritual of the chase is actively sought out by officers 
to relieve boredom, and to engage in fast, exciting work that 
measures up to officers' self conceptions. Police wurk gets done 
all the same, but the manner and style of its performance 
simultaneously serves the goals of the occupational culture. 
The technological and social organisation of the 
communications system provides a mechanism through which scarce 
police resources are selectively deployed to incidents. The 
outcome of this selectivity is determined as much by 
organisational structure as by the occupational culture. From 
the patrol officer's point of view, the allocation of different 
types of work to different functions leads to some postings 
being valued above others. In a similar fashion, the situated 
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reading of messages in the light of occupationally relevant 
criteria results in some calls being treated as more valuable 
than others. However, officers do more than just react blindly 
to calls. Through manipulation of the technology and 
communications system of reactive policing, they can transform 
police work in line with their own expectations. 
While the technological and social organisation of the 
communications systems, in part, determines the quantity and 
quality of the police response to an incident, it is only when 
officers arrive on scene that they can evaluate the action (if 
any) necessary to resolve the situation. The next chapter 
explores the ways in which officers manage the public so as to 
allow then the possibility of determining a resolution. 
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Chapter 8 
MANAGING THE PUBLIC 
The next section focuses on the manner in which patrol officers 
intervene in the lives of the public which they police. Rather 
than focusing on why the public call the police or why police 
officers choose to intervene in particular situations of their 
own accord, the central concern will be how such interventions 
are managed. 
In the previous chapters, it has been argued that the 
"terms of trouble" provided, in part, a culturally derived 
solution to the organisational and environmental problem posed 
by the practice of policing. While it is true that tust 
encounters with the public are trouble free, officers are aware 
that they have the potential to go "griefy" on them. The result 
of this awareness is to heighten the officers' need to establish 
control over incidents by creating the conditions under which 
their authority to define and determine resolutions is upheld. 
If we accept that one of the primary concerns of officers 
is the avoidance of negative sanction, then it is necessary to 
ask what resources officers can bring to bear to achieve this 
end. The terms of trouble indicate primarily how officers avoid 
within-the-job trouble and what officers can do to to mininimise 
its consequences once it has occurred. What they do not 
indicate is how officers prevent trouble arising in the first 
place and, to some degree at least, if officers can prevent 
trouble arising on the job, they can minimise within-the-job 
trouble. The decisions and actions taken at incidents reflect 
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the: 
.... concern to control the relationships between 
themselves and the various publics on the division, to 
maintain their capacity to intervene authoritatively in 
any incident, and to preseve their own and others belief 
that they are on top of the area. (Chatterton, 1978: 
115). 
What this makes explicit is that the avoidance of on-the-job 
trouble is concerned with the issue of control, and the ability 
to impose and maintain control is fundamentally related to how 
power is exercised. To address the issue of how officers manage 
encounters with the public, it is first necessary to address the 
issues of power. Power is like the wind, it can only be seen 
through its effect. In short, the problems is, then, how 
can power be conceived and what constitutes the exercise of 
power? 
Power, Authority and Control 
Weber defined power as the: 
"probability that an actor within a social relationship 
will be in a position to carry out his own will despite 
resistance, regardless of the basis on which that 
probability rests. " (Weber, 1968: 53). 
The utility of this definition, unlike many others (Cf Lukes, 
193 for a full review), is that the manifestation of power is 
not conceived in terms of the form of its exercise. This has 
particular value when considering police/public encounters. 
For instance, consider the difference between the following two 
hypothetical examples: 
A) An officer makes an arrest without resorting to any 
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form of physical coercion. He merely states that a person is 
under arrest and the person complies with the all the officer's 
verbal commands with no resistance. on no occasion are "hands 
laid" on the person. 
B) Ten officers are involved in the arrest of a suspect 
This necessitates the breaking down of a barricaded door, the 
use of riot shields for self protection as the man is armed, and 
weapons to literally crush the resisting suspect into 
submission. 
What Weber's definition enables is a recognition that, 
because force was not used in the first example, it makes it no 
less a successful implementation of power. In this sense, 
Weber's definintion is implicitly Hobbesian, recognising that 
the exercise of power is essentially conflictual. Other 
theorists from Plato(Cf. Neumann, 1964) through to Parsons(1960) 
see power as a collective and, to some degree, consensual 
resource. For the purposes of examining the patrol officer's 
position, the possibility of conflict and resistance are the 
more salient features. 
Furthermore, Weber's definiton invites us to consider how a 
patrol officer effects his or her will even if the other parties 
are passively or actively trying to hinder their efforts. In 
other words, how officers gain compliance. And because it does 
not specify on what basis the exercise of power lies, for 
example coercion or legitimately perceived authority, it implies 
sorttie differentiation between the resources. Indeed, police 
officers are able to draw on a number of resources to control, 
and maintain their capacity to control, any situation. They 
have a symbolic resource - their uniforms; a coercive resource 
- their fists, handcuffs and truncheons; an organisational 
resource - their personal radios, which can be used to scion 
back-up; and an interactional resource - their bodies, and 
their ability to use talk. 
Although it can be argued that compliance ultimately rests 
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on coercion (Weber, 1968), the manner in which compliance is 
gained in any particular situation depends on the orientation of 
the subordinate to the superordinate. This notion of compliance 
has been developed by Etzioni: 
"(Compliance) is a relationship consisting of the power 
employed by superiors to control subordinates and the 
orientation of subordinates to this power. " (Etzioni, 
1961: xv). 
Etzioni distinguished between three primary orientating 
relationships: alienative, utilitarian and normative. The 
basis for each form of compliance is, respectively, coercive 
force, instrumental interaction, and shared belief structures. 
In any given situation, compliance may be imposed, and given, by 
appeal to either of the three types. 
This recognition has important consequences for the study 
of policing. Generally, most commentators have followed 
Bittner's definition of policing which equates the police role 
with the potential and actual use of force. (Cf. Westley, 1970; 
Rubinstien, 1973; Reiss, 1968; Holdaway, 1983). In arguing 
with this, I do not want to suggest that the ability to use 
coercion is not one of the central features of policing, nor 
that, if compliance is not forthcoming, force will eventually be 
utilised. Rather, that by making the potential and actual use 
of force equivalent, some of the more routine and salient 
features of police public interaction are lost. Sykes argues 
that, rather than responding to the coercive basis of an 
officer's authority, in many instances, people are responding to 
a normative basis of compliance and, thus, grant officers a 
legitimate right to intervene, even when such interventions are 
potentially conflictual. 
As he writes: 
"Is it not possible that the police are called to 
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resolve the problem, not merely as coercive 
functionaries, but as mediators, arbitrators, or for 
personal support? Citizens differ in the amount of 
resources they possess to resolve disputes or resist 
victimisation. When their own resources are inadequate 
they call for help, but by so doing, neither they nor 
the police assume force will be needed. The case of the 
domestic quarrel in which the wife turns against the 
police when they lay their hands on the husband is a 
case in point. She did not wish her husband beaten or 
arrested, she wanted an additional resource, officially 
representing society, to help settle the dispute. 
Perhaps she hoped that the officers' authority, not 
their coercive power, would be sufficient. 
Score British data can be used to support such a claim. The 
British crime survey reported that, of those stopped by the 
police, either in a vehicle on foot or as a suspect in the last 
five years, 54%, 62% and 65% did not express annoyance with the 
police action. 
However, there are a number of problems with such a 
position. First, the reasons why people grant a police officer 
legitimacy raise crucial questions about the nature of power. 
Indeed, much Neo Marxist work has made such issues the central 
focus of attention. They have argued that the acceptance of 
authority is itself imposed by power. Notions such as 
"hegemony", (Gramsci: 1971) "legitimation" (Habermas: 1975) 
"ideology" (Lukacs, 1971) all relate to the imposition of 
authority through power. Many of these ideas have been usefully 
taken up in the study of policing. For instance, Brogden (1982) 
argues how the police service has become active in the 
manufacturing of consent to fend off demands for greater 
political control, and Hall et al (1978) argued how the 
manufacture of a moral panic over the issue of mugging was used 
to establish the legitimacy of one part of the repressive state 
apparatus. 
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A second problem with Sykes & Brent's position lies with 
how legitimacy is inferred. Because citizens in the main do not 
resist police authority does this mean that they grant them 
legitimacy? According to Lukes, (1978: 639) the acceptance of 
authority implies a person, "accepts as a sufficient reason for 
acting or believing something on the fact that he has been so 
instructed by some one whose claim to do so he acknowledges". 
Indeed, police officers act on the basis that they do have a 
legitimate right to intervene in situations and, in practice, 
this means that officers do not have to proffer reasons for 
their commands to be obeyed, merely that they should be obeyed 
because they have a recognised claim to be. While police 
officers believe that people should grant them the legitimate 
right to authoritatively intervene, in practice this granting is 
not related to people's belief structures. In street 
encounters, officers do not have any access to the belief 
structures of the people they are trying to control. What they 
do have access to is the physical manifestations of intent. 
The importance of this is that, while, in the majority of 
police public encounters, the public orientate themselves to the 
officer's authority and thus avoid potentially coercive force 
being used, this does not imply that they believe the officer to 
be acting legitimately. As Weber clearly argued, the motives 
for compliance and obedience are manifold. People may obey 
another hypocrytically, instrumentally, opportunistically, and 
so on. The important point is that "in a given case the 
particular claim to legitimacy is to a significant degree and 
according to its type treated as "valid", that this fact 
confirms the position of the person claiming authority and it 
helps determine the means of its exercise" (Weber, 1968: 214). 
In terms of the immediate necessity of controlling street 
encounters, officers are not interested in whether people 
believe that they have a legitimate right to intervene, merely 
that they act on the basis that they do. In other words, that 
the officer's claim is "treated as 'valid"'. The granting of 
this right is not inferred from the belief structures of the 
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citizens, but manifests itself from the concrete displays of 
verbal and non verbal action. If people display overt signs of 
acquiescence, keeping quiet, obeying commands, answering 
questions, and so forth, then, whether they are responding to 
the coercive potential of the office, or to a legitimately 
perceived authority is, from the officer's point of view, 
irrelevant. 
Although Sykes and Brent's position is untenable from the 
point of view of motivation, what it does make central is the 
notion that police officers rarely use force to establish their 
goals (1983), and that it is sociologically, as well as 
practically, interesting to examine how control is achieved 
without the use of force. 
However, any discussion of control must first address the 
issue of the use of coercive force by the police and this will 
be addressed in the next section. 
The Use of Force and the Exercise of Power 
"People get hit here", declared the inspector at our first 
meeting. I nodded wisely and, with no further elaboration, the 
converstation turned to other things. The inspector's remark 
was neither an aplology nor a confession. It was a statement 
that control in the inner cities, unlike the pleasanter pastures 
of Surrey where I had been based before, was often achieved by 
physical coercion and that I, like the officers working there, 
would have to cone to terms with the occupational necessity of 
using violence to control people. 
The use of force is an everyday occurrence in the policing 
of Kimberley. True, individual officers do not have to resort 
to using force every day. However, one of their colleagues will 
have had to, and they know that every next incident may require 
its application. Officers regularly push, shove, hold and 
grapple with people. More occasionally they slap, hit, punch 
and kick people. On most occasions the application of 
force 
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results in no more than a damaged ego, on others it exacts a 
higher price, bruises, cuts and broken bones. 
The right to use coercion as a means of control has been 
recognised by most conmentators on the police as the central 
feature of the police role. Bittner's widely accepted defintion 
reads thus: 
"(The police role) is best understood as a mechanism for 
the distribution of non-negotiably coercive force 
employed in accordance with the dicates of an intuitive 
grasp of situational exigencies". (Bittner, 1978: 33) 
Sate of the problems with this definition have already been 
discussed, but part of its enduring utility is that it makes 
explicit the fact that the central feature of the use of force 
by the police can only be determined situationally. While legal 
and organisational rules can attempt to generally limit and 
proscribe in what circumstances and in what quantity force may 
be used, they cannot determine in each particular situation 
whether, and how much, is necessary. This is implicitly 
recognised in law. A police officer: 
"may use such force as is reasonable in the 
circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in 
effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of 
offenders, or suspected offenders or persons unlawfully 
at large" (Criminal Law Act 1967, s. 3). 
"may enter (if need be by force) and search any place 
where the suspect is, or where the constable with 
reasonable cause suspects him to be. " (ibid) 
Further, a police officer is empowered to arrest and therefore 
use reasonable force against anyone who obstructs him or her in 
the lawful execution of their duty. Thus a constable: 
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"may arrest without a warrant, any person threatening to 
commit a breach of the peace and any person who 
assaults, resists or wilfully obstructs him in the 
lawful execution of his duty, under circumstances likely 
to cause a breach of the peace (Cf: Sloan, 1980: 31). 
When Bittner writes 'situationally justified' the law writes 
'reasonable'. and the law does not specify what constitutes 
reasonableness. As Lord Diplock recently ruled. 
"What amount of force is 'reasonable in the 
circumstances' for the purposes of preventing a crime is 
in my view, always a question for the jury, never a 
point of law for the judge. " 
(Cited in Molyneux, 1985: 189) 
In effect, then, the standards of reasonableness are determined 
by the commonsense understandings of ordinary men and wumen who 
constitute the jury and, as Molyneux points out, this must 
include the assumption that "Reasonable men make mistakes in the 
'agony of the moment" (1985: 189). 
The law, then, grants police officers the right to use 
force for particular purposes and, to some degree at least, 
tries to limit, in advance, the purposes for which it may be 
used and maintains the right to decide, after the event, whether 
the amount of force was reasonable. In effect, the law tries to 
express, in formal terms, what an American police trainer told 
his recruit class: 
"If they resist, you can knock 'em on their ass and keep 
knocking 'em until they give up, but that's it" 
(Rubinstein, 1973: 324). 
In Kimberley, however, the patrol officer is no rrere puppet 
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of the law. While the law is constraining, it is also a 
resource. Officers can and do selectively utilise law for 
purposes which the law did not intend. Similarly, the 
application of force can be used for a variey of purposes and 
in a variety of ways, so me of which may be legal, others of 
which may not. However, it may also be used simultaneously for 
different motives. Consider the following extract from my field 
notes: 
[The van is tansporting three prisoners, all white, one 
female. They are all in their late teens. They have 
been arrested after a high speed chase across several 
divisions. They are all very drunk. One of the 
prisoners has messed themselves and there is a strong 
smell of faeces in the back of the van. The van has 
just pulled up into the station forecourt]. 
The doors of the van are opened and the first two 
prisoners are escorted out. The last one is slumped on 
the bench, semi-conscious, hand-cuffed to the officer. 
"Get up! ", shouts the officer as he drags him towards 
the door. The hand-cuffed youth falls out of the van 
after him and lands on the tarmac. Another officer 
grabs him under the arm and the two of then drag him 
along like a corpse towards the charge room, his feet 
scraping along the ground. 
I coo not want to argue whether such use of force was excessive. 
What is more interesting is that the officers could have 
achieved the removal of the suspect from the van in a different 
manner. For instance, the example stands in sharp constrast to 
the "balletic grace" that Fielding described an officer in 
Washington displaying when handcuffing and transporting a 
prisoner (Fielding, 1984). In the above example, although the 
officer is utilising his legal power to use force in the arrest 
and detention of a suspect, he is simultaneously using force for 
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other ends. Other officers could have been called to help 
remove the prisoner fron the back of the van in a less forceful 
manner. Instead, the manner of the application of force was 
calculated to inflict injury and degradation on the recipient. 
What this suggests is that, while there are legal rules for the 
use of force, they are mediated and transformed by the 
occupational culture. As Holdaway has illustrated, force is 
used for a variety of purposes which go beyond the legal right 
to establish control. It is used to inflict punishment, to 
extract confession, and to humiliate (Holdaway, 1983). 
Although force can be used (and is used) for extra-legal 
purposes, this does not mean that its application is not 
governed by shared understandings about its legitimate and 
illegitimate use. As the "terms of trouble" have already 
indicated, in certain circumstances to use too little force is 
to "have lost one's bottle", to use too much is to "have gone 
over the top". This critical attitude to the use of force 
extends to more than just an incident by incident appraisal of 
an officer's actions. There is a recogition that some officers 
use force gratuitously or unnecessarily. These officers were 
sometimes referred to as "cowboys" or, rather more poignantly by 
one officer, "the SS Boot Boys". Thus even if the occupational 
culture accepts that there are legitimate uses of extra-legal 
force, there is an implicit recognition that there are 
illegimate uses. The PSI study illustrated that: 
Nearly two thirds of officers think that some officers 
often use more force than necessary, and 35% say that 
they know such officers. The mean of the estimates of 
the percentage that such officers form of all the force 
is 4.7, and the most common estimate (apart from none) 
is between 1 and 4 (given by 28% of informants). 
However, a significant minority of informants think that 
officers who use excessive force are numerous: 6 percent 
think they account for 16 percent or more of the total " 
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(PSI, 1983; Vol iii: 150-151). 
This raises two major issues. First that a substantial 
proportion of police officers are, privately at least, critical 
of their colleagues' use of force. Second, the use of 
unnecessary force is illegal. Therefore, if officers have 
reasonable suspicion that their colleagues are guilty of its 
use, then they have grounds for arrest. However, as recent 
cases have made very clear (CF Gaurdian Feb 18/ 19/ 20), police 
officers are unwilling to utilise their powers in this way. 
The reasons for such toleration can be hinted at if we 
accord the patrol officer the same appreciation as 
interactionists have argued should be afforded the deviant. One 
of the three main elements in social bonding is commitment. 
Gof fman defined commitment as : 
An individual becomes committed to something when 
because of the fixed and interdependant character of 
many institutional arrangements, his doing or being this 
something irrevocably conditions other important 
possibilities in his life, forcing him to take courses 
of action, causing other persons to build up their 
activity on the basis of his continuing in his current 
undertakings, and rendering him vulnerable to 
unanticipated consequences of those undertakings. He 
thus becomes locked into a position and coerced into 
living up to the promises and sacrifices built into it 
(Goffman, 1961: 88-89). 
The mist important reference group for a patrol officer is his 
or her colleagues. It is they he or she will expect to provide 
back-up in an emergency and, if necessary, risk their lives in 
so doing. Practically all officers agree that 'you can't police 
by the book' and thus expect to have to lie and cover for 
colleagues in a variety of ways, and expect their colleagues to 
do the same for them. These factors, coupled with the social 
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isolation described earlier (Chapter3), create a situation where 
conmitment to the peer group overrides other less tangible 
concerns. 
Limitations on the Use of Force 
In spite of the existence of what Westley has termed 'a morality 
of secrecy and violence", officers do not act as though there 
are no checks upon their power to use force. There are three 
primary constraints which limit officers' desire to use force: 
organisational/legal, group/cultural, and individual. 
Organisational/Legal 
The use of force opens up the possibility of a complaint 
being made by a member of the public. And, while patrol 
officers will hope for the support of their senior officers in 
such circumstances, it cannot be guaranteed. As the saying 
goes, "They'll just leave you in the shit". As one officer 
described: 
It's all right for the do-gooders in the press to go on 
but they don't have to put up with what v- have to. For 
instance,, a PC of ten years, and a good copper too, was 
involved in an incident with a group of yobs. They were 
beating him up, kicking him, and so on. Help arrived 
and they arrested this one lad. They got him in the 
back of the car and he was still struggling and mouthing 
it off and generally giving agrro. The PC gave him a 
punch, and it caught him in the eye, giving him a black 
eye. The FC was marched out of the force for assaulting 
a prisoner in the back of the car !" 
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Thus, even where force is viewed as legitimate from the point of 
view of the relief, courts and senior officers have different 
standards. The use of force is the most likely factor to give 
rise to a serious complaint. As the PSi study revealed, 38% of 
complaints received against officers were in regard to the 
excessive use of force. Although few complaints are ever 
substantiated, this is due less to the zealousness of the 
investigation mechanism and more to the impossibility of getting 
patrol officers to testify against each other. Officers are 
reluctant to lay themselves open to official scrutiny, since, 
even if there is not enough evidence for the complaint to be 
upheld, the officer may be liable for internal discipline 
arising from the case. Fines, transfer and demotion are all 
used this way. (PSI, 1983, Vol iii: Ch 6). 
Officers believe that complaints are often made 
maliciously and that it is in the nature of the job that people 
sometimes will be aggrieved by their actions, even when they are 
acting legitimately. As several officers told me, "If you 
haven't a couple of complaints against you, you can't be 
%urking". On the other hand, they realise that the complaints 
procedure levels an official mark on their records which will be 
used for assessments by their seniors. As one officer who 
wanted to become a dog handler told me , "First the 
Superintendant has to agree. He'll check your records and make 
sure you're not the sort of bloke that hits anything that 
moves. " 
Further, police officers have no special indemnity for the 
use of force, therefore, they cannot justify its application 
with regard to their office. This is brought out most clearly 
in relation to the Home Office guide lines for the use of 
firearms, "(T)he responsibility for the use of the firearm is an 
individual decision which may have to be justified in legal 
proceedings" (cited in Molyneux, 1985: 199). 
Cultural/Group Constraints 
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As we have already seen, these organisational and legal 
constraints are buffered against by the occupational solidarity 
of the lower ranks. However, there are limits to such 
solidarity. When force is used, its results can be 
unpredictable and it may necessitate some form of cover up, on 
behalf of the officer by the relief. If the force results in 
broken bones, cuts and bruises, etc., it will have to be 
formally accounted for by the station officer. Sufficient 
evidence must be presented, on paper at least, to justify the 
injuries. If a cover up is staged, other officers are 
immediately implicated, either actively, by swearing false 
statements, or passively, by turning a blind eye. While such 
reciprocity is expected and is part of the solidarity demanded, 
an officer cannot expect his or her colleagues to expose 
themselves to the risk of disciplinary action on their behalf 
too often. 
Individual Constraints 
On an individual level, when an officer resorts to the use of 
force in an incident, he is immediately inreasing his risk. The 
only effective way a person can resist is by the use of force in 
return. Such a situation increases the officer's likelihood of 
being injured and it also runs the possibility of escalation. 
This is particularly the case when there are bystanders present 
who could intervene on behalf of the suspect. There are also 
less instrumental reasons limiting the use of force. As regular 
practitioners in the art of coercion officers develop a personal 
morality of force. 
The development of such a morality is out of the scope of 
this study. However, as Muir has illustrated, in the United 
States, officers do come to terms with the use of force by 
developing a legitimating belief structure which orders, and 
makes coherent, their activities in terms of a personal world 
view. The development of such a position rests on the 
recognition of the need to use coercion coupled with a 
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philosphical perspective on the human condition. For Muir, the 
'Professional' police officer was the one who felt "morally 
reconciled to using coercion and at the same time he reflected 
empathetically upon the condition of mankind. " 36% of Muir's 
sample of officers displayed this trait. 
Although police officers can and do use force for a variety 
of purposes and in a variety of ways,, as we have seen there are 
limits to its application. Force is rarely used by police 
officers as an end in itself. The primary reason for the use of 
force in street encounters is to establish and maintain control 
of an incident. However, as has already been noted, force is 
but one resource on which police officers are reluctant to rely 
if other less risky mechanisms can be utilised. The diagram 
below seeks to formally teases , ar some of these other 
resourses at the officer's disposal. 
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SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF CONTROL STRATEGIES 
IS IT IMMEDIATELY APPARENT THAT 
CONTROLLING THE SITUATION WILL 
BE PROBLEMATIC ? 
" LEVEL A 
OFFICER(S) AT1111PT TO ESTABLISH & MAINrAI 
CONTROL OF THE SITUATION BY MERE PRESENCE: 
DEFINITIONAL REGULATION. 
YES 
UNSUCCESSFUL 
OFFICER REQUESTS 
1 BACK-UP 
LEVEL B 
OFFICER(S) ATIP4? T TO ESTABLISH & MAINTAIN 
CONTROL THE SITUATION BY USING VERBAL COMMANDS 
AND GESTURE. IMPERATIVE REGULATION 
. . 
UNSUCCESSFUL 
LEVEL C 
OFFICER (S) REPEATS VERBAL CQN MANDS 
. 
. 
UNSUCCESS 
LEVEL D 
OFFICER (S) ATILT TO U ILISE PHYSICAL RESTRAINT 
TO ESTABLISH CONTROL. COERCIVE SUPERVISION AND 
NOT ALREADY DONE REQUEST BACK-UP 
UNSUCCESSFUL 
LEVEL. E 
OFFICER(S) ATILT TO CONTAIN TfE SUCCESSFUL 
SUCCESSFUL 
SITUATION UNTIL BACK UP ARRIVES 
LEVEL F 
BACK UP ARRIVES: A IMP IS ENTERED 
......................... ... TAMRE BY THE BACK-UP ATI'II E"I'S TO 
ESTABLISH CONTROL AND CONTINUES TO 
DO SO UNTIL CONTROL IS ESTABLISHED 
OFFICERS LOSE CONTROL OF THE INCIDENT 
RESULTING IN THE POSSIBILITY OF SUSTAINING 
INJURY AND/OR LOSING THE SUSPECT 
. 
CONTROL ESTABLISHED 
AND MAINTAINED 
Towards a Model of Control 
The above model was derived by analysing all the calls to 
"disturbances" recorded in my field notes. The reason for this 
selection is twofold. First, they are fairly common calls and 
thus, even with the attrition rate due to other officers already 
having dealt with the call or there being no trace on arrival, 
12 incidents remained. Second, such calls are the most likely 
to involve more than just victims. They can relate to fights, 
suspects on premises, domestic disputes, etc., and are, 
generally, those calls which are the most problematic for the 
police to deal with. 
The individual stages of the model, labelled A to F 
represent the most forceful strategy in each incident used by 
the officer to establish and maintain control. These have then 
been presented as incremental stages which, as each is 
unsuccessful, results in the next stage being tried until, 
ultimately, coercive force is used by one officer or, if 
necessary, by more and more officers until the sitution is 
brought under control. 
I want to examine each stage in turn and illustrate in 
detail the forms of control strategy that officers routinely 
ulilise. The model assumes that officers' activities can be 
treated as displays of "stategic interaction" . Goffman defines 
Strategic Interaction thus: 
"Individuals typically make observations of their 
situation in order to assess what is relevantly 
happening around them and what is likely to occur. once 
this is done, they often go on to exercise another 
capacity of human intelligence, that of making a choice 
from a set of possible lines of response. Here sane 
sort of maximisation of gain will often be involved, 
often under conditions of uncertainty or risk. This 
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provides one sense in which an actor is said to be 
rational" and also an ethically neutral perspective from 
which to make judgements concerning the desirability of 
a various course of action. " (Goffman, 1970: 85) 
Police officers, then, are being considered as players in 
Goffman's gante of strategic interaction. First, they are have 
to make an assessment of a situation based on the information 
available at the tine and the likelihood of various outcomes 
occurring. Second, they have to decide what is the correct 
response having weighed up the situation. This will involve 
calculating the possibility of risk and injury to themselves, 
the chance of being successful, the possibility of a good arrest 
etc. However, as van Maanen (1978b) reminds us, the shape of 
police/public encounters cannot be determined from without. The 
interaction and the various strategies called upon to deal with 
an incident can change as the course of the interaction 
proceeds. From the patrol officer's point of view this will 
depend on whether the other parties to the encounter are 
orientating to his or her authority. 
The police role is inextricably bound up with the use of force. 
Paradoxically, however, the use of force to control people is 
the exception rather than the rule. As Sykes and Brent have 
illustrated, officers have at their disposal three types of 
control strategies which they term, definitive, iterative and 
coercive supervision. Definitional supervision relating to 
questions such as "Where do you live? " or "Do you know why I 
stopped you? " allow the other party to hone in on the officer's 
cognitive domain. If an answer if given to the question then, 
to a large degree, the officer has established control, since 
the other is displaying an orientation to the officer merely by 
answering the question. Iterative supervision relates to the 
use of command like statements such as "Get out of the car" and 
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coercive supervision relates to the threat of force, for 
instance, "Get out of the car or you will be arrested. " (Sykes 
and Brent, 1981). 
The importance of Sykes and Brent's study is to illustrate 
that "talk" is the primary resource officer's have at their 
disposal for establishing control. This is perhaps even more 
important in the British context. In contrast to America, 
where search and handcuff are obligatory, even arrest situations 
are remarkably unforceful. Although it is a legal necessity for 
the officer to "lay on hands" to indicate to the arrested person 
that they are now under the officer's control, this is often 
achieved with the minimum of physical contact, for instance a 
hand placed lightly on the arm or the back. Thus, even where 
force is being used its application is more symbolic than 
physical. 
The purpose of the above model is to try and tease out the 
manner in which power is excercised and control is achieved. A 
word of warning, the model is not a representation of any single 
incident and cannot be treated as such. Its ontological status 
is as a heuristic device to enable an analysis of the strategies 
that are routinely utilised. In the analysis below, the 
illustrations are not confined to distubance calls. 
Mere Presence as a Control Strategy 
(T tv 1 70 
In the main, police officers appear to do very little to 
establish control of situations and achieve the necessary 
deference to their authority. Perhaps the coercive potential of 
the office is being deferred to, or the belief that they are 
acting legitimately. Whatever the reasons, power is being 
exercised and, in the main, it requires little work on the part 
of the police officer to establish his or her right to 
authoritatively intervene. 
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Consider the following example: 
As Martin was walking down the high street on foot 
patrol a man tried to park his car on a yellow line in 
front of the hamburger store. The driver looked up, saw 
the officer. The officer shook his head and gave a wry 
smile. The driver drove off down the high street. 
In this example, there is an almost inunediate orientation to the 
officer's authority. The slight shake of the head is enough for 
the driver to change his behaviour in the manner desired by the 
officer. The interaction is kept to the miniminum. A set of 
culturally available symbols are being relied upon for the 
parties to make sense of each other: the yellow lines, the 
uniform, a shake of the head, all cane together to provide the 
potential offender with enough information about the officer's 
intent and defer to his authority. By physically doing very 
little the officer has controlled a situation. Of course, such 
situations are unlikely to result in serious confict between an 
officer and a potential offender. However, consider the 
following situation which involves the arrest of a disqualified 
driver: 
By the time we were out again it was light and the world 
was starting to cone to life, the traffic increasing and 
the buses starting to run. Russ informed me that this 
was a good time to find disqualifed drivers as they 
headed off to work. (The station produces a list of 
disqualified drivers in the area, with the make of car, 
registration number, etc. ) So, as we cruised the early 
morning streets, they checked to see whether the cars 
they knew which should have been stationary had moved. 
Russ asked if Drew would go down to ....... Road where he 
knew that a D. D. was using his car and should be 
heading off to work about now. As we turned into the 
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road, a man came out of his house. "That's him! ", 
exclaimed Russ with glee, "Oh this is a bonus and it's 
double time. " (referring to the fact that he was already 
working overtime at less than eight days' notice at one 
and a quarter time and, if they went on past six, it 
would be double time. 
Drew parked the car up in the next road and then waited 
for the man to drive past. Sure enough a few minutes 
later he did. Drew followed for a few yards, flashed 
his headlights and the car stopped. Before Drew and 
Russ could get out of the car the man was out of his, 
casually waiting for than to approach. [1] (Giving rise 
to the ca mint from Drew that the man had obviously been 
stopped before). The man, white, in his mid thirties, 
dressed in jeans and a bomber jacket, stood by the side 
of his car. 
"Have you got a licence to drive that car? ", asked 
Russ. 
"Yes, " replied the man confidently. 
"Have you got it on you? " 
"No, it's at hare. " 
"Are you disqualified? " 
The man shrugged, gave a half smile, and agreed with 
resignation. 
"I'm afraid that you're under arrest. " 
Without any further core ent, the man slowly began to 
walk towards the officers indicating that he was not 
going to give any trouble. [2] 
"Where are you going? ", asked Russ in a friendly tone. 
"Off to work---I've got to be there at seven to open up. 
How long is this going to take? " 
"0h, not long". 
Russ continued to chat with the man about a job and so 
forth and assured him that they'd have it over and done 
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with in no time. " [3] 
Back at the station, the man was taken into the charge 
roan and the sergeant cams into process him. Every 
effort was made to speed the process up. (It was more 
like being at the dentist than a police station, the 
whole affair being dealt with, with no apportioning of 
blame. ) 
The sergeant asked if the man wanted to make a phone 
call. He didn't. The whole process was over in half an 
hour. He was arrested at 0607 and released at 0640. As 
he was released, the sergeant suggested the quickest way 
the man could get to work. 
Back in the charge room, Russ turned to me, "This should 
be good for an hour's overtime at Bank Holiday rate. " 
The sergeant looked up and said that he'd be finished by 
seven, to which Russ retorted that the sergeant didn't 
know how slowly he typed. They both smirked at each 
other knowingly. 
Even in such a potentially conflictual situation as an arrest, 
there is an almost immediate orientation to the officers' 
authority. The driver could have engaged them in chase, or 
could have been generally uncooperative. Instead, he displayed 
the appropriate degree of deference to the officers' authority. 
At point [1] he stopped and pulled over as soon as he could, and 
again, at point [2] "without futher comment he slowly walked 
towards the officer". While such displays can indicate to the 
officer that control is not going to be a problem, they remain 
aware that, at any time, the person can become uncooperative and 
offer physical and verbal resistance. Once the arrest seemed 
secure, Russ tried to normalise the relationship through the use 
of every day talk [3]. 
This raises a number of questions. The power relationship 
between the officers and the offenders is highly asymetrical. 
It could be expected in such a situation that displays of 
intimacy, friendliness etc. would be kept to a mininimum by the 
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most powerful in the interaction. However , the reverse is true. 
Russ utilises a form of interaction, 'everyday talk', as a means 
of repairing the imbalance and thus having the effect of 
placating the man. The relevance of everyday talk is that it 
requires no special skills on the part of the other to engage 
in. It is a form with which everyone is familiar and, thus, can 
be drawn upon with little prior rehearsal on the part of 
the parties involved. Further, everyday talk takes the form of 
question and answer which is particularly suitable to a 
situation where the power relationship is unbalanced. The 
superordinate, in this case Russ, asks the questions and the 
subordinate the offender provides the answers. While the 
content mirrors that of "everyday talk", the form reveals the 
status difference. 
The effect of such a strategy is twofold. First, since no 
reference is made to the offence or to the moral disposition of 
the law breaker, the possibility of conflict is reduced. 
Second, by keeping the offender's 'cognitive domain' fixed to 
answering questions the officer is, in effect, exercising a 
subtle form of thought control, limiting the possibility that 
the offender can think about his aggrieved state. 
The use of everyday talk as a device to secure and maintain 
conpliance is illustrated explicitly in this-next example. 
9.00 a call came over fran the station to go to an 
address to arrest a man for failure to attend court. We 
entered the fairly well kept forecourt of a large 
pre-war council estate. There were three officers in 
the van now as we had picked up Laurie from the 
adjoining sub-division. All three trooped up to the 
third floor. Several people had collected below to see 
what was going on. Russ knocked on the door. A woman 
answered and then got her husband. The man came to the 
door. He was black, thirty, wearing smart jeans, and a 
sweat shirt. He explained that he thought he was 
supposed to attend court on Thursday. "Oh well, it's no 
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problem. If you don't mind caning with us now we will 
have it all sorted out in half an hour. " [1] More people 
had gathered on the balcony and in the forecourt to see 
what was going on. 
Hubert got his coat and came straight away, with the 
officers, Russ and Quentin flanking him on either 
side. [2] There was no attempt to physically restrain 
him. When they got back to the ground floor Hubert went 
over to talk to some of the people gathered. Quentin 
went to stop him but Russ interjected. "No, it's 
alright, Quentin. He's going to be no trouble". [3] 
Indeed, Hubert followed a few seconds later. "What do 
you do for a living Hubert,? " asked Russ chattily. 
"Car spraying. " 
"You're just the man I want to see. You don't mind if I 
sit in the back with Hubert do you Quentin, but I think 
he can help me. " 
Russ explained about the problem with the paint work in 
the car and kept up a very friendly banter with Hubert, 
thanking him very much for his advice, asking about his 
job, and so forth. [4] 
Quentin decided that, rather than go straight back to 
the station, he'd try another address where there was an 
outstanding warrant. The man was in and brought to the 
van. 
Russ introduced everybody as though they they were old 
friends. "Clive this is John, John this is Hubert, " 
Russ chatted merrily with his charges until we arrived 
back at the police station. [5] 
Ahmst as a point of contrast to the civil and non 
aggressive way in which the twn men had been arrested, 
the WPC grabbed me by the arm and started to march me 
into the charge room. Hubert and John were left to walk 
freely. [6] 
Again, in this example, we see the instrumental use of talk 
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as a strategy for gaining and maintaining compliance. Rather 
than formally arresting the suspect, Russ presents the problem 
as one of a technicality which will be sorted out in a short 
time. Even the form of words, "If you don't mind coming with us 
now" [1] are calculated to soothe the man into accepting his 
fate gracefully. By offering the man a choice, the officer is 
indulging in a calculated degree of sophistry. From the 
officer's point of view the man does not have any choice. 
Either he will come quietly or, if not, the officer will 
physically coerce him. However, the man does have the choice to 
determine the manner in which he comes. The question allows the 
man to either accept his fate gracefully and retain the illusion 
of freedom, or to argue and resist and thereby lose the option 
of keeping the illusion. The choice may be only a matter of 
style and not of end result, but such factors, to a large 
degree, determine the quality and type of policing that members 
of the public enjoy even when they are on the receiving end of 
the negative consequences of law enforcement. 
Second, the officers utililise their bodies as a resource 
to enable them to establish control of the situation if Hubert 
should decide to make a run for it. [2] They flanked him on both 
sides which, while not actually restraining him, gives them the 
maximium advantage should he try to run. Interestingly, when 
Hubert does break away [3], Quentin is ready to bring him back, 
while Russ has taken the decision that control is 
non problematic. 
Third the officer again displays the use of everyday talk 
as a control mechanism [4], and this strategy reaches its peak 
at point [5] where the situation can almost be described as one 
of caricature, a point noted by the WPC and ironically commented 
upon [6]. 
Talk is, then, one of the most powerful resources that an 
officer has at his or her disposal for establishing and 
maintaining control. But this also extends to the use of 
posture and gesture. The following example makes explicit how 
members of the public can perceive officers, and how style 
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becomes more important than content. 
[Background. Fletch is trying to gain information from a group 
of West Indian youths about the whereabouts of a man who is 
wanted on an outstanding warrent. We are located in a small car 
park to the rear of the "square". The square is one of the most 
hostile areas on the division. It is the centre piece of a 
large multi-storey estate and had a reputation, until recently, 
as a place where officers would only walk in pairs. Indeed, 
Fletch has informed the station that he is entering the square 
and has asked other units to 'keep an eye out for him'. Fletch 
is trying to talk to a group of rather reluctant black youths 
who are hanging around two cars, some in the cars other standing 
around the outside. ] 
Fletch looks inside one of the cars across the passenger 
seat. "Who's that inside there? " he asks. 
"Can't you tell in the dark", taunts one of the West 
Indians. "I didn't say anything about all niggers 
looking the same in the dark, " quips Fletch with a 
smile. 
Fletch implores them to tell him where the man on the 
warrant is and finishes off with "Well, we'll get him in 
sooner or later. " 
"Yeah but you've got to catch him first and you know how 
fast us niggers run", one of the youths retorts with a 
smile. 
Fletch changes his tack and starts to talk to one of the 
youths about his car. The initial tension is easing 
despite several more black youths standing around the 
car, just watching, almost threateningly. Fletch seems 
prepared to stay and chat. The talk is slow and uneasy, 
sometimes the questions falling on deaf ears. one of 
the youths is particularly chatty and Fletch capitalises 
on this and engages him in a fast banter. 
Another foot patrol officer starts to approach from the 
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far side of the square. As he nears, one of the youths 
breaks from the loose circle surrounding Fletch. Rather 
than walk, he moves with a dance that resembles a shadow 
boxer. The officer approaches him. 
"What's all this waving your arms up in the air like 
a... " Fletch quickly interjects into the officers jibe, 
"He's alright Paul. " 
The youth to whan Fletch was talking turned and said 
"You can tell he's new ... you're alright though, not 
like some of them. " Paul moves through the loose circle 
and stands with his back against the car his arms folded 
tightly against his chest. This makes an interesting 
contrast to Fletch who is moving about, chatting 
aimiably, smiling, his body loose and relaxed. 
The combination of factors which come together to form mere 
presence include speech, body, gesture and posture which 
gel together to form a miniminal control strategy. It is 
minimal because, on their own, these devices are orientated to 
by the others in an encounter without recourse to any further 
strategies. However, if orientation to an officer's authority 
is not immediately forthcoming, or if these devices to establish 
and maintain authority fail, officers mist do repair work to 
re-establish their authority. 
Verbal and Paralinguistic Control Strategies 
(Levels B& C) 
If ini'diate orientation to their authority is not forthcoming 
then officers must actively intervene to establish it. Officers 
act on the basis that they have a legitimate right to intervene 
in any situation that they so deem and on the assumption that 
other people should also grant them the legitimacy to do so. In 
the light of this, officers will often explain why they are 
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stopping a person or a car, especially if it looks as though the 
person is going to argue or become disgruntled. This, tacitly, 
appeals to an element of reciprocity. It invites the person to 
see the officer's actions as legitimate by putting themselves in 
the officer's shoes. Furthermore, by objectifying the salient 
features of the stop or intervention, an officer is appealing to 
the person not to see the activity as directed at them 
personally. Thus: 
"I'm sorry to flag you down madam but we've just had a 
report of a burglary in ------- and I'm stopping all 
vehicles heading this way. Could I just have a look at 
your driving licence? " 
or: 
"You've got to see it from my point of view. I see the 
three of you hanging around an obviously stolen car. " 
The devices of telling people why they have been stopped, the 
invitational form of requesting and of using questions, not only 
to gain infomation but also to place the other in the officer's 
cognitive domain, are all brought together in the following 
incident. 
As we are driving through one of the older estates, 
Terry's attention is drawn to a lone black man in his 
early thirties, bomber jacket, jeans, walking slowly 
down the road. The van crawls behind him for several 
yards. Terry winds down the window, passes him, pulls 
up, and waits for the man to pass. The man is carrying 
something in his hand which Terry cannot make out. As 
he passes Terry asks from the window, "Can I have a word 
with you? " 
The man stops but says nothing. Alison gets out of the 
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back, Terry the front. 
"Where do you live mate? " [1] 
Silence. 
"Where are you going? " [2] 
"Hare, " the man says sharply. [3] 
"Where's that? " [4] 
The man stares back blankly. Terry sighs, turns to me, 
and gives me a 'here we go again' look. 
"What's your name? " 
"Why did you stop me? " rebuffs the man. [5] 
Terry explains that he had seen a man walking along the 
street carrying something in his hand, and he wanted to 
see what it was. [6] 
"No, why's you stop me? " says the man agressively. 
"I don't need any reason", retorts Terry impatiently, 
"just a routine stop. " 
"Do you mind if I look in your pockets? ". [7] 
Terry moves fowards to take a look in the man's jacket 
pocket. The man pulls back a little, resisting the 
search. Terry continues to try and search the jacket 
pocket without success, so he switches to the front 
trouser pocket, making to dip into it with his 
fingers. [8] The man pulls back, tensing his body and 
putting his hand on his hip to thwart Terry's attempt. 
"Can I have a look in there? What you got in there that 
you don't want me to see? " [9] 
"Nothing, " says the man frostily. 
"Why can't I have a look then? " Terry's voice is giving 
way to rising anger. 
"What are you looking for? " 
"Drugs? " 
"Look, I'm just walking home. " 
Terry goes to search his pocket. The man tenses again. 
"0K, you pull it out, " suggests Terry, indicating that 
he doesn't care who pulls it out as long as he sees the 
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pocket. 
The man holds a fixed and hostile stare straight into 
Terry's eyes. A few tense seconds pass and then he 
begins to empty his pockets. He produces a wad of 
money, quite a lot, in fact, in fives and tens. 
"You got a job"? asks Terry. 
"What do you mean? ", the man snaps, resenting the 
implication. 
Terry tries to get out of the faux pas rather clumsily. 
(I don't recall the words) 
"Yes, I work for my money ." 
"What do you do? " 
"I said I work", his voice getting more hostile. 
Terry goes to check the man's back pocket. The man 
looks as though he is going to be un-cooperative again 
and then changes his mind, turning his body to allow the 
officer to search him. The only thing in his back 
pockets is his travel card. 
Terry asks the man his name. 
"I'm not under arrest am I? " 
"Then I don't have to tell you nothing. " 
Terry looks at the traveller's card and radios for a 
computer check. 
"How old are you? " 
Silence 
"Thirty? " 
Silence 
The computer check comes back negative. 
"I've heard about you but I've never experienced you 
before, " challenges the man. 
"OK", you can go now", instructs Terry as he starts to 
go back to the van, not rising to the bait. 
The man just stands on the side of the road, staring 
into space. Terry gets in the van. The man continues 
to stand impassively, staring at the van. He is still 
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there when we round the corner. As we approach the 
junction Terry looks at me, shrugs and declares, "Why 
me? " 
In the above example, the man's open defiance of the officer by 
not answering his first question [11 is net with nothing more 
than a restatement of a question [2]. Even when the man does 
answer [31 it is unhelpfully obtuse and the officer rejoins with 
another question [4]. This process continues until the man 
challenges the officer [51 and the officer invites him to see it 
from his point of view [6]. 
Even with this level of challenge to his authority, the officer 
still retains the invitational form when asking the man if he 
can look in his pockets. [7] and when this is rebuffed, a 
command is not issued, the question is merely restated in a 
slightly more forceful way. Th this is added another question 
which intimates that non-cooperation is a sign of guilt. [9] As 
the incident continues, although the man only gives the barest 
minimum of co-operation, the officer manages to carry out the 
purpose of the stop through a delicate process of negotiation, 
each stage being negotiated step by step, until eventually the 
officer is satisfied. 
In the above example, the officer controls the situation 
almost entirely through the use of verbal strategies and his 
body. Although the officer touches the man, he does not use any 
force in trying to achieve his goal. The physical contact 
initiated by the officer is not for the purpose of control. 
When the man offers resistance he is not coerced into accepting 
the officer's authority, instead a new process of negotiation is 
entered into [8]. 
However, if the others in an encounter do not display 
orientation to the officer's authority, eventually the officer 
will either have to abandon his or her attempts, utilise more 
forceful measures to establish control, and/or request back-up. 
Page 211 
Force as a Control Strategy 
(Levels ABC D) 
As the model is set out it suggests that force is a last resort 
measure which will only be used after other resources have been 
tried and failed. This is in accord with much of the 
sociological literature Muir, (1977) Sykes & Brent (1983). Muir 
sees the potential of the use of force as increasing 
incrementally as each successive challenge to the officer's 
authority continues. He terms this the 'extortionate 
transaction'. Even Sykes and Brent, who reject Muir's model of 
the extortionate transaction, see force as occurring towards the 
termination of an incident, as if force is, in some way, the 
ultimate state. (Sykes and Brent, 1983). 
However, force is merely one resource through which control can 
be established and, as the next few examples will clearly 
illustrate, force can be used at any stage during the encounter 
as a control strategy. Once control has been successfully 
established then the other resources can be brought to bear. 
The use of force is not, then, necessarily related to arrest or 
termination. For instance: 
It is axproximately 11.30. We are driving along the 
High Street. Two men, both white in their late teens, 
are grappling on the pavement outside a chip shop. 
Terry is not too sure where to put the van as there are 
railings all along the side of the road and he is 
heading in the wrong direction. Rather than deliberate, 
Terry makes a sharp right across the traffic flow, 
driving the van between the only gap in the railings for 
fifty yards or so. He brings the van to a halt within a 
few feet of the wrestling bodies and leaves it jutting 
out into the road, blocking one line of traffic. The 
men are still struggling and shouting aggressively at 
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each other. Their two mates, acting rather like boxing 
seconds, are trying unsuccessfully to pull them apart. 
All are fairly drunk. Terry calls for some 
assistance [1] and then steps in the middle, roughly 
pulling the combatants apart. [2] As he bends down, his 
radio springs free of his back pocket and smashes him 
over the back of the head. 
He double takes and looks stunned and angry. He seems 
unsure as to what hit him. The flailing stops. Alison 
has the man on the ground by the shoulder. One of the 
seconds looks concerned and asks if Terry is alright. 
Terry still looks a bit dazed but he starts to push the 
combatant who is still standing away from the one on the 
ground. The two men are still trying to have a go but 
each of the seconds are trying to discourage them fran 
doing anything rash. Terry is placed firmly in the 
middle. [31 
"It's nothing really, just had a bit too much to drink, 
that's all, " pleads one of the seconds. The area car 
arrives and Terry calls the rest of the back-up off. 
However, within the next minute, as Terry put it later, 
"Every fucking car on the divison turned up. " - Kl, K2, 
the Panda, the inspector's car, the crime car. 
The driver of the first car to arrive jumps out, picks 
up the body that Alison is still holding on the ground. 
He looks at Terry, "Where do you want him? In the 
van? " [4] Terry indicates to the officer with his hands 
to hold on a minute so he can assess the situation. 
Seven or eight officers are now on the pavement and 
others are waiting in cars. Terry asks the two men if 
they are going to stop fighting now [51. The youth who 
is being held by the other officer starts to struggle, 
"I'm fucking going get him", he screams, his shoulders 
bearing fowards and his fists clenched. The officer is 
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forcibly having to restrain him. "OK, in the back of 
the van", Terry threatens rather than orders. The youth 
stops struggling and shuts up. [61 The seconds 
intervene and suggest that they should go home. "Yeah 
that's a good idea -- you go that way", says Terry, 
pointing. Be turns to the other youth, "You live that 
way don't you", [71 more a command than a question. The 
youths start to walk off with their respective seconds 
and, as they go, one of the seconds apologises for all 
the trouble they've caused. 
In the above example, Terry saw it as immediately apparent that 
assistance would be needed [1]. While Terry calls for back-up, 
which take no more than a few seconds, the combatants have time 
to stop fighting of their own accord and orientate themselves to 
the officer's presence. They do not. The chance of using 
either verbal ccnamand or gesture to establish control is 
therefore remote since the disputants are completely engrossed 
in their own affair. Therefore, stages A, B &C are by-passed 
and force is used to establish control at the onset [2]. Terry 
then uses his body as a means of control by physically placing 
it in the middle of the two disputants as a buffer between them 
[3]. Only when control has been established does Terry try to 
find out what is going on. 
The resolution to the incident is not achieved by arrest, 
although one of the youths comes close as soon as the other 
officers arrive [4]. Rather than ordering the combantants to do 
anything, Terry again makes use of the invitational form. He 
asks if they are going to stop fighting [5]. One of the youths 
indicates that he is not and Terry threatens him with arrest if 
he continues to resist [6]. The youth ceases. The final 
resolution is again achieved invitationally [7]. "You live that 
way don't you", cannot be read as a literal question since Terry 
has no interest in such information. It is being used and 
understood as an invitation to leave the situation without being 
arrested. If the combatants accept then they can go, if they 
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don't they will be arrested. They choose not to be arrested. 
What starts to become acutely apparent from these examples 
is that officers regularly have to deal with challenges to their 
authority and that, to a degree, their major response is to 
merely reissue a verbal instruction. As the number and force of 
the challenges increase then there is a likelihood that the form 
of the response will change. Moreover, officers utilise 
invitational strategies as a bridge between definitional and 
imperative supervision. It is as if there is same truth to that 
mythical question, "Are you going to come quietly? " Officers 
can, and do, allow members of the public the right to determine 
the quality and quantity of force that is used in gaining their 
ccopliance. 
Additionally, rather than the level of forcefulness 
increasing in a linear progression, there is some considerable 
movement back and forth between the different levels. Consider 
the following example: 
It was nearly nine-thirty. John decided to stay with 
Quentin in the Panda until they went in. "Burglary in 
Progress at --------- House". Quentin accepted the call 
adding that he was nearly on scene. He turned the car 
round fast and sped towards the location. We arrived in 
the estate, one of the older pre-war blocks, with the 
familar signs of delapidation, abandoned cars, boarded 
up flats, etc. 
John jumped out of the car and found the right stairway. 
I followed but let Quentin overtake me on the stairs. 
"Put it down", [1] came the booming order from John. A 
West Indian man in his late thirties, dressed in 
workman's clothes was crouched by the front door of a 
boarded up flat, about to strike another blow to the 
door with an eight inch cold chisel. The man did not 
respond immediately. "PUT IT DOWN! " [2]John boomed 
again, this time with a slow deliberate edge to his 
voice. The man dropped the chisel. Both Quentin and 
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John moved in, pulled the man from his feet [ 31 and then 
roughly turned him around so he was facing the other 
way. "WALK", [4] coan-anded Quentin, "Down to the other 
end and put your arms against the wall. " Quentin and 
John edge behind the man. He put his arms against the 
wall, legs straddled. They quickly and efficiently 
frisked the man, each taking one side of his body. [5] 
The man appeared to be clean. Quentin moved back 
towards the door and John told the man to stay where he 
was. [6] 
A pain of glass had been smashed and the boarding, 
obviously put up by the council, had been ripped away. 
Sate neighbours had started to to come out and peer from 
their doorways. Quentin wanted to look inside the flat, 
but it was dark. A smell of paraffin wafted out. 
Quentin radioed back to the station and asked for the 
ara car to bring a "Seek and Search" torch. It arrived 
a couple of minutes later. John kept an eye on the 
suspect, making him stay at the end of the walkway. The 
two other officers came up with the lamp. Quentin went 
in, and asked me to stay outside, "Just in case". While 
Quentin was inside, John started to ask the man some 
questions. He said that he lived there, but when he had 
arrived home fran work he'd found the place boarded up. 
He produced some identification on request and it had 
the right address on it. 
Quentin emerged from searching the flat and said that 
all appeared to be in order, but what was the man doing. 
John explained and said that he was satisfied. Quentin 
thought that they should make some more checks. John 
looked at his watch. It was 2148. "I want a pint of 
Fosters", he declared. Quentin shrugged and turned to 
the man. "Try and keep the noise down", and with that 
they left. Back in the car, Quentin radioed through to 
the station. "Yes, all appears to be in order. A man 
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effecting repairs to his property. " 
The order of the various controlling techniques in the above 
example is thus: 
Carinand [1] Put it down Resisted 
Ccnnand [21 Put it down Complied 
Force [3] Pulling the ma n up Complied 
Carimand [41 Walk Complied 
Force [5] Frisk Complied 
Cam-and [61 Stay there Complied 
While the man failed to obey the first command, which is not 
unreasonable, given that it probably took him a few seconds to 
work out what was happening, he was conpliant at all other 
stages. There are, however, five other stages of imperative 
supervision and force that are utilised until the officers are 
satisfied that the man does not present a problem of control. 
once they have established control to their satisfaction then 
the information search begins and, as we can see at termination, 
even this level of forcefulness is not related to an arrest 
strategy. Its purpose is solely one of creating the conditions 
under which other forms of supervision become appropriate. The 
next example clearly illustrates how the range of techniques are 
welded into a coherent control strategy and how the level of 
forcefulness varies at different stages within the incident. 
"Woman beserk at ------ Library". It was on KD's ground 
and, after checking with Russ, Quentin accepted the call 
from the mainset. Neither was quite sure of the 
location, and the first stop was the wrong library. The 
one we wanted was three hundred yards down the road. A 
car from another district had also accepted the call and 
pulled up behind us. Russ explained where we were 
going. 
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The siren and light went on, and we sped the three 
hundred yards to the library. Quentin missed the 
turning but the people waving and shouting, "Over here, 
over here, " soon put him right. Russ jumped out of the 
van. A large West Indian woman in her mid twenties was 
reeling and thrashing in the middle of a crowd of 
people, Russ approached and she started to sprint 
off. [1] "Come back here" [2], Russ commanded. The 
woman continued to run and Quentin sprinted after her 
[3]. Russ caught up with her and grabbed her by the 
arm. [4] "Leave me alone, " she screamed. 
We were now standing on a path way bounded by waist high 
railings in the middle of the grassed area in front of 
the library, and away from the main body of spectators. 
"Leave me alone you cunt -- Get your fucking arms off 
me. " [5] Russ kept hold of the woman's arm. [6] 
"Now just quieten down luv, [8]" he said firmly but 
without malice. "Fuck off! " [7] 
The woman struggled and broke free of Russ Is grip and 
started to run further along the path. [9] Quentin 
headed her off a few yards along the path and edged her 
back towards the railings. [10] 
"CUNT ! FUCK OFF !" The woman started to try and move of f 
again. [11] She had her back towards the railings, 
Quentin was on one side facing her a few feet away. 
Russ was on the other side. With his back and side and 
using the outside of his arm, he edged her back towards 
the railings, thus restraining her with little direct 
force other than body weight and protecting himself from 
her kicks. [12] 
"OK now quieten down, " Russ ordered firmly. [13] 
"Take your fucking hands off me you cunt. You want 
pussy. " The woman started to rub her breasts 
provocatively. Her summery blouse had come open and she 
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continued to rub her breasts through a skimpy bra. [14] 
"Look I just want you to calm down. " [15] 
"I've done nothing, nothing. I got to pick my daughter 
up from the nursery". Russ continued to stand with his 
back towards her and Quentin faced her a little way 
back. The woman seemed to calm down and started to make 
sobbing noises. "Let me go home, " she pleaded meekly. 
[16] 
"OK" in a minute reassured Russ. [17] 
Then without warning she started to try and run away 
again. [18] Russ blocked her way. [19] 
"Let me go you cunt. You want pussy. I got blood, I 
got blood. " The woman started to rub her crutch pulling 
her dress up to her thighs. Russ backed off a little as 
she had stopped trying to run. A special constable had 
arrived and the four of us stood in a cordon around her. 
She started to pull her knickers down and squat in the 
pavement as if going to urinate. [20] 
Russ made the decision to arrest her. He signalled his 
attention to Quentin, "Right that's enough I'm taking 
her in. " He took hold of one arm, Quentin the other, and 
they started to carry and drag her the hundred yards or 
so towards the van. [211 
In the above example, we can see how the officer utilises 
command, force and mere presence as the situation dictates. 
A schematised version is presented in Figure One below. While 
the model and the literature assume that force is the highest 
stage in the encounter, the last two examples illustrate that an 
increase in the level of forcefulness does not preclude a 
subsequent decrease. Thus we move from force to command to 
definitional supervision and back to force again (6,7,8,9). 
Between points six and nine it appears, briefly, that the woman 
may have finally calmed down and, although both officers are 
still controlling her physical space, Russ has switched from 
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Imperative Command [7] to less firm and more definition forms of 
supervision [8,9] issued in mellow and reassuring tones. He has 
even suggested that the woman might be allowed to go home which 
is highly unlikely. 
Figure One 
schematic representation of 
control strategies used in a specific incident 
Presence [1] Russ approched Resisted 
Command [2] Come Back Here Resisted 
Force [3] Grabbed Her Arm Resisted 
Command [4] Just Quieten Down Resisted 
Force [5 Quentin Headed her off Resisted 
Force [6] Using His arm Resisted 
Command [7] Quieten Down Resisted 
Definitional [8] Calm down Complied 
Definitional [9] OK Resisted 
Force [10] Russ Blocked her Way Resisted 
Force [111 Carry and Drag her Resisted 
Despite coercion being used directly on four separate 
occasions, it appears that control has been established and that 
the woman is now responding to less forceful measures being used 
to instigate the officers' authority. Point [91 is perhaps the 
crucial decision stage in the incident. If the woman ceases to 
resist, becomes cooperative and compliant, the decision as to 
her fate will be taken in regard to the original incident (of 
which Russ knows little). She may be released, if the original 
information turns out to be exaggerated or perhaps arrested for 
criminal damage. This will depend on a host of factors, such as 
whether the complainant wants to press charges, how severe the 
damage is, and so on. However, all this is overridden as she 
continues to resist and the decision to arrest is taken on her 
demeanour alone. Thus, she is dragged screaming and kicking all 
the way to the back of the van. (see page 74) 
The level of forcefulness is negotiated; there is a complex 
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ritual of trove and countermove. In overall terms there is a 
strategy of containment and control. However, different tactics 
are selected as appropriate to different stages of the incident. 
Certainly, not all troublesome police encounters are handled 
with such a range of sensitive and measured tactics but it again 
reminds us that officers offer people choices as to how control 
is going to be exercised and as to how people will submit to 
police authority. That police will control a situation is non- 
negotiable. However, the manner in which control is established 
is often negotiated. 
Containment and Backup 
(Levels A, B, C, D, E, F) 
In all the examples so far the possibility of officers losing 
control of the incident has been remote. The others in the 
encounters have either responded to the verbal and non verbal 
regulatutory devices or they have been fairly easy to physically 
control. There are, however, situations where such control 
becomes tenuous and, without back-up, officers are liable to 
either have to back down (a situation I have never seen happen) 
or try and contain the situation until more officers arrive to 
help. However, even in these situations arrest is not 
inevitable. Consider: 
We pull round the Estate, in front of us is an orange 
Cortina cruising very slowly. Terry follows it for 
about 150 yards and then decides that it is mirth 
stopping. He flashes his headlights and the car pulls 
over. Terry approaches the driver's side window. The 
man unwinds the window... (Missing Data) .... "I've been 
following you for a few minutes and you're going very 
slowly aren't you? ", Terry says by way of explanation as 
to why he has stopped the man. He asks if the man will 
give him the keys. The man complies, with no overt 
hostility or resistance. 
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"What have you got in your boot? ", asks Terry. 
For the first time I have a clear view of the occupants 
of the car: two West Indian males. The driver is in his 
early thirties, smartly dressed in an open neck shirt 
and jacket, looking as though he might be off to a night 
club. The passenger is older and more scruffily 
dressed. 
The man hesitates for twenty seconds before he answers. 
"Do you mind if I have a look? ", requests Terry. The man 
says no and Terry heads round to the rear of the car to 
open the boot. The driver gets out and cones to help 
Terry find the correct key. " 
"You off hoe? ", asks Terry chattily. 
"Yes" 
"Where do you come from? ". 
The man replies while Terry opens the boot. He checks 
the contents and everything that the man said was there 
is there, with the addition of two hifi speakers. Terry 
questions him about them. 
As he is answering the officer's questions, the 
passenger gets out. He is reeling a little, possibly 
from the effects of gandga or alcohol. His left eye is 
all swollen and a recent gash is visible along with the 
stitches holding it together. 
"Why do you stop us when we're driving home? ", 
interrupts the man aggressively. [1] Terry ignores him. 
[2] "You stop us for nothing, " he continues, raising 
his voice. The driver is looking visibly worried by the 
trouble his friend is causing. "You only stop us 
because we're black..... (Missing Data)........ it's 
worse than fucking Russia here! " [3] 
Terry asks him brusquely to get back in the car and to 
stop shouting. [4] The driver seconds the advice, but 
the man takes no heed and continues with his vociferous 
tirade against Terry. He starts to walk away frown the 
car towards the gap in the crash barrier. 
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"Cy! Come back here", orders Terry. [51 
"I'm going home", the man snarls. [6] 
"You're not going anywhere. Cane back here" [7] 
The man continues to walk towards the gap in the crash 
barrier. [8] Terry radios for some assistance, before 
swiftly catching the man up and placing his body between 
the man and further progress, the opposite way being 
barred by the crash barrier. Terry does not touch the 
man to restrain him but walks the man back, edging him 
with a roll of his upper torso, easing him back towards 
the car. [9] 
"It's not like this in Jamaica, a man can walk the 
street there", the man shouts angrily and a new hail of 
abuse is started. 
At the side of the road a group of about fifteen black 
youths has gathered and, on hearing the new torrent, 
they start to egg him on. Terry calls for back up 
again. [10] The situation is now clearly getting out of 
hand. Terry is starting to lose his patience with the 
man. The man is leaning against the railings and Terry 
is standing inches away from him, enabling him to check 
every move. The crowd, some fifteen to twenty feet 
away, starts to jeer, the man shouts to the crowd, the 
crowd shouts, the man shouts back. [11] Without warning 
Terry squares up to the man. 
"Just fucking shut up you stupid cunt", he commands. Go 
on! Go on! ", he taunts "You fucking wanker! ". Terry 
continues with his outpourings, no longer maintaining 
any semblance of coolness. 
"You heard that", the man appeals to the crowd, "The 
officer swore at me" 
"Oh fucking piss off! ", says the officer. The other man 
who, up until now, has been very compliant, turns to his 
friend and suggests that they go. (More, I think, 
because he is worried that his friend might do something 
stupid, than because he wants to defy the officer. ) 
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"You stay there. " The man continues to walk towards the 
door of the car and gets in. The officer abandons 
trying to control the passenger and walks round the 
barrier. The passenger gets in the car, the engine 
starts up. The officer walks in front of the car and 
places both hands on the front of the bonnet, issuing 
the challenge that if they want to drive of f they will 
have to run him down. The crowd jeers. The assistance 
that the officer has now asked for twice still shows no 
signs of arriving. The officer waits, hands on the car 
bonnet, staring into the driver's eyes. [12] Within 
twenty seconds the area car, the inspector's car, and a 
panda are on scene. The officer moves away from the 
bonnet. The inspector approaches and asks the officer 
what is going on. "It's just a simple little stop that 
has got completely out of hand". The inspector 
instructs Phil and Leslie to go and quieten the crowd 
down, and then tries to calm the agitated West Indian 
man who is still hurling abuse at all and sundry. (For 
some reason.. I am not completely sure why, the man gets 
back into passenger's seat). 
This example poignantly illustrates both the complexity of 
incidents and the problems that officers face when their 
authority is continually resisted. From the officer's point of 
view he is carrying out a routine and, to his mind, a perfectly 
reasonable car stop. The driver is offering no resistance and 
being cooperative; it is the passenger who is defiant and, to 
add to this, there is a large and vociferous crowd gathering who 
are only vocally supportive of the man but could physically 
intervene on his behalf. 
When the first hint of defiance occurs [1], the officer 
ignores it [2]. This is unsuccessful as the man continues his 
tirade. The officer asks the man to get back in the car [3]. 
The man continues his defiance [4]. The officer issues another 
comnand [51 and repeats it [7] when it is ignored [6]. At this 
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point [8], the officer is faced with a central dilemma. To back 
down would be to abandon his original goal and to lose face, to 
continue to expose himself to the risk of having to escalate his 
use of force, with the possibility of the crowd, which is 
gathering, intervening on the man's behalf. All officers face 
the same problem if their authority is challenged and 
definitional and imperative supervision fails. Either they have 
to use force to reinstate it, backdown or contain the situation 
until back-up arrives. 
It is perhaps in this light that the officer opts for a 
minimalist strategy of physical containment by controlling the 
physical space around the man [9], rather than direct physical 
contact which might have provoked the crowd that had gathered. 
Also, at this stage, the officer has little grounds for arrest 
and his legal powers would not offer him much support for the 
use of force. Moreover, the physical rough and tumble that may 
result could possibly open up the wound above the man's eye, 
leading to allegations of assault. In view of these factors, 
such a minimalist strategy seemed appropriate. However, 
although this results in him managing to thwart the man's 
attempt to run away, it leads to the man invoking the support of 
the crowd on his behalf [10]. 
What happens next is a puzzle. It is the only time I have 
seen an officer lose his temper with a citizen (in public). It 
may be that all we can say about this behaviour is that he lost 
his temper and that to suggest anything else would be to over 
rationalise heat-of-the rent decisions and ascribe motives for 
which there is little evidence. Bearing this in mind, I would 
like to suggest an alternative. While recognising that the 
officer was frightened, with good reason, (I certainly was) and 
he was also angry, there are certain features which suggest that 
his behaviour was structured towards a particular goal. 
First, he does not once refer to the man's race (this 
officer has a wide vocabulary of racist terms). Second, he does 
not touch the man. Rather, it is possible that what he is 
trying to do is to escalate the confrontation so that the man 
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gives him positive grounds for arrest. Third, he has now asked 
for back-up twice [111 which means that he is conveying to his 
colleagues that the situation is serious. It is not just a case 
of requiring another vehicle, perhaps to transport a prisoner or 
aid in a routine search. If he had established control, it 
would not have required repeating the request. Further, the 
officer is aware that the reason why back-up is slow in arriving 
is that there is a serious incident at the other end of the 
ground. Thus he is taking away officers from something that is 
probably more important. Finally, he has already asked for 
back-up once that evening, less than an hour ago. When back up 
does arrive the, situation must, on face value, warrant it, 
otherwise the officer will have a credibility problem with his 
colleagues. 
In the end, the officer has only one resource to maintain 
control of the situation until backup arrives and the officer is 
forced to combine his body and his authority into the same 
physical and symbolic unit. If his authority is further 
violated so will be his body [12]. This is perhaps the ultimate 
example of restraining force. In essence, he is issuing a 
challenge, "If you want to defy my authority you will have to 
take ne with you", and, thus, when back-up arrives they are 
presented with the dramatic and powerful image which needs no 
explanation. 
When an officer calls for back-up, the nature and dynamics 
of the encounter change since the inter-personal dynamics of 
control become subservient to the organisational. The shift is 
not just one of quantity but of quality also. Even where 
control is still being directly exercised by the individual 
officer, the physical presence of other officers makes the 
implicit threat that as much force as necessary will be used to 
gain compliance, particualary poignant. With regard to this, 
officers often caustically observe how a supects will to fight 
miraculously disappears as the back-up arrives with lights 
flashing and sirens blaring. 
In small scale incidents, then, back-up plays a relatively 
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symbolic role in control, the additional officers doing little 
other than just being there or following the line of the 
first officer on scene. (Cf incident on page ?? 
f). Even when a 
senior officer does arrive on scene (as above) he rarely takes 
control but lets the original officer deal with it himself. 
Where control has not been established, because one or two 
officers cannot hope to control such a large disturbance or 
because a person is armed or so aggressively violent that it is 
not possible, the senior officer on scene would be expected to 
take overall corranand and attempt to direct the proceedings. 
Moreover, the additional officers arriving on scene will not be 
constrained by the decisions taken by the first officer on 
scene. 
The final example illustates how the police, both 
individually and organisationally, are prepared to escalate the 
level of forcefulness, both qualitatively and quantitatively, 
until control is established. However, at this level, the 
process becomes far more complex since it involves various 
segments of the police organisation which are competing to 
establish their own definition of the situation. 
We were nearly back at the station when a disturbance 
call came out. K45 accepted it but Matt decided to go 
as back up, "Since it's just round the corner". It only 
took a minute before we were driving into the forecourt 
of an old, shabby, pre-war estate. The van had already 
arrived - Terry and Chris could be seen on the fourth 
floor balcony. G45 arrived and we started to walk 
slowly towards the stairways. Without warning the 
relative quiet of the night was rent with the sounds of 
splintering glass. Matt started to run for the stairs 
and up the four flights; Matt leading the way, Pam next 
and me last. As we arrived Leslie, Jake and Chris were 
standing either side of the door truncheons drawn. 
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Diagram of Initial Siege Situation 
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The person inside smashed the glass again, everyone 
moved back. "Watch yourself at those windows", ordered 
Terry, pointing to the kitchen windows which Matt and I 
were standing in front of. We ducked and moved back for 
cover. Terry and Chris pushed themselves flat against 
the wall by the side of the door. Terry moved back 
towards Matt. Terry is covered in glass splinters. He 
explains what has happened. "I only came up to talk to 
him. His rnissus called us 'cos he carne back roaring 
drunk, threw her out of the flat and locked himself in. 
I banged on the door and Chris put his head down to the 
eye hole. "Then a fucking iron bar came through the 
window. It nearly got Chris. Then it came again. I 
blocked with my truncheon, I think that's when he got 
hurt. I caught him in the face". (To understand what 
is going on you have to imagine a typical council flat 
door, wood at the bottom and a glass window inset in the 
upper part of the door. ) "I think I cut his hand too". 
They reapproach the door, truncheons drawn, keeping to 
the sides. "Right are you going to come out? " Inside, 
the man was screaming, "Leave me alone" over and over. 
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"Are you going to come out, or are we going to came and 
get you? ", threatens Terry. "Leave me alone, " the man 
screams again. "Something else hits the window and more 
glass shatters. 
The inspector has arrived, accompanied by two other 
officers. Inside, the sounds of the man still screaming 
can be heard. Terry and Chris back of f to the adjacent 
flat. A line of seven police officers stand watching 
the door, pondering what to do. They decide to get two 
shields over from the divisional station and a sledge 
hammer to break the door down. In front of the door is 
a carpet, rolled up and in the way. Terry and Chris, 
ducking below the firing line, move in, pick it up, 
check to see that nobody is below and throw it over the 
balcony. A washing line which is hanging precariously 
over the door is hastily removed. 
Below, there are nine police cars, and fifteen or 
so officers looking up anxiously. The inspector asks 
Pam to stand on the stair well and stop any more 
officers from coming up since there are already seven 
there and little roan to manoeuvre on the narrow 
balcony. 
Pam does as she is requested but, almost 
immediately, two plain clothes officers push past, not 
heeding her request. Terry approaches the door again, 
standing on the far side for cover. "Are you going to 
cone out? " he shouts. "No, " comes back the simple 
reply. "Look, somebody's going to get hurt, because 
we're going to cone in if you don't cane out. " 
"Fuck off, leave me alone. " 
"Why don't you come out? ",, Terry asks in a softer, more 
pleading tone. After several more attempts to get the 
man to talk about coming out Terry has had enough and 
moves to a less dangerous position. Just as he is out 
of the firing range, the glass splinters again and a 
cold chisel comes flying through the window, over the 
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balcony and lands noisily on the tarmac below. 
"Get those people away from there" somebody orders. The 
crowd that has gathered below is ushered back by some 
officers. 
The inspector thinks it best if everyone on the balcony 
moves back and just waits for the shields to arrive. We 
all move back. I start chatting to the plain clothes 
officers. "Are you a neighbour? ", one says, pointing to 
the the open door. "No, I'm with KH" 
"Oh? " 
I explain what I am doing. More glass shatters. He 
doesn't flinch but just keeps talking, asking about my 
work, and expressing interest. As more glass breaks, I 
jung, and feel acutely aware that my conversation 
partner seems ca 1etely at ease. 
Two shields arrive and are brought up. Terry 
informs us that, from what he can see, the man has now 
armed himself with the entire contents of the kitchen 
drawer. If the shields are going to be effective, three 
at least would be needed, four would be better. The 
inspector orders more shields to be brought from the 
police station and the sledge harn er to be brought up 
from below. 
The hanmr is brought up and Leslie starts to smash at 
the door. The banging reverberates around the whole 
estate. Af ter fifteen or so blows the door still has 
not given and another officer takes over. Below, more 
people have gathered but are keeping a safe distance. 
As Jake continues to bash at the door, the IRU draw up 
below. Helmeted and shielded men unload. The inspector 
calls down for just two more officers with shields. The 
sergeant leading the officers sends two ahead but 
continues to head for the stairs. More glass shatters. 
Despite the Inspector's request, six of the IRU officers 
come up, acconpanied by their sergeant and inspector. 
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They push past the other officers and immediately 
establish operational control of the situation. The 
relief inspector is de-facto overruled and the IRU 
officers takw over the incident. The door gives and the 
shielded men form a shell around themselves, using three 
shields at the front and two sides, and one over the 
top. (What follows is a mixture of what I saw and heard 
from various sources. As such it is a fairly accurate 
account, but not all witnessed by my own eyes). The 
proceeding had taken about twenty five minutes. It was 
now 11.45. 
[The man, a Scot in his mid thirties, was inside the 
flat, confronting the assembled riot shields. The plan, 
as training indicates, is for the shell to advance 
slowly against the assailant and trap him in a corner. 
From all accounts, the action passed off in text book 
manner. The man, armed with two knives, thrashing and 
threatening all the way, was cornered. The shielded 
officers pressed against him until he ceased to resist. 
The only thing that didn't go according to plan, so the 
sergeant said later, was that, once the man had ceased 
to resist and was in a heap on the floor, the men piled 
on top which he thought was "both excessive and 
dangerous". Further, it wasn't expected that the man 
would try and kill himself during the build up to the 
storming]. 
The man was escorted out, an officer holding each arm, 
which were handcuffed together. He seemed to have lost 
all desire to fight as he was led down the stairs to an 
awaiting van. He had slashed both wrists, losing a lot 
of blood in the process as the riot sheilds testified 
then, and the charge room f loor later. His left hand 
was also cut up, probably as a result of smashing the 
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window, and his face was badly gashed, presumably where 
Terry's truncheon had caught him. 
Gradually all the vehicles left. I helped carry 
down the bloodied riot shields, loading them into the 
DSU. Outside in the forecourt, officers swopped details 
of the incidents. "I thought Terry and I were on for a 
commendation before the DSU arrived, " Leslie lamented. 
"If he'd have come out first, that would have been it. 
I don't think us, with just truncheons, would have stood 
a chance with him with an iron bar". 
The inspector stayed behind for a while to clear up 
the loose ends such as the securing of the property, 
finding the informant, and taking some statements. As 
he put it later, "I've got a lot of writing to do". 
Back at the station, the man was being placed in an 
ambulance when I arrived. Four DSU men were going with 
him. The hospital refused to treat him as he was still 
being stroppy and was very drunk. He was, therefore, 
brought back and locked in a cell until he was more 
sober. 
In the canteen, more stories were swopped. The 
general opinion of those present was that the DSU had 
performed well, bringing about a successful resolution 
to the incident. They look well pleased with 
themselves. "Yeah, but we cleared the ground for you. 
You had nothing left to do really", teased Leslie. 
"What have you learnt fronn tonight? ", somebody asked the 
sergeant. "The importance of training and discipline. " 
He went on to criticise the relief inspector who he 
thought should have handed over immediate control to the 
DSU. 
The above data both simultaneously supports and undermines the 
model. on the one hand, the level of forcefulness increases 
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incrementally throughout the incident until, eventually, control 
is established. However, due to the initial level of violence 
from the suspect, the role of the first officers on the scene is 
immediately one of containment, until back up arrives. Although 
the officers attempt to cajole and threaten the man out, it is 
net with an unequivocally violent response. In this situation, 
back-up is not needed as a symbolic extension of the officers' 
coercive potential, but as a practical one. Although the relief 
inspector takes overall control of the incident, he is mindful 
of the situational etiquette which prescribes the degrees of 
interference and non interference to which even senior officers 
adhere. Thus, he consults with the first officers on scene, 
listens to their advice and, primarily, uses his superior status 
to order the necessary hardware from the station. 
However, this etiquette does not extend to other segments 
of the organisation who have an independent and autonomous 
command structure. Thus, when the DSU arrives, even though it 
was not requested, it presumes its right to intervene and take 
control of the incident. The DSU inspector de facto overruled 
the relief inspector and refused to accept his line of caý. 
The most notable feature of this is that they make no attempt to 
establish the history of the incident. They have one goal, and 
one goal only, to place the man under police control. The 
nature of the offence, the wishes of the complainant and the 
ability of the other officers on scene to deal with the 
situation more successfully because they have greater knowledge 
of the build up, are all overridden by a taken-for-granted 
assumption that the immediate problem is control. 
We have examined how police officers exercise power to 
establish and maintain control. By refusing to conflate the 
potential and actual use of force (as Bittner does), it is 
possible to argue empirically that it is not the capacity to use 
force which stands at the core of the police mandate but the 
capacity to exercise control. 
Rather than conceptualising the police in terms of their 
right to use force, it is more profitable to see them as a 
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mechanism for authoritatively establishing control in the light 
of situational exigences. Although the right to use force is 
undoubtedly essential for the establishment of control, its 
exercise is rarely required and, to concentrate upon it, 
overshadows the far more routine and mundane aspects of how 
power is enacted. 
When these are considered, then, it raises immediate 
problems as to how to interpret what Bittrer means by 
"non-negotiably coercive force". While, in theory, the police 
may have that right, in practice, patrol officers consistently 
negotiate the quality and quantity of force necessary to 
establish control. 
The model has provided a useful tool with which to 
conceptualise the manner in which control is achieved but, as it 
stands, it is clearly inadequate. I do not propose to rework it 
but it is necessary to point out its major weaknesses. It is 
apparent that the conceptualisation of escalation progressing in 
a sequential manner from the least to the most forceful 
response, does not adequately capture the dynamics of control. 
The data reveals three fundamental weaknesses in the model. 
First, officers move straight to high levels of forcefulness 
(Levels D and E) at the onset of some incidents if they have 
reason to believe that other strategies will not be appropriate. 
Second, while the model suggests that, once the level of 
forcefulness has increased it cannot decrease, the data shows 
otherwise. In actuality, once control has been established at 
one level, officers often resort to a lower, less forceful, 
level. The process is iterative rather than just linearly 
progressive. Finally, the model cannot accommodate the 
complexity of prolonged serious incidents which necessitate the 
involvement of other segments of the organisation. 
However, the model has enabled us to examine the nuances of 
control. From the patrol officers' point of view, it is the sin 
qua non of police work. Without it, they cannot achieve any 
resolution of an incident. 
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Chapter Nine 
RESOLUTIONS 
The resolution to any incident police are called to deal 
with is comprised of two components: the "here-and-now" on the 
street and the "sometime-later" at the station. 
The here-and-now relates to resolutions at the scene, 
whereby the immediate event is sufficiently dealt with so that 
it no longer requires the presence of police. The 
scmetime-later resolutions follow on as a direct consequence of 
the here-and-now resolutions and relate to the organisational 
accounting procedures that must be performed in order to close 
the matter. 
The organisational lifetime of an incident varies. Most 
incidents have a very short life span. For instance, a call 
comes in to the station that youths are causing a disturbance 
outside Joe's fish shop. A Panda car is dispatched and, when 
the officer arrives, the youths have gone. From an 
organisational point of view, as long as the incident is not 
repeated, when the patrol officer reports back with the ords: 
"All quiet on arrival - Area search - No trace", the incident 
is, effectively, closed. On the other hand, some incidents may 
have a very long organisational life span. For instance, the 
shooting of Mrs. Cherry Groce by armed police officers in 
September 1985 was still requiring organisational attention 15 
months later. (See Guardian, Jan 7,1987; pl). 
What is important to understand is that, although the 
here-and-now and the sonetine-later are related, a resolution at 
one level does not necessarily entail a resolution at the other. 
An on-the-street resolution may not result in a satisfactory 
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organisational one, the paperwork may "bounce", a complaint may 
be made against the officer at a later date, and so forth. Nor 
does an organisational resolution imply that a satisfactory 
here-and-now resolution to the incident was obtained, only that 
the police withdrew. For instance, when officers are called to 
a dispute and leave the parties still arguing, with the words, 
"If we get a call back, someone's going to be arrested. " (a 
phrase I have heard used on many an occasion) and then clear 
with the dispatcher, "Parties seen and advised. No of fences 
alleged or disclosed. ", a satisfactory organisational resolution 
has been achieved, regardless of what was, and probably still 
is, occurring at the actual incident. 
For an organisational resolution to be achieved, it is 
necessary to "file" the correct paperwork. In some instances, 
this may involve extensive form filling, the taking of detailed 
statements and the writing of substantial reports. Generally, 
the most that is required is a short report and/or the filing of 
a simple pro-forma sheet. More usually, calls are resolved on 
the message pad which records any incoming calls and subsequent 
deployment from the station. 
At the end of each shift, the sergeant or inspector will 
check to see that each dispatched message has an appropriate 
resolution. From their point of view, this is either a stock 
phrase indicating that the matter requires no further police 
attention, as with the words, "Area search - no trace" or 
"Parties seen and advised - no cause for police action". 
Alternatively, it will provide a reference to a further report 
which is filed in another part of the organisation. This will 
merely be a number which indicates where the report on the 
incident is located and is awaiting further action. 
The patrol officer is, then, faced with two distinct, yet 
interrelated problems: how to resolve incidents on the street 
and how to resolve them organisationally. 
There are, perhaps, four major constraints available to 
patrol officers which shape the type and nature of their 
resolutions. First, as we have already seen, the majority of 
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incidents to which officers are called bear only a tenuous 
relationship to their law enforcement function. Furthermore, 
even where incidents are related to law enforcement, such as a 
call to a burglary, the chance of a suspect still being on scene 
is remote. In most of these incidents, then, the police role is 
that of report taker, advice giver, comforter, mollifier, 
counsellor, and so forth. Resolutions are related more to 
successfully gathering enough information to satisfy any 
official forms and procedures that have to be completed, than to 
solving the actual problem. 
Even where matters are of a criminal nature, a robbery, 
rape, burglary, car theft, and so on, the patrol officer is 
unlikely to play rmre than a minor part in the processing and 
eventual outcome of the incident. He will be expected to hand 
over control of the incident either to a higher ranking officer 
or to a specialist squad. Thus, his or her involvement in the 
incident will be, primarily, that of an information gatherer, a 
preserver of the scene, and a report writer. For instance, at a 
call to a reported burglary, once it is clear that the suspects 
are no longer in the vicinity, the patrol officer's task will be 
to gather information to ascertain whether there are enough 
"leads" to justify the devotion of specialist resources to its 
investigation. Once the patrol officer has left the scene and 
filed the correct paperwork, the incident is, effectively, no 
longer their concern. 
However, it is not just the growth of organisational 
specialisation which limits the role of the patrol officer, it 
is the manner in which patrol work itself is organised that 
imposes limitations. Patrol officers are only on duty for eight 
hours a day and overtime will only be granted in exceptional 
circumstances. Therefore, a resolution must either be reached 
by the end of the shift or the incident handed over to the 
oncoming officers. Officers are also expected to be "free" to 
deal with other incidents as and when they occur, so they are 
under pressure to complete many incidents quickly. This 
pressure is augnented by the informal understandings between 
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patrol officers and superiors as to the length of time it takes 
for an officer to deal with, what others view as, trivial 
affairs. If an officer exceeds the accepted norm, it will be 
taken either as a sign of incompetence or that they are avoiding 
work by pretending to be still dealing with an incident when 
they are, in fact, uncommitted. 
Although, theoretically at least, patrol officers could, 
and sometimes do, try to postpone their resolution of incidents 
by taking a longer term view of a problem and, for example, 
promising future call backs and further personal investigations, 
the shift systems, the arbitrary designation of assignments, the 
haphazard and unpredictable workload all mitigate against the 
possibility of knowing when one will be able to return, thereby 
encouraging, once-and-for-all, a here-and-now resolution. 
Finally, since the majority of the w rk is not crime 
related as such, it does not have any official place in the 
organisational scheme of accounting. It is hidden from view 
and, therefore, no credit is and, to a large degree, can be 
given for how it was performed since the organisation has no way 
of knowing. In practice, the only organisational interest shown 
is if something should go wrong. What this means is that, as 
long as a patrol officer achieves a here-and-now resolution that 
does not result in a call-back or a complaint and appropriately 
accounts for it in the brief organisational shorthand, that is 
the close of the incident. Lengthy and involved disputes, for 
instance, may involve patient and skilful handling by the 
officer in order to achieve even a temporary resolution enabling 
him to leave the scene reasonably confident that he will not be 
called back but, often, the only organisational record of his 
efforts will be: "Parties seen and advised. " It is in this sense 
that the organisation makes apparent its own set of values, 
priorities and hierarchy of importance and so encourages the 
view that such cork is not 'real police work' and can, thus, be 
accorded fewer resources. 
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With these constraints in mind, it is necessary to turn our 
attention to how patrol officers achieve a resolution of any 
incident. It is possible to break down the component processes 
that must be undergone and the attendant problems that must be 
solved into seven major tasks. First of all, an incident must 
be located. Second, those involved in the incident must 
orientate themselves to the officer's authority. Third, the 
officer has to determine the roles of the various parties. 
Fourth, officers must try and piece together what has happened 
or is happening. Fifth, they must decide what options are 
available to them in order to resolve the incident and what, in 
practice, they are actually going to do in order to achieve this 
resolution. Six, the officer has to terminate his or her 
involvement and then resolve the matter, both fran a 
here-and-now and, finally, a sometime-later perspective. 
Location : Obvious as it may be, officers have to locate an 
incident before they can deal with it. However, locating an 
incident presents officers with two distinct problems with 
regard to their competence. First, if they do not know where a 
particular address is located, and this is often a problem on 
large council estates with their annonymous blocks and grafitti 
covered maps, then, somehow, they will have to find out. 
Whilst, by far the easiest solution is to ask their colleagues 
over the PR or to ask the dispatcher to look it up on the 
station map, they are loathe to do so. All but the newest 
officers are supposed to have a developed local knowledge and to 
have to ask is an indication that one does not. 
The problem of locating an incident is far more troublesome 
when no contact address is given and the information is vague, 
such as with a call to "Youths causing a disturbance on the 
Blandee Estate. " Officers must then attempt to locate the youths 
who could be on any part of the estate. If they cannot be 
found, there are two courses available. The officers can 
request contact with the informant by eliciting an address from 
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the dispatcher or by asking the dispatcher to ring the informant 
and seek further information or they can ask the dispatcher to 
instruct the informant to make themselves known to the police. 
Alternatively, they can merely clear the call with the 
dispatcher with the words, "All clear on arrival - Area searched 
- No trace. " The problem with choosing the second course of 
action rather than seeking out the informant is that the 
informant may call and ask for service again. This would then 
raise questions as to whether the incident had been 
satisfactorily dealt with by the officer in the first instance. 
Or, worse still, the informant my ring to complain that no 
service was delivered. Bearing this in mind, officers normally 
seek out the informant, even if it is just to show their faces 
and to promise future assistance if the need arises. 
Control : Once an incident has been located, officers must 
ensure that the parties orientate themselves to their authority. 
Without this, they cannot effectively deal with the incident. 
Although we have dealt extensively with this topic in Chapter 8, 
it is worth renenbering that the mere act of establishing 
control may result in an arrest which has little bearing on the 
original incident to which the police were called. (See the 
incident on page 74). 
Role Determination: However, assuming that control is 
non-problematic or, at least, does not itself result in an 
arrest, the officer must then determine who is who in an 
incident and attribute a role to each party which orders them 
into police categories, e. g. informant, victim, witness, 
offender, suspect. Although this may seem relatively 
straightforward and, in many cases it is, there are enough 
situations where it is not to make it a problem. Even in the 
generally straightforward instance of a burglary report, it is 
necessary to ascertain whether the informant is actually the 
victim. They may be a neighbour or friend and, if this is not 
discovered from the onset, it will require the same ground to be 
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covered again with the right person. It becomes even more 
complex if the officer has reason to suspect that the informant 
of a burglary is actually the offender, for example, in cases of 
suspected insurance fraud or where people have robbed their own 
gas meters then reported the incident to the police in order to 
"cover themselves". 
The designation of people into the relevant categories 
allows police to select the appropriate strategy for dealing 
with them. This is, perhaps, one reason why 
interpersonal-disputes, particularly "domestics", are 
consistently cited as the most troublesome and disliked calls, 
since both parties are normally alleging a grievance and the 
officer has little "evidence" on which to cast his own judgement 
and select the relevant oppositional role terms, such as 
offender, victim, witness, suspect, and so on which would 
provide him with a set of appropriate actions and treatment for 
each party. 
These problems are compounded when decisions have to be 
made very quickly and on the basis of limited information. For 
instance, 
"The area car is dispatched 
call. We arrive quickly. 
to a "Suspects on Premises" 
The address relates to the 
fourth floor of an apartment block. Alan rushes up the 
first tcsO flights, Paul and I close on his heels. From 
above, the sound of someone helterskeltering down the 
stairs can be heard. A scruffily dressed West Indian man 
in his late twenties hurtles round the corner. Alan tenses 
his body, ready to grab him. The man slows dawn. Alan 
checks himself and hurriedly asks the man if he has called 
the police. The man nods and explains that he thought that 
the sounds of Alan pounding up the stairs may have been the 
suspect returning...... When e left, Alan declared, "Cor, 
that was lucky. I nearly arrested him! ". 
History: The fourth task, which is likely to be emeshed in the 
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third, is to try and ascertain what has happened or is 
happening. Has a burglary taken place? What, if anything, has 
been taken? Who is in dispute with whom? Over what? This 
process can be exceedingly complex and officers attempt to limit 
the information available to them to only that relevant to 
resolving the incident. For instance, consider this account of 
the rather short shrift a woman reporting domestic assault 
received from an officer: 
A call comes over to attend a domestic assault. 
Reluctantly, and after some hesitation, Adam accepts the 
call. We arrive at the scene. Adam rings the door bell. 
A woman in her late twenties answers the door and beckons 
him into the dining-room, a neat and tidy room, if rather 
sparsely furnished. Dawn follows Adam in. The woman sits 
back down in an arm chair, Adam and Dawn stand. Adam asks 
her what happened. In a slow monosyllabic tone, the woman 
relates a complex and incoherent story involving an assault 
by an unknown assailant who, she is alleging, earlier in 
the day, broke into her house, tied her up and beat her. 
Adam listens to the story then points to the bottle of 
valium pills on the mantlepiece and coldly asks the woman: 
"How many of those have you taken today? ". She remains 
silent. "Have you taken any of these this evening? " 
"Yes, after it happened. " 
"Why didn't you ring us then? " 
"I tried but it wouldn't work. " 
Adam leaves the room and tries the phone. 
"It's working now", he says as he returns. 
"So, what happened this time? ", he asks again, not having 
been able to make much sense of the woman's first answer. 
"Sane as before", came the terse reply. "I haven't worked 
for three weeks 'cause of this, but I'm not going to make a 
complaint. " 
"Well, we might as well go then ." 
"Yes", she says flatly. 
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The PC spends a few more minutes trying to gather some mire 
information about the incident. 
"We'll be off then", he finally declares and se leave. 
In this example, the officer has chosen to narrow his focus of 
concerns to a strictly legal interpretation of what has 
occurred. He had decided, fron the outset, that the matter was 
unlikely to involve, what he considered, "real police work". 
Having said this, fron the confused and incoherent story related 
by the woman, it was very difficult to discern what had actually 
happened and whether what had been reported was contemporary or 
historical, fact or fiction. For the officer, the truth value 
of what was being reported was at issue and, to support this 
interpretation, the valium and the fact that the telephone was 
working when the woman had said it was not, joined to give him 
sufficient doubt. The final factor in his decision was that the 
%rxnan said she did not want to make a complaint, thus, in his 
mind, ending any necessity for police involvement. 
Due to the difficulty in evaluating the truthfulness of 
other people's claims, officers are particularly concerned with 
evidence which supports these claims. The smashed window at the 
scene of a burglary, the cut lip of the person alleging assault, 
not only supply added weight to the person's claim, but they 
start to provide a framework which supports appropriate actions 
and resolutions. 
Action: Establishing what has happened is a necessary 
component of deciding what, if anything, an officer can do about 
the incident, and then what it is he or she is actually going to 
do about it. Since discretion is an integral part of the patrol 
officer's job, there is normally a considerable disjunction 
between what the officer is legally allowed to do and what he or 
she discretionally decides to do. Whilst officers may have the 
legal power to arrest and charge, they are equally at liberty to 
warn offenders, threaten them and otherwise trade. For 
instance, in the example cited on page 213, the officer had 
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sufficient grounds for arrest on a charge of Drunk and 
Disorderly. However, he chose to only use the threat of the 
exercise of this power in order to secure a resolution. Had 
canpliance not been achieved, then full legal powers could have 
been mustered. Or, consider the following example: 
At 11 p. m. on a Saturday night, two officers are called to 
a dispute between a resident and sonne "guests" at a small 
social gathering, in the course of which the resident 
provides information which leads to the recovery of some 
stolen property and the identification of one of the 
"guests" as being responsible for the theft. The officers 
do not arrest the thief but arrange for her to be at a 
specific location at 10 o'clock the following horning for 
an "appointment" with the Home Beat. 
In both these examples, the officers' decisions about what they 
can do, and what they actually do, are related. However, it is 
not only the situational features of the incident which are 
being called into play. In the example on page 213, if the 
officer had arrested the youth this would have tied him (and the 
van) up for several hours processing a relatively trivial 
offence and, therefore, preventing him fran dealing with other 
incidents and providing back-up on, what looked as though it 
would be, a very busy shift. In the second example, the "thief" 
was a juvenile, known well to the officer, as was her address. 
To have arrested her would have resulted in either calling her 
parents out (and the officer thought they were unlikely to be 
home) or, alternatively, trying to locate a social worker to be 
present and vouch for her custody. At 11 p. m. on a Saturday 
night, the latter would have been very difficult. Since the 
girl could not be "processed" without the presence of either her 
parents or a social worker, then arresting her would have 
created problems for the station sergeant and may have not 
disposed him favourably towards the arresting officer. 
What can be done and what is actually done are contingent 
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upon legal, situational and occupational criteria. But, quite 
clearly, the officer must also account for organisational 
factors. Thus, if a sergeant considers arrests for Drunk and 
Disorderly as improper use of discretion, preferring more 
informal methods, then the officer must choose whether to employ 
informal means in order to resolve the incident in the 
here-and-now or to risk antagonising the sergeant. 
Alternatively, he could find another charge to which the 
sergeant is more favourably inclined. Similarly, if an officer 
decides that a crime report is warranted at the scene of a 
burglary, then it is he or she who must make certain that they 
gather the relevant information to fill out the required forms 
and, thus, prevent the paperwork "coming back at them". 
Termination: Having decided what is going to be done, the 
officer has to achieve a successful here-and-now withdrawal. 
This may be through arrest, the taking of a report, the promise 
of future assistance, and so on. Whatever the chosen means, 
they must enable the officer to leave the scene. What is 
important to understand is that, although the sometime-later 
resolution chronologically follows the here-and-now resolution, 
more often than not, in terms of police docunentation, it 
proceeds it. That is to say, here-and-now decisions are taken 
in the light of the sometime-later account that will have to be 
produced at the station or, for instance, that the desk sergeant 
is anxious to "tidy up" his message pad before the end of his 
shift. 
Police work is essentially bound up with trouble. The 
police are called to, and expected to deal with, a host of other 
people's troubles. Whether it be the reporting of a sudden 
death, arbitrating between disputants, or the taking of a 
burglary report, trouble is the "bread and butter" of police 
work. However, other people's troubles are not, necessarily, 
policing troubles which are rather different and relate to the 
occupational problems arising from performing patrol work, 
rather than as a direct consequence of the work itself. The 
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concern with trouble, I have argued, underscores the entire 
patrol task. It provides a vocabulary and grammar for ordering 
the police argot which results in, what I have called, the 
"terms of trouble" and it gives rise to a set of culturally 
valued strategies for trouble management and avoidance. 
The concern with trouble creates the conditions under which 
the tensions between isolation and solidarity, autonomy and 
dependency are managed. Further, it allows officers to unpack 
and give meaning to the calls they receive and prioritise them 
in accordance with the relevancies of the occupational culture. 
On the street, it provides a framework for understanding how 
officers exercise power, authority and control and frames the 
various resolutions available to them. It is not that the 
concern with trouble and its avoidance is their only concern, 
it is however, one of the most important. 
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APPENDIX 
Introduction 
Rather than present yet another methodological account in the 
"How I Did It? " tradition, I want to organise this discussion 
around the ethical implications arising from-my fieldurk in the 
police setting. However it is necessary to provide the context 
first of all. 
All the field work for this study was conducted between November 
1983 and December 1984. There were four major blocks of 
fieldwork at three different research sites , two in the 
Metropolitian Police and one in the Surrey Constabulary. Over 
six hundred and twenty hours were spent accompanying 
more than sixty different officers on Patrol. In total, in 
excess of, one hundred days were spent in the field. 
All the different functions of routine patrol were accompanied, 
including general foot patrol, Hare Beat Patrol, and all car and 
van patrols. No restrictions were placed on whom I accompanied, 
as the research progressed at each site, and I got to know names 
and faces, I selected the officers whan I accompanied. 
Access to the three research sites was negotiated through, and 
with the help of, the Police Foundation. Indeed, at the Surrey 
site I carried some work for them, on the understanding that I 
could use any data for my own purposes and that they would help 
facilitate access to the Met. 
It would be nice to say that the research sites were choose for 
analytical criteria it would, however, be untrue. They were 
choosen on the basis that the Police Foundation had built up 
contacts with research minded individuals within the force who 
were prepared to accept my presence. 
More by luck than design, then, the areas in which I worked 
provided a rich contrast. In Surrey the divison, contained a 
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mixture of rural and urban. The town itself has the ethos of an 
affluent county town; a modern a well serviced shopping precint, 
a busy and bustling high street and large detached houses with 
spacious and well tended gardens. Away fron the town centre 
itself there are less salubrious pockets of low rise public 
authority housing. 
The first london research site was a poor inner-city, racially 
mixed division, with a large concentration of public utility 
housing, much of it high rise. It contained all the ingredients 
of inner-city problems: Poor housing; unemployment, particularly 
amongst the West Indian Youth; poverty and a high crime rate. 
The second division, in contrast, was situated in a busy Central 
London shopping and cornmercial area with a small residential 
population swelled, during the day, by shoppers, tourists and 
business people. 
I now ant to move on and consider the n thodologogy of this 
study more closely in the light of the recent debates concerning 
the ethics of fieldwork. 
Ethics 
There are three different responses to the ethical debate on 
fieldwork practice; the legalistic, the antinomian and the 
situational. (Fletcher 1966). 
The legalists, at one extreme, present codes and inviolable 
rules (BSA, 1973; ASA, 1971; Bulmer, 1982), as a solution to the 
problem of ethical decision-making. Fieldwork methods in 
general, and covert observational research in particular, are 
placed under the microscope, dissected and then discarded as 
distasteful. 
At the other extreme, the antinomians (Douglas, 1976; 1979) or 
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conflict methodologists, as Punch has termed them (Punch, 1986), 
reject all such stricture. The pursuit of knowledge, they 
argue, is an end in itself and must not be hampered by ethical 
codes and restrictions which, for the main part, have been 
erected by the powerful to protect themselves rather than the 
weak (Douglas, 1979). 
Between these polarised positions there are an increasing number 
of accounts from practising f ieldworkers which stress the 
complexity of ethical decisions faced by the researcher (Cf: 
Punch, 1986; Holdaway, 1983; Fielding, 1982; van Maanen, 1979). 
Collectively, these reseachers have opted for a situational view 
of ethics. Following Fletcher, they argue that "the 
situationalist enters into every decision making situation fully 
armed with the ethical maxims of his community and its heritage 
and treats them with respect as illuminators of his problem. 
Just the sane as he is prepared in any situation to compromise 
them or set them aside in the situation... " (1966, p. 17) 
The Literature 
I do not want to rehearse the arguments or add to the debate 
over the morality of observational research nor do I wish to 
consider the appropriateness of such a methodology. Instead, I 
want to focus on one issue of relevance to those engaged in 
observational field irk in general and with the police in 
particular. This can be summarised in the form of a single 
question: What should the researcher do when faced with a 
situation of police misconduct? 
This question is not a marginal issue. A cursory examination of 
the literature suggests that occupational deviancy is an 
everyday factor of police life. (Cain, 1971 & 1979; Shearing, 
1981; Punch, 1985; Rubinstein, 1973; PSI vol IV, 1983 ). In 
essence, the police researcher is presented with exactly the 
saure problems as those studying other deviant or criminal groups 
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(Klockars, 1975; Hunpreys, 1970; Patricks, 1973; Rainwater & 
Pittman, 1967). To what extent does the researcher become 
personally involved with de viant activities? To what extent is 
one implicated by mere presence and does one 's presence condone 
such activities? At what point does the researcher feel that 
their subjects' right to anonymity and confidentiality is 
overriden by other claims? 
Although there is now a growing body of observational studies on 
the police, there are few accounts which describe how the 
studies were conducted and, in particular, how the ethical 
problems of the fieldwork were managed. Some studies do not 
dicuss the issue at all (Rubinstien, 1973; Reuss-Ianni, 1983; 
Manning, 1977 & 1980), whilst others mention it merely to note 
its absence (Banton, 1964; Punch, 1979). Banton, for instance, 
writes: "I have not been able to study what happens in 
situations where policemen are subject to strain and provocation 
and can say little about the sorts of incidents that attract 
newspaper publicity. "(1964, p. xii). 
Those who do write about the problem and the personal distress 
undergone by the researcher do not necessarily say how they 
resolved the ethical dilemma (Westley, 1940; Catterton, 1978; 
van Maanen, 1974 & 1977). Hence van Maanen notes: "There were, 
for example, moments during my study when disgust does not begin 
to describe what the police made me feel as I saw people thrown 
through windows, kicked to the ground and dogs put on than, or 
terrified beyond belief by a gun placed to their heads" (1981, 
p491). A few researchers, however, actually discuss both the 
cases and the reasoning behind their decisions (Ericson, 1981 & 
1982; PSI. vol. IV, 1983; Holdaway; 1983) 
There are three reasons why such information is important. 
First, without it, it is impossible to judge to what degree 
authors ace practising self censorship. For instance, has key 
data been "lost", perhaps it was not written up due to the fear 
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of subpeona or the feelings of betrayal it caused? 
Second, unless one knows the constraints under which the 
researchers were operating and the degree of penetration they 
had gained within the organisation, it is difficult to assess 
the reliability of the findings. For instance, if we have a 
field work account which docuunents neither police use of 
violence nor how the field work was carried out, it is 
impossible to decide whether the researcher has been duped and 
systematically excluded from various settings or whether no 
misconduct took place. 
Third, in the absence of honest accounts as to how the fielthork 
was conducted, the novice researcher is continually faced with 
the problem of having to re-invent the wheel. As van Maanen has 
rightly suggested: "The best advice I could offer to a 
researcher just entering a police system would be precisely the 
same were he a recruit: simply keep quiet and to himself 
virtually everything he hears and sees during his early days in 
the field. " (van Maanen, 1978, p 341) Yet there comes a point 
when the early days have passed and, if one is doing one's job 
well, the backstage is made accessible. The researcher may then 
become party to events which pose serious dilemmas, both 
professional and personal. 
In addressing these issues I do not want to fall into the trap 
of offering moral prescription or, conversely, to abandon 
ethical reasoning to the simplistic rhetoric of "Whose side are 
se on? " (Becker, 1963). Rather, I take Punch's argument 
seriously that "ideally, every fieldwDrker should be his or her 
own moralist" (1986, p73) and concur with Holdaway that "in the 
end it is the individual researcher who will make the decision, 
accepting the risks involved. There is much truth in Whyte's 
remark that they will have to live with the decision - and 
continue to do so. " (Holdaway, 1982, p79). 
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The problem with the situationalists' approach, however, is 
that, while codes require that the specifics are reducible to 
generalities, the situationalists run the risk of making every 
situation unique and, therefore, irreducible to any form of 
generality. There is a danger that this will lead to an 
inability to conduct any meaningful debate as to how we should 
ethically proceed with our work. Punch's solution that "we 
should rely on "commonsense .... academic convention and peer 
control through discussion" as these approaches are "more likely 
to promote understanding of the issues and compliance with 
them", (Punch, 1986, p83) does not seem a very satisfactory 
answer. Commonsense is a remarkably elusive concept and, as I 
have stated, academics are by no means in agreement on the key 
issues. Furthermore, given the nature of such research, often 
conducted by lone graduate students, peer control is likely to 
be remote and after the event. In fact, having argued against 
codes and strictures as inappropriate in practice, Punch 
suggests that they are useful in cueing the researcher to the 
potential pitfalls and problems that he or she is likely to 
encounter. It is almost as though bad advice is better that no 
advice. 
In this paper I seek to ground situational ethics on a firmer 
foundation. I shall start with a general discusion as to how I 
constructed an observer-as-participant role in a police setting 
and to go on to focus on three particular issues which bear most 
heavily on ethical decision-making. These can be discussed 
under three headings: informed consent, the invasion of privacy 
and trust and deceit. I then want to consider one specific 
incident which raises the central dilemmas a field-worker might 
face. Finally, I want to consider what choices are available to 
the fieldworker and to suggest how dilemmas can be most 
appropriately resolved. 
The construction of a research role 
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The aim of my research was both to describe and elucidate the 
practice of policing from the perspective of the street level 
officer. Accordingly, my attention was drawn to the 
occupational culture of the lower ranks, the shared values and 
norms that surround their work and the formal and informal work 
practices which, together, constitute the patrol officers' work 
world. Two types of data were viewed as salient. First, 
incidents of naturally occurring inter-officer talk which, in 
comparison with accounts generated for the researcher's benefit, 
say far more about the shared value system of police officers. 
Second, detailed descriptions of how officers handled "live" 
incidents. No notes were written in the field, as it was felt 
that this would be overly intrusive, and create barriers to the 
building up of trust with those I was accompanying. All 
fieldnotes were written up within twenty-four hours of the end 
of each shift. They are, therefore, only as accurate as memory 
and ear allow. 
An observer-as-participant role was chosen as the only practical 
research methodology which would provide the necessary data for 
such an analysis. 
As Becker has written: 
"The participant observer gathers data by participating 
in the daily life of the group or organisation he 
studies. He watches the people he is studying to see 
what situations they ordinarily meet and how they behave 
in them. He enters into conversation with some or all 
of the participants in these situations and discovers 
tizeic interpretations of the events he has observed. 
(Becker, 1970, p25) 
This definition broadly serves to describe 'now I set about 
studying the police. For example, I went out on routine patrol, 
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both on foot and in cars; I sat in the station office and made 
tea for the shift; I helped chase suspects and, at times, arrest 
them; counselled the distraught and administered first aid to 
attempted suicide victims. I have felt a sense of relief when 
we have slipped out of the cold into a warm tea hole and shared 
the fear, humour, and boredom that are part of the everyday 
lives of police officers. 
Yet Becker's definition also tends to obscure the variations 
inherent in the role. Pearsall has pointed out that 
"participant observation" is a master term which covers a 
continuum from complete participant to complete observer 
(Pearsall, 1970, p341). Unlike participant observation of other 
social or occupational groups, there are legal limits defining 
the extent to which one can became a complete participant in the 
police organisation. As van Maanen has noted, this has led to 
most research on the police being carried out from the position 
of the "fan". (Van Mannen, 1979, p 344). This corresponds to 
Pearsall's "participant-as-observer" role. See diagram below. 
Active 
SPY I MEMBER, 
Covert = L' Overt 
ta_; 
VOYEUR FAN 
Passive 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Pure Types of Participant-Observer Role 
(Adapted from Van Maanen, 1978 p344) 
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As I have illustrated on van Maanens typology, my predominant 
research role was also that of the "fan". But there is always 
movement between roles. When I deliberately placed myself in a 
position to overhear private conversations between officers t 
felt like a "voyeur"; when I excused myself to the toilet, 
hurriedly to scribble down notes, I felt like the spy but when I 
was attending incidents on the street, passively listening and 
watching, I was the "fan". However, when I was left guarding a 
prisoner, introduced as a fellow police officer or helping in 
the arrest of a violent and hysterical drug user, I was, f or all 
intents and purposes, cast in the role of a police officer. As 
van Maanen points out short of wearing a sign, "there is no way 
for the field-worker to be sure that his research role in the 
organisation is in fact the role that the others are responding 
to. " (1979,346) 
The ethics of the research role 
In the diagram below I show how the research role that I 
constructed undermined many standard ethical considerations. It 
is to an examination of how and to what extent I broke the rules 
that I now wish to turn. 
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The Degree to which the research ccaplied or 
contravened with standard ethical considerations 
POLICE PUBLIC 
Was the principle I I Theoretically Yes l Generally No 
I of informed I Practically No sometimes Yes 
Iconsent adhered to I I ý 
Were the research I Generally No Generally Yes 
I subjects' right to I I Sometimes Yes 
privacy undermined I II ý 
Were the research I I Generally No Generally Yes 
Isubjects deceived I I Sometimes Yes 
by the researcher 
Informed consent 
Adherence to the principle of informed consent implies that two 
major conditions are met: First, that the research subjects are 
made aware of and understand the nature and purposes of the 
research; second, that, frcxn a position of knowledge, they can 
freely give their consent to participating in the research. 
The explanations which one constructs for one's research are 
always conditional upon the audience which one is addressing. 
This is especially true when carrying out an ethnographic study 
where one has only a vague sense of what one is looking for. I, 
like others, constructed an account of my work which was 
serviceable as the following extract from my field work 
illustrates: 
This has become my standard explanatory patter. "Well, 
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what I'm trying to do is to develop collections of 
different types of incidents such as "street stops", 
"domestics", "fights" etc. then, at some point, I'll 
have to sit down and analyse them. " This often elicits 
the question "Do you write it all up then? " "Yes, I 
tend to spend about as long writing as I do in the 
field. " I stress how arduous this is and that my tutor 
wants to see all my field notes which means that they've 
got to be good to keep him happy. Then I talk about the 
analysis and say, "Perhaps I'll break than down into 
just incident types or, it may be more interesting, say, 
to develop collections of 'hostility', 'resistance' 
etc., regardless of what the incidents are. In this way 
one can start to see the patterns which are merging. " 
Such accounts are not untrue but they are veiled. They 
construct the research role so as to make it understandable and 
acceptable to the subjects. When pressed, the veil becomes more 
transparent. For instance, early on in the research a young 
sergeant joined the table in the canteen where I was having 
dinner. 
...... I felt that I was being 
interrogated and set up to 
make a wrong footing so I could be felled - which nearly 
happened with the next question. 
"What are you going to do if, in your opinion, you see 
the excessive use of force? ". 
"Well, I'll cross that bridge when I cone to it but I'd 
be interested in explaining why it happened". At this 
point Mark came in "You were at the pub fight the other 
night - and a couple of people got hit - did you think 
that that was an excessive use of force? " I could have 
done with out this side quip. (I did think the use of 
force had been excessive). Rather than answer directly 
I taked about how gory it had been when we had Ei rst 
arrived and said that one of the things that struck ri 
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was how arbitrary the arrests had been. "If you gave a 
bit of lip you were liable to be nicked and roughly 
handled ." At this point, much to my relief, the sergeant 
got called away and the conversation broke off. 
This was how I explained the nature of my research to the 
officers with whom I had to work closely. I would also 
constantly reiterate that nothing I saw or heard would be 
reported back to senior officers or colleagues and that I 
granted everyone anonymity. In addition to this, I tried to 
give officers a chance to refuse working with me. For example, 
when I first introduced myself to the reliefs, I would state 
publically, "If any officer does not want me to accompany them 
that's fine. They just have to say. I don't want to accompany 
anybody who doesn't want me along and if you want me to stay out 
of a particular incident just say. " Oddly, this first issue was 
never a problem. Perhaps they all thought like one of my 
informants who stated: 
"As far as I'm concerned when you're with ne you can 
come to anything. I suppose I think, if he's prepared 
to cane to ------ then it's up to him". 
The last issue was, however, more problematic. When sergeants 
assigned me to specific officers it is difficult to know whether 
having me along constituted an order. This is particularly the 
case with probationers who may have felt that to raise an 
objection to my presence would put them in a bad light with 
their sergeants or inspectors. But, as the study progressed, 
this became much less of an issue. People would ask me if I 
wanted to ride with them and, if I was in the canteen when a 
good call came out, would of ten come and find ne to see 
if I 
wanted to attend. 
If the principle of informed consent is 5-0ged in terms of the 
police, it was completely disregarded for the public. I made no 
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attempt to seek the permission of the public with whom I daily 
came in to contact in my role as a researcher. This was a 
purely pragmatic decision. When I arrived at the scene of a 
fight, for instance, to suddenly declare to all those present 
that I was a researcher would have been impossible. However, 
such incidents are the exception rather than the rule and in 
many routine stops, domestic disputes, etc ., it would have been 
possible to state the purpose of my presence. Nevertheless, I 
decided that to do so would be to create problems of "observer 
effect". I thought that people might play up to the presence of 
the researcher or, curse still, might try and get me to act as a 
witness and give testimony against officers in cases of possible 
wrong doing. If this did happen I would be breaking the promise 
of anonymity which I had given to the officers whom I 
accompanied. As a rule, I remained silent about my role and let 
people presume what they wanted. 
However, although I did not declare the nature of my role 
occasionally this was done by police officers. Often they 
would ask me on our first meeting how I would like to be 
introduced and I would reply with my stock formula, "It's 
very much up to you. If you want to say, 'This is Mr. Norris 
fron the University of Surrey engaged in a research 
project. ', that's fine. But, if it's a bit tricky the last 
thing you want is for someone to start playing up to me so 
I'll leave up it to you". In consequence, I have been 
introduced as Special Branch, C. I. D., the Investigating 
Officer, Plain Clothes or simply as a colleague. However, 
in most situations I was not introduced at all. In general, 
the more relaxed and friendly a situation, the more likely 
it was that I would be introduced as a researcher. Whereas, 
in more hostile or tricky ones I might be introduced as a 
police officer. 
Privacy 
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The foregoing raises a number of issues other than those 
relating to infonwNd consent. As Bulmer has written, "To 
insinuate oneself in. () a pa. cticular setting on false 
pretenses in order to gather material for research violates 
the rights of the individual to be let alone, to control his 
personal space and information about himself. " (1982, p219) 
Both by default and design, the public often believed or 
were led to believe that I was a police officer . Under such 
pretences, I entered their houses and witnessed the Trost 
private of scenes; a husband and wife quarrel, a woman 
reporting she had just been raped, or an attempted suicide 
victim semi-conscious and covered in blood. And, in spite 
of the fact that they were providing core data for my 
thesis, they were not granted the right to control 
information about themselves. 
Furthermore, this invasion of privacy extended from the 
public to the police. Although the police were aware of my 
research in the terms that I had constructed for them, I 
became party to private information about people's domestic 
lives, their marital problems, their divorces and so forth. 
Although much of this information was never recorded, 
occasionally it provided useful insight into the nature of 
the job and the constraints of being a police officer. 
Deceit and trust 
The practice of participant observation is, inevitably, 
interactionally deceitful. The researcher has to cultivate 
informants and lessen the distance between themselves and 
those they are studying. In this sense, one's aims are to 
make the research role invisible in the field and 
to 
emphasis similarity at the expense of difference. 
For 
instance, I would dress in the same : Wanner as the 
in-house 
C. I. D. style; grey flannels, blue blazer, white shirt and 
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formal tie. In this way, officers who did not know of my 
research role often took me for another C. I. D. officer. 
But this deception ould move from the accoutrement of my 
projected image to areas nearer to self, especially 
language. As I became familiar with the police argot I 
would use police talk to indicate a sense of shared 
perspective. For example, after I had just started work in 
a different station for purposes of comparison: 
Other PCs had joined the table and gradually the 
conversation turned into a joint interview - the whole 
relief interviewing me. "Has your opinion changed since 
you've been doing this job? You've been in you must 
have seen a lot there. " 
"Yeah, I used to think that you were a bunch of fascist 
pigs! " I quipped light heartedly. 
"We are", he replied with a smile. 
"Oh I know that - you know the only time I'd ever come 
in to contact with the police before starting this was 
being stopped on the way home-, late at night. I thought 
you were a pain but nothing else really. I used to 
think, probably from watching too many Arrerican Cop 
shows, that it was all crime stuff. But it's not like 
that is it? You know, all the 'rubbish', 'domestics', 
'process' - that changed my opinion. " 
"Do you see our side now, see us as people? What do you 
say when people ask you what you think of us? " 
"I tell them about the work, what it's like - you know, 
you go into a situation with bottles [lying -a pub 
fight. It's rough and tough in somewhere like . 
Perhaps the police go in a bit strong but then, I think, 
what would I do? If you've got to deal with it quickly 
you just get people out and ask questions later". 
This sort of question and answer gaTe went on for about 
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twenty minutes. "Has this changed you? I was listening 
to you and you sound just like a policeman, using all 
the words. " intervened one of the older PCs. 
"Yeah, my friends say that, 'You're getting more and 
more like a policeman every day' - I've got more 
cynical". 
This strategy certainly seemed to pay off. Generally, 
my face is now known and, in specific term, as I walked 
into the front office later that evening, a PC came up 
to me immediately and said, "If Andy's not going out for 
a bit why don't you come and see how the front desk 
works? " Two nights later I was invited to a goodbye 
drink for one of WPCs who was leaving the relief. It 
was held in the station, at 4am, when everyone should 
have been on duty. 
As Punch has rightly questioned (1986 p72) "... if the latent aim 
of the field worker is to create trust then what is the aim of 
that trust? " The concept of trust implies mutuality of interest 
and an equality of dependancy. To a major degree, this is 
inherently absent in the fieldworker role and, therefore has to 
be manufactured. In the police setting this is even more 
apparent since, as many con ientators have noted, police officers 
are very reluctant to share information with each other, let 
alone outsiders (Ericson, 1982; Chibnal, 1977; Bittner, 1970; 
Rubinstein, 1973; Manning, 1977 & 1980). 
However, the manufacture of trust requires getting one's hands 
dirty since it is not something that can be promised with 
declarations of confidentiality and anonymity. These are 
distant and far-off concepts. Trust in the police world is more 
coamion-place and mundane. Trust is about keeping your mouth 
shut when others are being called to account. It is about not 
letting slip in front of senior officers that you were not where 
you were supoosed to be. Trust is an action, often marked by 
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absence rather than presence. As such, it involves , not doing" 
rather than "doing". It is gained and earned, shown in the 
day-to-day realities of the police world and, as such, it cannot 
be promised. It has to be displayed and, only after it has been 
seen to exist, will it be assumed. Until then all promises are 
empty. 
Nonetheless, there were times when the dependance was mutual and 
such mutuality created a bond of personal friendship and 
loyality which did not fit easily into the general notions of 
professional ethics. 
An officer asked me to indicate to him when the road was 
clear so he could pull out onto a particularly busy 
road. I made a mistake and the consequence was that the 
police van collided with an oncoming car. Thankfully 
the driver was Xll disposed to the police and 
unconcerned with the damage to his company car which, 
although quite serious was hardly noticable. The matter 
was effectively forgotten. However, in so doing, the 
officer was guilty of co mitting two offences: failure 
to report damage to a police vehicle and, more 
importantly, failure to report an accident. Had he 
reported the accident, I would have felt obliged to have 
taken a major proportion of the blame which could have, 
undoubtedly, threatened my continuing research role. By 
staying silent he was protecting ne and laying himself 
open to more serious charges. 
Like policework, fieldwork is not a polite occupation. I promised 
people anonymity, put officers at their ease with all the interactional 
devices at my command and let them }avow that I understood that police 
work was not always performed according to the rules and that I wanted 
to see how it was really done. In both word and deed I indicated that 
I could be trusted not to report back misconduct that I witnessed to 
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senior officers or to their peers. Having done all this, I 
undoubtedly got what I deserved -a case of ' I've made my own 
bed now I've got to lie in it. ' 
The Dileimia 
I want to illustate some of the possible consequences and 
dileirrnas a researcher may face once intimate access has been 
obtained. I refer the reader here to the incident reported on 
page 122ff of the thesis. 
For me, this incident posed, in very explicit terms, a 
serious dilemma. To what extent did my duty as a citizen 
override my duty as a researcher? Here we had an individual, 
who had been the recipient of the gross misuse of force and, 
rather than being compensated for such, was liable to bear the 
brunt of his own misfortune by having false charges laid against 
him. True, he was not blameless. However, if it should reach 
court, he would be liable to receive a heavier penalty and 
perhaps go to prison on the basis of false evidence. 
The solution 
Perhaps the most accurate account of how I decided to deal with 
this incident comes fran ny field log the following day. 
I was apprehensive about going in tonight. Last night's 
events have left me confused and a little paranoid. 
Fear, violence, emotion, disgust have all mingled.... 
When the two prisoners went beserk I felt the rush of 
adrenaline, smelt fear and then anger and sensed the 
inevitability of the events that followed. I felt 
frightened by the thought that I had witnessed what I 
should not have seen. Would I be called to account? 
What would I say? Would I now be frozen out as 
being 
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potentially too dangerous to have around anymore? How 
much did they think I could be relied on not to spill 
the beans? - Whose side was I on? 
Such thoughts went through my mind as I boarded my bus - 
Was it wise to go in at all? In fact, I let two buses 
go past. But I had decided that the most important 
thing was to be seen, to be part of the process, to be 
in view, to be one of them, to be normal and go to werk 
and carry on as though nothing had happened. If such a 
ploy were sucessful then, hopefully, it would facilitate 
an even greater depth to my access. I would have 
demonstrated that I could be trusted. 
My immrediate reponse, although recognising the dilenma, was to 
opt for the solution of "business as usual". However, on 
reflection, it seems to me that I was faced with two distinct 
decisions: 
What I should do in the short term: 
- unofficially report their actions to a senior officer 
- officially lodge a complaint 
- go for the expose mode, publishing quickly and 
damningly 
- abandon the study 
And in the long term: 
- neither write up nor publish 
- write it up and use the data like any other, 
in 
other words, to publish normally 
The long and the short term solutions are heavily 
dependant on 
each other as are the consquences that flow from each. 
It is to 
an examination of these consequences that I now turn. 
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The consequences 
A serious problem in making a decision arose from the Eact that 
I had no guidance as to how to do so. The literature, as I have 
already noted, offered little advice. If the literature was not 
much help neither were my professional colleagues (in whom punch 
places so much faith). In the months that followed I discussed 
this incident with over half a dozen senior British and American 
police researchers (to whom I grant the same anonymity as to my 
research subjects). I received the following advice. 
I should: 
- have immediately reported the action to a higher 
ranking authority 
- have lodged an offical complaint 
- have done nothing but, if called to a discipline 
hearing, lie on behalf of my police contacts and 
therefore establish greater legitimacy in their eyes 
- refrain from publishing such material as it is 
"unhelpful" 
- have reminded all those involved at the incident that 
a researcher was present and thus allowed them the 
chance to alter their behaviour in that light 
Although I have my quibbles with these reponses each one has 
some merit. However, this advice was given with the benefit of 
hindsight and fron the luxury of not being personally 
compromised. Futhernere, it is clearly contradictory and this 
seems to encapsulate the dilemma - if I satisfied one ethical 
maxim I was guilty of abandoning another. 
The complexity of this balancing act can be conceived as arising 
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from the contradictory binds ensnaring the researcher. In any 
research relationship a matrix can be drawn which illustrates 
these competing pressures. (See Ethics Matrix One above. ) 
The horizontal axis indicates those factors which should be 
considered when making a decision. On the vertical axis are the 
six major alternatives with which I was faced. Reading from 
left to right, it is possible to see the consequences of a 
particular choice with regard to the major ethical 
considerations. What wieght is given to the various factors 
is always situationally contingent upon the researcher own 
research bargains and their personal evaluation of each factor. 
The matrix cannot, therefore be filled in in advance of the 
study. 
In my own case I have indicated the effects of various types of 
action on the research bargains I made at the time of the study. 
I have included a tally at the end which, at a glance, lists the 
overall consequence of a course of action. The more "NO's" 
there are, the fewer canons broken. This is not to suggest that 
each consideration has equal weight. Only the individual 
researcher can decide that. The Ethics Matrix below has been 
completed to reflect how, given my research role, I weighted 
various courses of action. Others, of course, may fill it in 
differently. What becomes immediately apparent is that, in my 
case, certain courses of action would have had quantitatively 
more negative effects than others. 
Broadly speaking, the most negative actions would be the 
official or unofficial reporting of the officers and the expose 
mode. Both lay me open to charges from all quarters about the 
nature of the research role. Informed consent, anonymity and 
protecting my research subjects are all sacrificed. My public 
conscience may have been satisfied but the contract with 
the 
researched has been competely abandoned. 
By not writing up or publishing, my research subjects are given 
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the highest protection. However, I am fullfilling neither my 
responsibility to present undistorted findings nor my public 
conscience. 
Similarly, abandoning the study protects the research subjects 
but leaves public conscience and my duty to my sponsers 
unsatisfied and is, essentially, self censorship. 
The decision I most favour is to publish normally. This means, 
in the short term, one does not report the actions and, 
therefore, leaves public conscience unsatisfied but breaks no 
research agreements and is true to the aims of the original 
enterprise. 
Conclusion 
As I have argued, f ieldwork methods can, and do, lead the 
researcher in to a quagmire of ethical considerations. 
Inevitably one is faced with contradictory and competing choices 
and it is impossible to satisfy them all. However, whilst 
acknowledging each situation as different and that individual 
conscience has its own parameters, there are some issues that 
have to be faced by all field %orkers. The purpose of the 
Ethics Matrix is to make those issues apparent and to act as a 
heuristic device in revealing the complex ra. snif ications of any 
chosen course. If, by utilising such a device, we escape from 
simplistic solutions and trite codes, so much the better. We 
may never be able to agree on what constitutes the right 
decision in a particular case but we can insist that researchers 
consider the consequences of their actions and are publically 
prepared to defend their own choice. 
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